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Summary 
 
Today microfinance has become a familiar term that many associate with financially 
sustainable poverty reduction. Others, on the other hand, argue that it make poor people‘s 
lives even more rigid by making them slaves of debt. Seeing that no country in the world has 
more clients associated with its microfinance sector than India, there is a need for examining 
the quality of the growth in the Indian microfinance movement. What lead me to focus on the 
quality of the sector‘s outreach is that the sector now counts more clients than there are poor 
households in the country. If providers of microfinance truly direct their services toward the 
poor the dependence on informal sources of credit could be expected to have declined, and the 
―Report of the Committee on Financial Inclusion‖ (2008) should not have documented that 
exclusion from formal financial services in general is large, and that the poorer the group, the 
greater is the exclusion. The aim of this thesis is to challenge the argued outreach by 
considering the quality of it.  
The paper accounts for why microfinance in India is needed, how the microfinance 
approaches aim to reach the people that traditionally are excluded from formal financial 
services, and it explores strengths and weaknesses in banking poor through the microfinance 
approaches. The thesis will discuss the group lending approach, the relationship between the 
size of microloans and the impact it has on the lives of poor persons, the problems associated 
with low quality self help groups, and it takes a closer look at the competition that is going on 
between the providers of microfinance and the effects this competition might cause. The 
reason why I use the word ‗might‘ is because even though my informants expressed to 
witness the effects documented in this thesis, their statements alone does not allow me to 
argue that the effects are universal trends applying to the sector as a whole. However, the 
concerns raised in this thesis are in my view worrisome developments (though to greater or 
lesser extent), and I believe that it needs to be raised awareness of them. The concerns raised 
by my informants also led me addressed the Andhra Pradesh Ordinance. The ordinance came 
be in order to regulate the microfinance institutions as some of them allegedly charge 
extortive interest rates and redeem loans through coercive methods which cause poor clients 
to commit suicides. This thesis suggests that the ordinance might be a blessing in disguise 
more than it is an actual blessing for the sector. 
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1 
Microfinance in India:  
Challenging the outreach be considering its quality 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Today microfinance has become a familiar term that many associate with financially 
sustainable poverty reduction. Some say that microfinance organisations are engineering a 
social revolution, others refer to the phenomenon as a social movement ―which is likely to 
mark an important turning point in human history‖ (Fernando, 2006a, p. 2). The year 2005 
was proclaimed the International Year of Micro-Credit by the UN, and the Nobel Peace Prize 
was in 2006 bestowed to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank ―for their efforts to create 
economic and social development from below‖ (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006 
[online]). However, some scholars, amongst others Jude L. Fernando, insist that the field has 
remained ―somewhat insulated from critical scholarly inquiry and the few existing critical 
analyses have not been politically popular within academic and policy circles‖ (Fernando, 
2006a, p. 3).  
The popularity of microfinance has not passed India by. After adjusting for overlaps 
the country hosts about 70 million clients of microfinance that are being reached through the 
two approaches; the Self Help Group-Bank Linkage Programme (SBLP) and the 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 2).
1
  The SBLP alone has become the 
largest in the world in terms of outreach (Kelkar, 2008, p. 24 [online]), and the two 
approaches together thus show extraordinary outreach. Seeing that no country in the world 
has more clients associated with its microfinance sector, there is a need for examining the 
quality of the growth in the Indian microfinance movement.  
My hypothesis is that the argued outreach of microfinance is overestimated because 
the sector, or at least parts of it, is characterised by a ‗touch and go‘ approach. By ‗outreach‘ I 
mean not only in terms of mere numbers, I also aim to explore the quality of the financial 
inclusion that is being realised through microfinance.
2
 My main aim in this thesis will be to 
                                                 
1
 Both these approaches will be properly introduced and addressed at length in chapter five named: ‗What shape 
has the microfinance movement in India taken, and how does it aim to correct for the market failures in the 
formal economy?‘ 
2
 Financial inclusion is in this text defined as the process of ensuring access to timely and adequate financial 
services to all the needy sections of the country‘s population at an affordable price. These sections are often 
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challenge the impressive outreach by examining the quality of it. By ‗touch and go‘ I mean 
that a provider of microfinance aim at spreading its services to as many as it can, as fast as it 
can, in the most cost-efficient manner achievable. This is not a bad thing in itself. However, if 
the provider avoids going to the most remote, hard to reach, low population density areas 
(reaching out to the people that are the furthest away from already established formal 
financial access points), or the provider, after forming the most cooperative and interested low 
risk villagers into groups move on to new areas in which client acquisitions is easily 
obtainable, the quality of the outreach might be less than desirable. When an 
organisation/institution chose ‗touch and go‘ growth instead of going more ‗in depth‘ in the 
area in which it operates, microfinance cease to function as an effective tool through which all 
deserving financially excluded poor might experience economic development, and the 
microfinance movement will no longer live up to its full potential in terms of creating socio 
economic development. ‗In depth‘ connotes that the provider will focus on all of the residents 
in an area, not ignoring the potential beneficiaries that might need more persuading before 
accepting a loan, or who fear the idea of formal finance and will miss out on the possible 
benefits, financial as well as non-financial, unless the provider takes the time to inform and 
coach them. In areas in which the ‗touch‘ is easily obtained, it also tends to be more focused 
on. This might lead to situations in which competition among the practitioners becomes too 
harsh. This thesis therefore also aims to examine how the competition among practitioners 
affect the quality of the services they  provide, at whom they direct their services, how many 
times each client can access a microloan, and how it affects the sustainability of the providers. 
We will now move on to explore the outreach of the approaches, the SBLP and the 
MFIs. The discrepancy we will discover between the number of poor households in the 
country and the number of financially excluded rural Indians and the number of clients 
reportedly having access microfinance is what makes up the rational for why the quality of 
the outreach should be examined. The chapter ends in an outline of the thesis, i.e. the way in 
which I have chosen to address the inconsistency. 
 
1.2 The outreach of the sector 
In the following paragraphs I will introduce quite a lot of numbers which I understand might 
easily become mixed up, that is not too important. What I want you to be left with after 
                                                                                                                                                        
weaker groups and low income groups as they are the ones who are most often denied access to formal financial 
services.    
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reading them though, is a sense of how many people that are expressed to be in need of 
microfinance (some form of understanding of the argued demand), relative to the reported 
outreach of the sector (the supply of microfinance).  
In early 2001, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) 
forecasted that about one million self-help groups (SHGs) would be taking loans from banks, 
with a total membership of about 17 million people by 2008 (Harper, 2002, p. 177). In 2002 
Harper wrote: ―If the NABARD and SFMC [Small industries development bank of India‘s 
Foundation for Micro Credit] forecasts are fulfilled, and if the present growth in the numbers 
of poor people does not accelerate, over a quarter of poorer Indian households will, by 2009, 
have access to formal financial services‖ (2002, p. 177-178).3 Chankova et al. argues that: 
―[W]ith 75 million poor households potentially requiring financial services, the microfinance 
market in India is among the largest in the world. Estimates of household credit demand vary 
from a minimum of Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 6,000 in rural areas and Rs. 9,000 in urban settings. 
Given that 80 percent of poor households are located in rural areas, total credit demand ranges 
between Rs. 255 billion and Rs. 500 billion‖ (Chankova et.al, date is lacking but they refer to 
numbers from March 2003, p. 7). 
Today, relying on numbers from Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report 2009,
4
 
we see that NABARDs forecast has been fulfilled by and large. ―The outstanding SHG loan 
accounts were 4.14 million, representing an estimated membership of 54 million. … The 
MFIs reported a total client base of 22.6 million as at the end of March 2009‖ (Srinivasan, 
2009, p. 2).
5
 This amount to that overall coverage of the sector (narrowly defined as 
outstanding accounts of members of SHGs and clients of MFIs) now has reached 76.6 million 
people.
6
 Because the outreach of clients reported by banks and MFIs might in some cases 
                                                 
3
 Harper based this assumption on that about 40 per cent of the population, about 400 million people, or some 80 
million households lives in poverty, and that it is unusual for more than one member of a household to be in an 
SHG. 
4
 The Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report (2008, 2009 and 2010) will merely be referred to as the 
State of the Sector Report (2008, 2009, 2010) throughout the thesis as that is the name it is known by, and 
because I attended a roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010 during one of my fieldworks. N. 
Srinivasan, the author of all three reports, points out that the numbers should be seen as approximate indicators 
of trends, and be evaluated in a comparative sense rather than in an absolute sense in the State of the Sector 
Report 2008 (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 2). I point this out as this is likely to be relevant for the succeeding reports as 
well; though it is not specified in the 2009 report (the report for 2010 has not yet been released). 
5
 ‗Outstanding debt‘ is defined as that portion of a debt which remains unpaid (McCracken, 2005, [online]). In 
the same way is an ‗outstanding loan‘ referring to a loan which has not yet been repaid and ‗outstanding loan 
balance‘ to the portion of the principal that has not been repaid. 
6
 ―The broadly defined microfinance sector, including small accounts of commercial banks, small and vulnerable 
borrowing members of Primary Agricultural Societies, SHG members and MFI customers, had more than 135 
million clients by the end March 2008 … The number of accounts is more than double the number of poor 
households at 61.4 million‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 3). 
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overlap, some adjustments to the number are made by N. Srinivasan who argues that the net 
client base of the microfinance sector is likely to be about 70 million people (2009, p. 2).
7
 The 
State of the Sector Report 2009 further documents that the outstanding loans in the books of 
banks against SHG has reached Rs. 241.96 billion by March 2009, while the outstanding 
loans of MFIs were 117.34 billion in 2008-2009 (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 2). The total amount of 
outstanding loans thereby amounted to 358.30 billion in 2009.  
 According to RBI‘s Priority sector finance Guidelines, available at the RBI webpage, 
providing microfinance as a category of priority sector lending goes as follows: 
 
(iv) Micro Credit: Provision of credit and other financial services and products of very small amounts 
not exceeding Rs. 50,000 per borrower to the poor, either directly or indirectly through a SHG/JLG 
mechanism or any intermediary (including NBFC/NGO/MFI), or to an NBFC/NGO engaged in 
provision of credit to the poor up to Rs. 50,000 per borrower will constitute micro credit. The poor for 
this purpose, shall include persons below the poverty line in the respective areas [sic] (Reserve Bank of 
India, 2007, [online]). 
 
Now, here is where things get interesting. The 61
st
 round of National Sample Survey 
Organisation‘s (NSSO) survey estimated that 27.5 per cent of India‘s population is poor 
(Srinivasan, 2008, p. 1).
8
 Because of the gap I have come across with reference to how many 
households actually living in poverty in India,
9
 I have chosen to make my own calculations 
using estimates based on the national poverty line from 2009 and keeping to the commonly 
used average of five members in a household. According to my calculations about 317 720 
                                                 
7
 ―While it is difficult to accurately determine the overlaps, the overall number of clients has been reduced by 10 
per cent. This would be equivalent to nearly 33 per cent of clients reported by MFIs and 13 per cent of clients 
under SHG linkage‖ (Srinivasan, 2009:21).  
8
 The number is based on the aggregated national poverty line, which rather strongly differ from the number 
provided by the World Bank. According to the World Bank webpage 41.6 per cent of the population lived on 
less than $1.25 per day (PPP) in 2005 (World Bank, 2010a, [online]). PPP stands for Purchasing Power Parity. 
To explain PPP I have chosen to refer to Ray’s Development Economics, he writes: ―Briefly, international prices 
are constructed for an enormous basket of goods and services by averaging the prices (expresses, say, in dollars) 
for each such good and service over all different countries. National income for a country is then estimated by 
valuing its outputs at these international prices. In this way, what is maintained, in some average sense, is parity 
in the purchasing power among different countries‖ (Ray, 1998, p. 15, (the author‘s emphasis)). As most of my 
data is collected from reports and literature produced by Indian agents, I will refer to numbers based on the 
national poverty line unless I specify otherwise. I will nevertheless ask you to mark the gap between the 
national- and the World Bank- poverty estimates, as the data I will provide in this thesis might very well 
represent an underestimation. 
9
 Harper reports some 80 million households to be poor (Harper, 2002:177); Basu and Srivastava‘s data results in 
the finding of 92 million poor households. They report that 460 million people were poor in 2003 based on the 
international poverty line of $/day, and by dividing this number with 5 (the commonly used average of 
household members) we end up with 92 000 000 people (Basu and Srivastava, 2005, p. 12); While N. 
Srinivasan, the person who provides the most recent data in the State of the Sector Report 2009, merely reports 
61.4 million households living in poverty in 2009. But he does not give a reference as to where or how he found 
the number (Srinivasan, 2009:3). 
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611 people in India are poor,
10
  and 317 720 611 people divided by 5 in each household 
equals to about 63.5 million poor households in the country (317720611/5=63 544 122). If we 
compare the number of poor households to the argued outreach of the two approaches, the 
MFIs and the SBLP (given that my calculations can be justified, and we, as Harper does, 
suppose that it is unusual for more than one member of each household to be in a SHG, that 
the argued outreach of the microfinance sector is correct and that the services are directed at 
the poor), the situation should be that all poor households in the country have access to formal 
financial services through the microfinance movement alone, and that the approaches 
additionally provide about 5-10 million non-poor with financial services. This claim does not 
agree with the NSSO (National Sample Survey Organisation) data that is presented in the 
―Report of the Committee on Financial Inclusion‖ (2008) available at NABARD‘s webpage: 
 
[D]espite the vast network of bank branches, only 27% of total farm households are indebted to formal 
sources (of which one-third also borrow from informal sources). Farm households not accessing credit 
from formal sources as a proportion to total farm households is especially high at 95.91%, 81.26% and 
77.59% in the North Eastern, Eastern and Central Regions respectively. Thus, apart from the fact that 
exclusion in general is large, it also varies widely across regions, social groups and asset holdings. The 
poorer the group, the greater is the exclusion (C. Rangarajan, 2008, p. i, [online]).
11
  
 
Due to the mismatch between the argued outreach (and thereby financial inclusion) reported 
by providers of microfinance, and the relatively high levels of poverty and financial exclusion 
that is documented in rural areas, I will argue that there is a need for further examining the 
quality of the outreach of the microfinance sector.
12
 What constitutes being financially 
included; is a person included if he has a bank account in his name? Does the group lending 
approach correct for the market failures in the formal economy which excluded poor people 
prior to microfinance? Has competition in the sector become too harsh and affects the quality 
of the financial inclusion? Is it the poor that are being reached through this tool for poverty 
                                                 
10
 To calculate the number of poor Indians I have had to rely on approximate numbers. A National Population 
Register (NPR) is expected to be realised during the year 2011, the population census 2011 will be conducted in 
two phases- house listing operations and population enumeration, the latter is expected to take place in February-
March 2011 (Indian Express, 2010, [online]). Until this is realised I decided to rely on the number reported by 
the World Bank which states that the population now counts 1 155 347 678 people (World Bank, 2010b, 
[online]).  
To come to the conclusion that approximately 317 720 611 Indians are poor I made the following calculation: 
1 155 347 678 (the total population) * 0.275 (percentage of poor) = 317 720 611 poor people in India. 
I wish to point out nonetheless, that it is not uncommon for an Indian rural household to count more than five 
members. This might affect the number of households negatively, i.e. the greater the number of estimated poor 
that are living within the same household, the lower the number of total households will be.   
11
 The page numbers in this article begin on page 11, all pages prior to this is referred to by me as pages i-xi so 
that it will be easier to trace where I have extracted the information from. 
12
 Throughout this thesis the focus will be on the financial inclusion of rural residents. 
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alleviation? These are questions that will be addressed in this thesis, and they will be 
answered as we conclude whether or not the outreach of the Indian microfinance sector is 
overestimated.   
This thesis does not wish to argue that the microfinance movement in India has failed, 
by no means. There is much evidence suggesting that a lot of people have been able to 
improve their realities after engaging in microfinance, and I personally believe that 
microfinance has the property to lift peoples self esteem, to help some become financially 
independent entrepreneurs, to improve nutrition in a household, to raise decision making 
power among the oppressed and to help people break free of bonded labour through debt 
swap schemes, among other such positive outcomes.
13
 The examples of good 
organisations/institutions, policies and clients are many, but the aim of this thesis is to 
examine the mismatch between the argued outreach of the sector and the number of 
financially excluded rural poor in the country. As most of the trends that we will explore 
derive from unfortunate practices and/or attitudes among providers, recipients and policy 
makers, please keep in mind that my seemingly critical and some time even negative tone is 
not representative for my attitude towards the sector as a whole. 
 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is made up by two main parts. Following this chapter will be a few pages 
presenting how I came about the data that will be discussed in this thesis, and thereafter our 
focus will turn to why microfinance is needed in India (which will constitute part one). This 
                                                 
13
 I know form talking with clients and practitioners during my fieldworks (this note is purely based on 
experiences I made during the fieldworks which will be properly introduced in the next chapter ‗Methodology: 
Doing fieldwork in India- Reflections and lessons learned‘) that formerly financial excluded poor people have 
gained access to the same banking services, pension schemes, types of insurance and so on as riches people have 
access to through the microfinance movement in the country. During my stay in Jaipur I learnt that, among other 
great examples, the organisation Aaina has helped raised the awareness of, and changed attitudes towards, 
people with disabilities. And that Aaina has formed a number of groups made up by disabled persons who now 
have become productive members of the community. That access to microfinance for housing, water and 
sanitation through the organisation ‗Habitat for Humanity India‘ has contributed to improve the life quality for 
many in terms of hygiene and health, as well as reduced the work load for some household members which has 
resulted in children being able to attend school more frequently and women becoming more efficient when 
performing household chores. In Uttarakhand I learned how being part of a group have contributed to raise the 
voices and decision making power of poor oppressed women both in the household as well as in the community 
(they were, among other things, able to stop an abusing husband from making and selling alcohol), and how self 
help groups organising into federations have managed to push through, for example, that the government was to 
build a school in the locality. The federations were furthermore large enough to affect the outcome (local) 
elections, while being strong enough to resist political hijacking. In Kaleshwar, with the organisation HARC, I 
saw an example of poor clients running a prosperous business which marketed and sold produce not only in the 
locality but also in markets quite a bit away from the village. And I believe that the rickshaw pullers in Jaipur, 
paying 20 Rupees a day in order to lease it, would not have been the proud owners of their own rickshaw within 
a year had it not been for the ‗Apna Rickshaw Apne Naam‘ programme of Kuhad Trust. 
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part (chapter 3-4) relies to some extent on basic economic theory as it explores terms that we 
need to be familiar with in order to examine how the microfinance approaches can, and do, 
reach people who used to be excluded from formal financial services. The second part 
(chapters 5-9) is mostly based on the two fieldworks I have conducted. The focus of this part 
will be to challenge the argued outreach by putting the theory into practice, and by examining 
the quality of the microfinance sector‘s financial inclusion.  
More concretely the next chapter, ‗Methodology‘, will be an introduction to the 
fieldworks I undertook in connection with this thesis, and the reflections I have done in this 
respect. In chapter three we will explore some basic economic theory which will explain why 
formal credit tends to flow toward the richer members of a community instead of to the poor. 
The calculations and the terms we explore in this chapter will serve as background 
information for the rest of the thesis, and the findings will furthermore be the point of 
departure for exploring India‘s formal financial sector in regards to rural credit delivery, and 
India‘s informal credit scene, both of which will be the topic of the following chapter, chapter 
four.  
 The first chapter in part two, chapter five, addresses the history of microfinance, the 
two approaches through with microfinance is provided in India and how the workings of 
microfinance is expected to correct for the inefficiencies that excluded poor from formal 
financial services prior to microfinance. Chapter six discuss the relation between the size of a 
microloan and the impact it has on the lives of poor persons. Chapter seven sets out to 
examine the quality
14
 of self help groups, and chapter eight takes a closer look at the 
competition that is going on between the providers of microfinance and the effects this 
competition have shown to generate. Ending off this thesis we will answer the four questions 
posted above; does the group lending approach correct for the market failures in the formal 
economy which excluded poor people prior to microfinance? and so on, because these 
questions all say something about the quality of the sector‘s outreach and will thereby enable 
us to determine whether or not the outreach of the sector is overestimated. 
                                                 
14
 With the word quality in groups I refer to a strong saving and repayment discipline among the group members. 
This is properly defined in the respective chapter, but in short the quality of a group contributes to determine its 
sustainability, the potential empowerment of the members, and to reveal how well it will function as social 
collateral in terms of covering for members finding themselves in trouble of repaying a loan. 
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2 
Methodology: doing fieldwork in India-  
reflections and lessons learned 
I conducted two fieldtrips to India in connection with this thesis. The first lasted from July 
2009 to December 2009. This was not one continuous fieldwork, but during these five and a 
half months I conducted several interviews with leading scholars and practitioners of 
microfinance, I spent four days with the NGO HARC in Uttarakhand (September 24-27), and 
I went to Dehradun to visit HARC‘s main office (November 21-23). The second fieldwork 
was conducted in Jaipur (June 23-25, 2010) where I attended a three days Annual Forum on 
Microfinance organised by Solution Exchange, United Nations. During these fieldtrips I 
mostly interacted with scholars, practitioners and policymakers, but both in Uttarakhand and 
during the Annual Forum I also got the opportunity to discuss with, and learn from, some 
SHG members.  
In order to present how I came across the data I rely on in this thesis and the lessons I 
learned on the way, I have chosen to present the fieldworks through a ‗road travelled 
approach‘. By a narrative of my fieldtrips I believe I can be truer in my descriptions of the 
processes through which I gathered data than what a schematic presentation would allow me 
to be. Furthermore a narrative allows me to address lessons learned as I learnt them. Ending 
of this chapter I have addressed some additional reflections around my fieldwork, the roles I 
had in the field and the quality of the data I was able to collect. 
 
2.1 Background 
Basu and Srivastava argue that: ―By far the most successful model of microfinance in India, 
in terms of scale and outreach, is SHG Bank Linkage, with other models, such as the 
‗Grameen-type‘ independent microfinance institutions, lagging far behind‖ (Basu and 
Srivastava, 2005, p. 11). This statement was the foundation for my initial research question; 
why has the much acknowledged MFI/‘Grameen model‘ been so slow in getting a foothold in 
India compared to the locally tailored self help group-bank linkage model (SBLP)?  
Before leaving Norway I read up on some of the newest publication concerned with 
microfinance and freshened up on what I believed to be a somewhat adequate knowledge of 
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Hindi,
15
 but I decided not to plan the stay in India as I had little idea about who to approach in 
order to establish a network of informants or where I would conduct the fieldwork. What I 
knew was that my main base would be an apartment in Delhi which I would to share with two 
fellow students, the rest I left up to fate. As I have travelled in India prior to this, and my 
experiences have been that India is a place where networking is easy, I did not think that poor 
planning would be a problem, rather I believed it to be a smart choice that would enable me to 
establish more and diverse contacts and thereby expand my knowledge of all aspect of the 
sector. 
 
2.2 Landing on a research question 
The first issue on the agenda after landing in Delhi was to establish contact with practitioners 
and scholars that could provide me with the insight I sought, as well as to find an NGO 
willing to include me in their work. I started out by sending e-mails to organisations operating 
in and around Delhi, and I exchanged telephone numbers with everybody that expressed an 
interest in my study. After having spent a month or so without getting in touch with people 
actually engaged in microfinance (which I now blame my poor preparations for), the girls I 
lived with and I met up with our teacher from the University of Oslo, Professor Zoller, who 
had come to Delhi. He introduced us to a friend of him, Mr. Gabar Singh Chauhan working at 
the South Asian Institute in New Delhi.  
Mr. Chauhan put me in contact with a couple of scholars who agreed to meet with me. 
Initially I prepared for these meetings by reading up on the scholars‘ work and by preparing a 
tailored questionnaire that I thought would provide answers as to why the SBLP had become 
so popular in India. The end result was the same for each and every one of the first four 
interviews I conducted; the informants seldom found my questions relevant to their field of 
expertise. Even though I altered the questions after each interview, as my understanding of the 
sector grew, the mere fact that I had prepared concrete questions resulted in me having hard 
time improvising and in that the informants replied in very general terms. This is not to say 
that the interviews and the preparations did not prove helpful, but when I changed strategy 
and asked the informant to interpret overriding topics freely, the informants, each being an 
expert on a specific field, provided so much interesting knowledge on all kind of trends that 
my research question changed almost with every person I came in contact with. It was 
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 Unfortunately one and a half year of talking absolutely no Hindi in Norway had affected my ability to speak 
Hindi as well as I believe I was able to during our Hindi classes in Jaipur two years earlier, but luckily the 
understanding of the language was still fairly (though not entirely) intact. 
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therefore not until I came home and listened through all the material I had gathered I decided 
that the topic of this thesis had to be a discussion on the quality of the outreach of the sector. 
 
2.3 Language and expectations 
After little luck getting a Delhi-NGO to include me in their work (becoming the researcher 
living amongst her informants) I went back to Mr. Chauhan. He knew a man from the village 
in which he grew up (Srinagar, Uttarakhand), Dr. D. R. Purohit, who currently was teaching 
at Garhwal University and was a board member of a NGO named HARC (Himalayan Action 
Research Centre). The day we were to meet in Srinagar, Dr. Purohit unfortunately 
experienced a death in his village. Still, as a favour/obligation to his friend in Delhi he 
contacted some people at HARC, found a bus, and sent my flat mate and research assistant for 
the trip Katarina Dogger Fürst and me on our way to a place named Kaleshwar with nothing 
but a couple of phone numbers and an address. 
We arrived in the small village Kaleshwar early Friday morning, September 24
th
. 
Expecting to get some sleep and to walk around and get to know the place the first day, I 
called Dr. Arvind Darmora, who Dr. Purohit had told me to contact, to set up a meeting for 
the following day. By chance Dr. Darmora had a room at the hotel we stayed in and stood 
right behind me when I made the call. Two things happened then that I was not prepared for. 
First of all he did not speak English, and secondly he immediately dragged me off to meet the 
manager of HARC, Mr. Prakash Raturi.  
The first day and a half in Kaleshwar most of the conversations took place in a mix of 
Hindi and ‗Hinglish‘. The language problems I experienced were to a certain extent overcome 
as I recorded most of the conversations which enabled me to listen to the interviews later in 
the day when I had a dictionary at hand. My insufficient Hindi did restrict me from asking 
certain follow up questions in the situation when I did not catch everything, or the exact 
meaning of what was being said, but luckily I had the opportunity to ask them and to clarify 
misunderstandings in the evenings as we all ate dinner together at about 10 pm. Furthermore, 
Mr. Tirpathi, who came to be my interpreter as he had good knowledge of English, Hindi and 
the local dialect, joined us in the late afternoon on the second day, and from that time on I had 
him at hand to clarify statements and to present my questions properly to the informants when 
they did not understand what I was trying to ask.  
In some cases the language problems brought misunderstandings to the surface right 
away, but I also experienced that people ‗faked‘ to understand questions I asked (both 
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because of my insufficient Hindi and their problems with English) and answered them in a 
way that made me interpret their answer as I thought (or even hoped) they meant. Tilde 
Rosmer writes about how we are unable to interpret something completely free of prejudices 
and in a perfectly objective way due to our nature as being rendering human beings belonging 
to a society (Rosmer, 2005, p. 50-52). I therefore tried to be persistent throughout the 
fieldworks with rephrasing questions to get confirmation on my interpretations whenever I 
thought that I had discovered a groundbreaking finding, or when I saw that the informant 
became uncertain. This method usually helped me realise my mistakes as the informants 
either answered the exact opposite to the ‗new‘ question, or they confirmed my interpretation. 
 During the days I spent in Kaleshwar I met a lot of knowledgeable people. I got the 
opportunity to meet with three SHGs, Mr. Raturi (the manager), Dr. Darmora, Mr. Mahendra 
Singh Kunwar (mostly working at HARCs headquarter in Dehradun), Mr. Tirpathi (the 
interpreter) and his older brother who was associated with a couple of NGOs in the area. On 
the third day of the Kaleshwar fieldtrip the people at HARC had furthermore arranged for me 
to visit an NGO, a State Bank of India representative, a Father and a Block Development 
Officer who were all stationed in a village a couple of hours further up in the hills. 
 
2.4 Staying neutral 
―Furthermore I will stay neutral to all information given to me, and produce the final text 
without any visible judgement.‖ I wrote this line for my Project description before I went on 
the fieldworks. As you will soon see, I failed badly at this with a Block Development Officer 
(BDO). One informant told me to ask the BDO (I thought) about the schemes that the 
government has for SHG clients, and he made me a bet that the BDO would not be able to 
answer the question. The former informant, whom I felt much respect and admiration for,
16
 
told me that bad BDOs was a big hindrance to the SBLP movement, and I became very eager 
to confirm this accusation. The first question I asked the BDO was therefore about the 
government schemes, and he answered: ―oh, you know, so many schemes.‖ There and then I 
assumed that he did not know his work, got the former informant‘s accusation confirmed, and 
I did not understand why I had to sit there, so hungry, and converse with that man who clearly 
could not provide any useful information. It was during the following interview that day, with 
Father Francis, that I realised the mistake I had made with the BDO. He talked about how his 
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 I think I did not stay neutral to the first informant because all the people surrounding him seemed to respect 
him so much, he was able to reflect well around a number of topics and he was willing to discuss sensitive issues 
with me that others before him had shunned. 
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animators (which is what he called the staff) often used the local BDO as a resource person 
and that the BDO was a very knowledgeable and helpful man. A bit confused I went back to 
the person who I thought had argued that the BDO was unfit to do his job, and this person 
corrected me and said that his critique had been directed at local bankers and had nothing to 
do with the BDO. Aukrust refers to a article written by Terje Planke that sums up where I feel 
I failed in this case: ―We need to submit to informant‘s understanding in order to access her 
perspectives, but we should never become our informants – no matter what‖ (Aukrust, 2005, 
p. 238).
 17
 I swallowed raw what I thought one informant had said and let it affect my 
objectivity towards the BDO. As a human being I am not capable of processing every 
situation I encounter unaffected, but I realised after the meeting with Father Francis that I 
should not have gone into the first interview with a hidden agenda (which of course was a 
very unethical/unmoral thing to do), I should have been more in control of my body language 
regardless of how I felt, and I am certain that I missed out on information which could have 
benefited this thesis because of my prejudice and attitude towards the BDO. I learned an 
important lesson that day; I had (obviously) not done a good job keeping a 
‗professional/neutral‘ relationship to the people I met. I do believe that the experience in 
itself, if nothing else, was beneficial for the succeeding interviews I was to conduct. It made 
me more aware of my own limitations and the signals I was sending out both during 
interviews and when I was just hanging out with people. 
 
2.5 Memory and research assistants 
Despite being warned by our teachers before we left Norway, I went into the first interview 
thinking that I would remember what was said, how the room looked, and how the 
atmosphere was. I was wrong. According to Nielsen (et al.), Michael Agar points out that 
field notes often gets inaccurate as it is rarely possible to write down what is happening while 
it is happening. He argues that one is forced to write the information down afterwards when 
much is already forgotten (Nielsen, 1996, p. 107). Michael Agar is right. When we returned 
from Kaleshwar I sat down to transcribe the interviews, and the first thing I did was to delete 
an entire folder with over six hours of interviews. In panic I started retracing the day, but I 
soon found that I had relied too much on the recorder and did not have sufficient notes. I 
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 Originally written in Norwegian: ‖Vi må underkaste oss informantens forståelse for å få tilgang på hennes 
perspektiver, men vi må aldri bli som våre informanter – uansett‖ (Aukrust, 2005:238). 
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remembered fractions, but I kept thinking that it would have been so much easier had only 
someone been with me that day. This too, proved to be less true than what I imagined.  
 In an attempt to recapture some of the information lost, I went to Dehradun to meet up 
with the informants from HARC in their main office. I asked my other flat mate Hanne Karen 
Unhammer to come with me as a research assistant, and I checked the equipment thoroughly 
before we left for the meeting. Two out of three lines were indicating that the batteries on the 
recorder were good, the camera had available memory and our pens were writing, all of our 
pens were writing. The first thing that happened when we sat down to talk with the informants 
though, was that the recorder‘s batteries ran flat. It was not possible to delay so we had to 
continue and try to write down as much as we could. My biggest mistake here was that I had 
not considered that it was impossible for Hanne Karen to know what parts of the information 
that was most crucial to me. She wrote down as much as she managed trying to cover a bit of 
everything, and I just wrote down clues because I had enough with focusing on the 
conversation. Coming home looking over our notes I found that I had not been accurate, nor 
detailed oriented enough in my own notes, and that she had written down a summary of the 
conversation but thereby also left out the same details which I lacked in my notes. Having an 
assistant did help me to discuss and retrace the interviews afterward, but the accuracy and the 
memory of a recorder was by far the most valuable equipment I had in the field.  
Even though it has been argued that a recorder might make the interview situation 
appear more formal which might make it tense,
18
 my experience in general was that all the 
interviews began somewhat nervous, but that after a couple of minutes both the informant and 
I began to relax and it did not make a difference whether the recorder was on the table or not. 
One factor which might have affected my findings though, is that some of the informants can 
have held back information as long as the recorder was taping. I only really experienced this 
once which was when the banker in Uttarakhand, after I had asked the last of my questions, 
took the recorder, turned it off and said: ―Good, now we can talk more informal.‖ Seeing that 
he had been so aware of everything he had said while the recorder was on, it is possible that 
others were too, but as I tended to stay for a couple of minutes after each interview to wrap 
things up and to thank the informant, I am under the impression that most of them spoke their 
mind even when the recorder was on because it was only during the interview with the banker 
that I felt that the on-tape informant was not the same man as the off-tape person. 
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 Lectures in the course KOS 4002, spring 2009. 
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2.6 Networking 
Prior to the Kaleshwar trip I experienced that few of the people I had contacted replied. I 
believe that this was mainly due to two reasons. First of all I was not pushy enough. When I 
did not receive an answer on my request per e-mail, I could have followed up on the phone 
and asked if the person had seen the mail. After that I probably should have called again to 
confirm that he had actually read the mail, and then I could have tried to set up a meeting. 
Second of all, I did not have a reference person to give the people I wanted to get in touch 
with. When I started taking advantage of networks that others had already built, people also 
started responding (as in Srinagar when Dr. Purohit arranged for me to visit with HARC). 
Back in Delhi I called up a man, Dr. Navin Anand at the UNDP, to ask him about a report that 
Mr. Kunwar had shown me in Dehradun. I started the conversation by saying that Mr. 
Kunwar had told me to contact him. Not only was Dr. Anand glad to provide me the report, 
he also offered me to use him as a resource person as he sat on much information and was a 
close friend of Mr. Kunwar. As it turned out, Dr. Anand is the Resource Person and 
Moderator for the microfinance community Solution Exchange, UN, and meeting him directly 
led, and enabled me to travel back for a second fieldtrip. Now, this is one of the problems 
with conducting fieldwork in unfamiliar places; it can take a long time before everything falls 
into place. Thanks to my clumsiness I had to travel to Dehradun where Dr. Anand‘s friend 
Mr. Kunwar was stationed and showed me the report. I would never have met Mr. Kunwar 
had it not been for Mr. Raturi‘s commitment to introduce me around in Kaleshwar, and had 
not Dr. Purohit experienced a death in his village I would never have been sent to HARC. 
Had Mr. Chauhan not grown up in the same village as Dr. Purohit, and ultimately been a 
friend of our Hindi teacher Professor Zoller, none of this would have happened.   
I met Dr. Anand only two days before I had to return to Norway, but we kept in touch, 
and one day I found an e-mail in my inbox saying that ―we are having our Annual Forum in 
June (23-25 June) in Jaipur. I will send you the invite. If you are in India during that period it 
will good to participate as you will be able to meet leading practitioners at one platform.‖ As I 
returned to Norway I found that despite having learned a great deal during the first fieldwork, 
I now had even more questions than before. The Annual Forum, for which Dr. Anand was one 
of the main coordinators, provided the perfect opportunity to get those questions answered. 
The way this have affected my data is that the participants at the Forum were all leading 
practitioners in the field of microfinance. We did undertake a fieldtrip to Aapni Sahkari Sewa 
Samiti, Phagi, Jaipur, and visited with a female self help group, but except for this relatively 
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brief encounter, most of my data from the second fieldwork reflects the thoughts and concerns 
of practitioners, scholars and policy makers. This is also partly the reason why I have chosen 
to address the outreach of sector instead of focusing more on how microfinance affects the 
clients‘ lives in the social sense. During the Forum I got to do interviews, I listened to 
speeches, engaged in group discussions, had random conversations with the other participants 
and visited stands that some of the NGOs and MFIs had set up by. Unfortunately, I did not get 
the names of all the participants, and coming home relying on the recordings I found it quite 
hard to place all the voices to the correct man (there was somewhere around 70 men) or 
woman (I think I saw eight different women at one point or another during these three days).
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Nameless quotes from the Forum merely represent that I do not know who exactly that made 
the statement. 
 
2.7 My roles in the field 
During the fieldworks I held three different roles. I was perceived as a young, foreign student, 
a European scholar and a (female) friend. As most of my data is based on short interviews I 
was not given role as a person my informants confide in expect for when we were in 
Kaleshwar, so I mostly balanced between being a young student and a ‗knowledgeable‘ 
scholar. What I noticed was that people spoke more openly when they saw me as a young 
nosey student compared to when people saw me as a European scholar. At one time, just after 
having met Mr. Tirpathi (the interpreter) for the first time, I sat down to discuss SHGs with 
him and his brother. In the situation it became very noticeable that I had the role of somebody 
that was there to investigate their way of living. They acted humble, a bit nervous, and it 
seemed like they were trying to answer the things they thought I wanted to hear. I felt that 
these informants (none of them having a leading position in their community) answered 
hypothetical questions coloured by what I had told them that I was there to examine. I believe 
that realising, or identifying, the situation, at least made me somewhat able to overcome the 
problem as I began to rephrase questions from being hypothetical to ask them to retell 
concrete happenings from their own or their friends‘ lives. 
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with our fieldtrip and the roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010, as that was when the most people 
were gathered and a lot of the participants shared their experiences and thoughts without stating their names.  
16 
 
 Another example is how one man during the Annual Forum was under the impression 
that I actually had a voice in the UNDP.
20
 I did not realise it at the time, but when I listened to 
the recording it became very clear that I had held a role as somebody he thought was in a 
position to help him. The way this affected the information was that he changed, or adjusted, 
his answers after my replies. When he talked about, for example, corruption in the area he 
would describe the phenomenon quite in depth, but when I asked how he thought that would 
affect the possibility of doing microfinance there, he quickly began to reassure me that 
corruption would not be a problem as it was not widespread at all.   
Having the role of a young exited foreign student, on the other hand, I believe 
benefited the thesis greatly, and I resorted to taking on this role from time to time when it was 
not given to me naturally. I could ask ‗stupid‘ questions and people began to explain whole 
processes in depth. The informants tended to express their own opinions more instead of 
referring to widely acknowledged attitudes, and some even expressed a need for making me 
aware that the microfinance movement was not working perfectly (as I had travelled all the 
way to India out of admiration and curiosity for it). Furthermore people expressed 
controversies which I suspect that would have been kept from me had I not held this role. In 
general people seemed more comfortable with lecturing, or teaching me, when I was only a 
student (which I greatly appreciate). This is not to say that I have swallowed every statement 
raw. I experienced people trying to fill my unknowing head with percentages and ‗facts‘ 
which I soon found out to be quite misleading, but had it not been for the BDO incident 
though, I do not think that I would have work as hard to verify what people said during the 
fieldworks. 
 
2.8 The validity of my data 
The data in this thesis relies partly on what I learnt during these fieldworks, and partly on the 
literature and reports familiar to me. During the fieldworks I was able to meet with SHG 
members, people working as volunteers in NGOs, managers of NGOs (both small and large 
organisations), knowledgeable scholars, leading persons in MFIs, bankers and policy makers. 
During the Annual Forum Dr. C. P. Yoshi, Hon‘ble Union Minister For Rural Development 
and Panchayat Raj gave a speech, and I was lucky enough to act as a Facilitator for the group 
which N. Srinivasan (a man I spent the first fieldwork talking about as ‗the king of 
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 My name was listed as facilitator for one of the groups during the workshops, an honour and a role that the 
Solution Exchange team probably delegated me as a welcoming gesture. 
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microfinance‘ and never dreamt of ever meeting) was the Resource Person, Brij Mohan was 
the Chair and Dr. Daniel Lazer the Rapporteur. The people I talked with who represented 
NGOs were engaged in everything from working with people with disabilities, to housing 
microfinance, pension schemes and rickshaw leasing (on the path of becoming owners) 
programmes. I had the opportunity to talk with NGO staff which primary occupation was to 
form and train SHGs that are linked with banks, and I spent time with people who promoted a 
community owned (and run) large business micro-financed by a formal bank. Participating at 
the Forum furthermore enable me to meet with people who came from all over the country, as 
well as with Indians living abroad. 
 As the range of people I had the opportunity to talk with, interview or merely listen to 
was quite diverse, so was the opinions they represented and the concerns they raised. I believe 
that this has helped me reach a fairly nuanced picture of the state of the sector. However, 
statements made by individuals cannot be said to be representative for the microfinance sector 
as a whole. People will present issues based on their own experiences and expectations, and 
this tends to colour the information they chose to pass on. What the things people told me 
allows me to argue though, is that the concerns they raised are present in some parts of the 
sector, the parts known to them. I know that people sometimes exaggerate or understate 
certain issues in order to create debates or to promote their cause, I also do this, but the data 
included in this thesis does not reflect the thoughts of just a single man or a single woman. 
Even though I have not included four of each quote stating more or less the same, all the 
quotes are representative for issues that was either debated (and for the most part agreed 
upon) during the Annual Forum, or that was raised on multiple occasions (for example both in 
Uttarakhand and in Delhi and/or Jaipur). When available I have substantiated the informants‘ 
statements with discussions and arguments found in academic literature, articles, official 
websites, or reports,
21
 and the reason why I have chosen to include and debate statements 
which I have not found to be debated elsewhere is that even though they cannot be argued to 
be representative facts for the sector as a whole (as they are statements made by the relatively 
few individual that I happened to meet during the fieldworks), they do imply some tendencies 
or developments that I feel it is important to put focus. When possible I have included World 
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producing their text, so I have been persistent in reading literature that has allowed me to address topics from as 
many angles as possible. As some of my data is based on reports and articles given or suggested to me by my 
informants, I have made sure that the texts I refer to in this thesis have been written by relatively acknowledged 
authors and/or practitioners that have backed up their arguments with substantial references and nuanced 
discussions.  
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Bank data, data provided by the National Sample Survey Organisation, by the National Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development or by the Reserve Bank of India to suggest some kind 
scope of the phenomenon under debate,
22
 but in other cases though, when I have not been in a 
position to argue anything except that it do in fact take place, the statements are included here 
because I am under the impression that they represent a phenomenon which might be sizable 
and therefore deserves the attention. 
Personally I often find it beneficial to substantiate tendencies and arguments through 
the social economics familiar to me. For me it makes more sense to discuss, for example an 
SHG, when I am in a position to explain the mechanisms behind why providers of 
microfinance rely on the group lending approach, and how that is expected to correct for the 
flaws that excluded poor people from financial services prior to microfinance. The way I have 
used social economics in this thesis is by challenging general theory by applying it to an 
Indian context. Even though a group lending approach in theory counters banks‘ imperfect 
information of poor borrowers, does it work in practise? In this thesis I have relied on the 
relevant algebra that can be found in the books Development Economics (Debraj Ray, 1998) 
and The Economics of Microfinance (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). This is 
seen in relation to statements made by my informants and the relevant literature concerned 
with social, economic and political affairs in rural India. As this thesis will explore whether or 
not the outreach of microfinance is overestimated, it will not primarily engage in the typical 
social issues, empowering of clients versus making their lives even more rigid, debate. That 
the sector will be at the centre of attentions rather than how it affects the clients‘ lives merely 
reflects that my data mostly comes from practitioners rather than clients.  
                                                 
22
 It is mostly in this respect I have had to rely on internet sources, but I have also relied on them to discuss 
current developments in the sector when contemporary (printed) literature is not available. The benefit with 
internet sources is that they typically are more updated. Some of the articles I rely on (for example one of the 
articles written by N. Srinivasan) are furthermore posted on acknowledged online discussion platforms. The 
advantage with this is that they are commented heavily on by others which provides a broader perspective of the 
topics under debate (even though I have not used and relied on random comments in this thesis, reading them 
have been beneficial as some comments have inspired me to approach certain debates from more angels than I 
initially was aware of). I do regard the information published on the websites I refer to reliable. 
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3 
Why does not capital flow naturally to the poor? 
 
This chapter is a discussion of why formal credit tends to flow away from the poorer 
segments of the population and towards the richer; even though basic economic principles 
suggest that it should be the other way around. The terms we explore in this chapter will serve 
as background information for the rest of the thesis. The findings in this chapter will 
furthermore be the point of departure for exploring India‘s formal financial sector in respect 
of delivering rural credit and exploring India‘s informal credit scene. The next chapter 
concerned with India‘s formal and informal credit markets will make it clear why 
microfinance has evolved as a movement for financial inclusion in the country. 
 
3.1 Diminishing marginal returns to capital 
In basic introductory economics one learns about the principle of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. This principle says that enterprises with relatively little capital should be 
able to earn higher returns per dollar (additional unit of capital) invested than enterprises with 
a great deal of capital already utilised. The principle derives from the assumption that the 
production function is concave in its form, as I have illustrated in figure 3.1.1. To set the 
principle of diminishing marginal return to capital in a context, and to show how the 
assumption of a concave production function can be legitimised, we can picture an Indian 
tailor who is working from home sewing/repairing salvar-kamieezes and sarees for the other 
villagers.  
Initially this tailors means of work was a needle, thread and a scissor. In this example 
the tailor gets a hold on 1000 Rupees, and whether she has borrowed the money or saved it is 
not a concern as of yet. If she uses the 1000 Rupees to buy a used sewing machine, the tailor 
will be able to produce/handle many more units of clothes per week relative to the amount it 
was possible for her to finish when she made everything by hand. The next 1000 Rupee 
surplus she is able to gain, she also wishes to invest in her business.
23
 The tailor chose either 
to use the 1000 Rupees to hire an assistant to measure clients and cut the fabric for her, or she 
buys a scissor sharpener, a new desk or maybe a more comfortable chair in order to further 
                                                 
23
 As I merely aim to explain diminishing marginal return to capital with this example, I do not take into account 
external factors that might pressure a poor Indian woman to make investment decisions that do not maximise her 
revenue (in this lays also the not very farfetched assumption that the lady knows what she needs in order to work 
more efficiently). 
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increase production. It is very likely that she will work more efficiently on a desk that is not 
crooked and unsteady, or that having a guy to measure, draw and cut will save her some time 
per unit of clothes she makes, but the incremental/marginal increase in revenue is not likely to 
be as great as that generated by the sewing machine, the first 1000 Rupees she invested. As all 
external pressure and obligations are held aside in this example, we can assume that the tailor 
expected to gain more from buying a sewing machine than what she expected to gain from 
investing in a scissor sharpener or hiring an assistant, if it was not so, she would not have 
prioritised to use the first 1000 Rupees on the sewing machine. The example thereby gives us 
that, at some point, each additional unit of capital invested (marginal cost) will ultimately 
bring smaller and smaller incremental, or marginal, gains. The theory that the steepness of the 
production function‘s slope decreases as more and more capital is invested is therefore very 
plausible. 
 
 
Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Capital    
Figure 3.1.1 
 
The incremental gain relative to capital finds relevance in this thesis because it can contribute 
to determine a borrower‘s ability to repay a loan. Seeing that a poor entrepreneur in theory 
should be able to pay higher interest rates on a loan, as his marginal return to capital is higher 
than what a rich entrepreneur‘s marginal return is, one can find the need for microfinance 
somewhat surprising. Believing that this basic tool of economics is correct, why then, does 
not capital from banks flow naturally towards the poor?
24
 Why do large companies or rich 
farmers have a far easier time obtaining formal credit than self employed village tailors?   
 
                                                 
24
 The question is posted and answered by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch in the book The Economics of 
Microfinance, 2005. 
Marginal 
return for 
poorer 
entrepreneur 
 
Marginal return 
for richer 
entrepreneur   
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3.2 Theory put into practice 
The convenient form of the production function in figure 3.1.1 conceals the assumption that 
everything but credit is held constant. Out in the real world, and in this case in an Indian 
village, one is not likely to find a homogeneous society in which everybody has the same 
financial literacy, business savvy, commercial contacts and access to their needed inputs. 
When everything except the amount invested is not held constant, and we do take into account 
where the tailor gets the money to buy the sewing machine, the scenario changes. If the tailor 
borrowed the 1000 Rupees she invested, in coherence with the argument, she should still be in 
a position to repay the loan at relatively high rate of interest. This assumption though, 
depends on the loan being taken from a formal bank whose only prerequisite for lending out 
the money is that it will be repaid with its respective interests. If we open for the possibility 
that she borrowed the money in the informal sector, and/or we open for situations in which 
lender and borrower also do business in other markets, a neighbour‘s or a family member‘s 
expectation of borrowing surplus money, sudden sickness in the household, a husband that 
controls the family income, alcoholism, or for example the risk that another village tailor gets 
a better reputation than she, the tailor might run into repayment difficulties regardless of the 
interest rate she is faced with. How severe her situation will get, or whether she will have 
trouble repaying at all, will differ with the arrangements she has made with others and the 
context she lives in. Furthermore one should keep in mind that there can be production 
opportunities in which technology exhibits increasing returns to scale over a relevant range. If 
this is the case with an occupation in a somewhat isolated village (in the sense that the poor 
entrepreneur would have to travel far in order to sell her produce in a different market), the 
poor resident would most likely be unable to compete with a better-off entrepreneur and 
would have lower marginal returns despite having less capital.  
Even if we do argue that poor entrepreneurs can be expected to have high marginal 
return to capital, like the village tailor if she borrowed 1000 Rupees from a bank and did not 
have to worry about external draining on her cash flow, there are some dominating factors 
that make formal providers of finance reluctant to engage in business with the poor.
25
 From 
the bank‘s point of view the main obstacles have to do with risk assessment, imperfect 
                                                 
25
 I refer to a person who do not own any valuables, savings or any assets that a bank will find satisfactory as 
collateral for lending out money when I use the term ‗poor‘. A poor person who owns the plot of land his house 
is build on is usually considered to be ‗relatively poor‘ as he in fact owns land, even though he might not have 
any savings and lack a steady income flow. In this respect, if the output from the man‘s plot of land cannot feed 
the household, is mortgaged to, or controlled by, others, or it is considered useless or unacceptable as collateral 
in the formal sector and the man do not have any other assets that the bank will accept, he is included in this 
reference to poor persons.  
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information, and lack of collateral and high transaction costs. As a point of departure to 
reflect around these problems I have found it beneficial to introduce two terms, namely 
‗adverse selection‘ and ‗moral hazard‘ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 37-46), 
which both are caused by information imperfections. We will first explore in what ways 
adverse selection affects a bank‘s decision making process when it comes to handle (or not to 
handle) poor clients. The next step will be to account for the ways in which moral hazard 
further contribute to exclude certain layers of the population from the formal economy. 
Adverse selection is what occurs when banks are unable to determine the risk it 
encounters when lending money to clients (Armendáriz da Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 
37). Banks would prefer to charge riskier customers a higher interest than safer clients in 
order to compensate for the added probability of default, but banks often suffer from 
imperfect information about poor villagers‘ ability to repay as they do not have access to 
credit records that can be tracked. If they were to go to each applicant‘s village and dig up the 
required information, that would hardly be obtainable in a cost-efficient manner, and further 
the banks have little guarantee for that the people they speak with in the village actually will 
be truthful. Banks therefore face a situation in which they will have to increase average 
interest rates for all just to be sure to cover the most risky borrowers. By raising average 
interests for everybody, though, the banks are likely to drive safer costumers out of the formal 
credit market and thereby get stuck with the ones most likely to default.
26
  
 A normal way in which banks compensate for risk is by demanding collateral in 
return for lending out money. Unfortunately, this requirement cannot always be met by the 
financially weakest sections of the population who do not have sufficient assets to put forward 
as collateral. The other direction that banks therefore often pursue, which at least if nothing 
else is an understandable choice due to restrictions on interest rates, high transaction costs, 
imperfect information and lack of collateral, is to simply direct their services to wealthier 
clients and treat the poor as financially untouchable.  
The second term, moral hazard, refers in this relevance to the problem that occurs 
when banks are unable to ensure that a customer is putting inn all the effort required for his or 
hers investment to be successful, or when banks are unable to observe the realisation of 
project returns.  Ray describes the problem of moral hazard, or as he also refers to it ‗the 
                                                 
26
 Armendáriz da Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 41-43, provides a numerical example that illustrates why safer 
clients get driven out of the market when banks are unable to discriminate against more risky costumers. As this 
clearly shows the math that works behind banks behaviour I have included a summarised version of the example 
in the ‗Appendix‘ of the thesis (Appendix 1).  
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problem of hidden actions‘ in the following way; "the benefit of a transaction to one party 
depends on some action taken by the other party; however, the latter may not have any 
incentive to take beneficial action after a contract has been signed between the two" (Ray, 
1998, p. 464).    
The problem that banks face, which in turn have consequences for the rest of the 
population and in this case especially for the poor without collateral, is to what degree moral 
hazard will affect the utilisation of the loans provided. One can expect that a man, who invests 
a relatively substantial amount of his own saving in a project complementing the money he 
has borrowed, or who has put forward valuables as collateral, will work harder to succeed 
with his project than a person who only spends money borrowed. This assumption naturally 
favours the better-offs with savings and assets when it comes to borrowing in the formal 
sector.
27
 However, personal investments and commitment does not automatically translate 
into the success of a project. Banks may therefore experience to encounter information gaps at 
two basic levels. There is lack of information regarding the use to which a loan will be put 
(utilisation), and regarding the repayment decision. With respect to the latter, Ray introduces 
the term ‗strategic default‘; a situation in which the borrower can repay but do not find it in 
his interest to do so (Ray, 1998, p. 529, 540).  
If a bank experience strategic default from a poor man who has borrowed a small 
amount, let‘s say 500 Rupees, the bank will often end up having to bear the loss. In its attempt 
to regain the loan the bank can drag the default borrower to court, but the value of the time 
spent on a trial and the money it costs to pursue the recovery of the loan will by far exceed the 
500 Rupees lent. Of course the borrower might go to jail, but it will not change the fact that 
the man does not have any valuables that the bank can seize and sell. Even if the bank has 
contacts in the borrower‘s village that can make life hard for the poor guy, it will not make 
the bank recover its money when the borrower is flat broke. In districts where it is difficult to 
enforce contracts due to a weak judicial system, this problem is just made worse as people 
might see the lack in implementation of regulations and punishment as an incentive to default. 
As banks do not receive collateral, and in most cases are unable to monitor the borrower‘s 
actions, the problem of hidden actions contributes to banks‘ reluctance to serve poor.28 
                                                 
27
 However, it is also a fairy common assumption that if poor are given half a chance, no one will strive harder to 
succeed if that means that they might have a chance to climbing out of poverty. 
28
 To see more on moral hazard, Ex ante and Ex post moral hazard and numerical examples, please see 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 43-46. 
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  To sum up; money tends not to flow naturally from banks towards the poor because of 
market imperfections in the formal economy. There are certain conditions under which 
markets fail, or functions at an inefficient levels, such as when there are incomplete 
information, strategically behaviour and incentives that affect the decision making process of 
the actors negatively (in the sense that peoples actions, the bank‘s and borrower‘s both, hinder 
financial inclusion of the needy). The main concerns that seems to hinder poor from accessing 
formal finance appear to be the information available to banks about the risk of lending to a 
potential client, the transaction costs involved in getting the required information about a 
customer (which of course can be thought of as even greater when one assume that poor 
borrowers mostly wish to borrow small amounts) and the poor‘s lack of collateral. As posting 
collateral in many cases could counter the problems of both moral hazard and adverse 
selection, lack of collateral rise up as the dominating excluding force. The reality that poor 
more often than not lack collateral results in situations in which information about the 
borrowers act as the main market imperfection that make banks direct their services towards 
the better-offs in the community. I will in chapter five explore in what ways the microfinance 
movement aim at providing innovative solutions to work around these problems, but let us 
now turn to some of the steps taken by the Indian government in its attempt to ensure that 
money do flow in the direction of the country‘s rural poor, and explore how India‘s informal 
credit sphere nevertheless might be better fit to provide the financial services that poor 
require.  
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4 
India‘s economic spheres:  
the formal and the informal providers of financial services 
 
As the informal economic sphere and the formal arena often overlap it is not possible to draw 
a clear cut line to separate the two, but as a guideline the economic discipline tends to refers 
to the formal sector as a sphere in which people operate ―under the umbrella of accepted rules 
and regulations imposed by the government‖ (Ray, 1998, p. 346). As a counterpart to this, the 
informal sector is regarded as an unorganised and non-institutional sphere that includes 
traditional, rural and subsistence socioeconomic activity (Germidis, Kessler and Meghir, 
1991, p. 39-40). A well developed and inclusive financial system is associated with faster 
economic growth for the country, and less biased income distribution among a country‘s 
inhabitants. An incorporating formal financial system is furthermore expected to reduce 
damaging concentrations of (economic) power.
29
 A concentration of economic power can be 
considered damaging as it might enable ‗superior‘ villagers to take advantage of their less 
fortunate neighbours who depend on the better-offs for work, loans, alms, advices or the like, 
when they do not access formal financial services.
30
 A popular expression for this kind of 
dependence is ‗patron-client relationship‘.31  
This chapter begins by exploring the extensive banking system in India. Thereafter we 
will address the present formal financial situation which will make it clear why one can argue 
that the financial sector has not been able to achieve the financial inclusion that policy 
planners have sought.
32
 From there we will turn our focus to the informal economy. We will 
                                                 
29
 The reason why I have put the word ‗economic‘ in parenthesis is that the typical powerful villager in rural 
India not is exclusively superior in terms of economy, but most likely also in the social and political sense as 
well. The three characteristics are often intertwined, and having one or more of these characteristics is likely to 
reinforce the others. 
30
 The reliance on better-off villagers is often present regardless of whether or not a person has access to formal 
services, but the option and the possibility of depending less on an informal source is what is left out when 
people do not have access to formal services.  
31
 I will discuss the relationship between patrons and clients in dept in the last part of this chapter, but for now 
please note that there is a mutual dependence between a patron and his clients, the latter not always being 
inferior the former, though the trend is that clients depend more on the patron than the patron does on a particular 
client.  
32
 Although microfinance now is provided through the banking system I have held it aside here as my aim is to 
address the flaws in the banking sector that advocate a need for an alternative approach in order to reach and 
bank poor people. For the same reason, as well as the fact that I have limited space to elaborate on, I have also 
chosen not to engage in a discussion of India‘s post offices even though they also provide some financial 
services.  
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discuss how moneylenders help to fill the gap for finance left by the formal institutions. This 
will naturally also require a note on moneylenders and the ways in which they do business. 
The chapter ends in a discussion of how informal lenders also sometimes fail to provide the 
poor with the services they require, or at least do not provide them on beneficial terms. 
 
4.1 The formal economy with focus on rural areas 
The 61
st
 round of National Sample Survey Organisation‘s (NSSO) survey estimated that 27.5 
per cent of India‘s population is poor. Of the people living in rural areas, 28.5 per cent is 
recognised as being poor, while for urban areas the number is 25.7 per cent (Srinivasan, 2008, 
p. 1). When we take into account that about 70 per cent of India‘s population live in rural 
areas we can estimate that just above 72 per cent of all the Indians living in poverty resides in 
the countryside.
33
  Policies aimed at financial inclusion have therefore naturally had a rural 
focus. The present banking infrastructure is vast and consists of cooperative banks, 
commercial banks and regional rural banks. The shape we find today has developed over time 
and through various policy initiatives, and I will briefly account for the most relevant for this 
thesis next. 
 
4.2 The Indian banking system with focus on rural credit delivery 
Cooperative banks are often regarded as the premier institutions for rural credit disbursement 
in India as the first legislation on co-operation was passed by the state in 1904 (Fisher and 
Sriram, p. 2002, 35; Jha, 2010, p. 40).
 
Today there are more than 105 735 cooperative 
societies in the country (Karmakar, 2008, p. 35), which are organised and managed after the 
principle of co-operation, self-help and mutual help as part of the objective to provide a credit 
                                                 
33
 To calculate the percentage of the poor Indians living in rural areas I have had to rely on estimated numbers. 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis I was naturally unable to find the exact number of people living in 
India, not to say an accurate ratio between rural-urban residents. Therefore I decided to rely on the heavily 
accepted assumption that about 70 per cent of India‘s population live in rural areas, and that the population now 
counts 1 155 347 678 people as per the World Bank‘s estimates (World Bank, 2010b, [online]).   
To come to the conclusion that approximately 72 per cent of India‘s poor live in rural areas I made the following 
calculations: 
1 155 347 678 the total population – 30 % living in urban areas ≈ 808 743 376 people living in rural areas. 
1 155 347 678 total population – 808 743 376 living in rural areas = 346 604 302 living in urban areas. 
Then I calculated that 28.5 % of the 808 743 376 people (808 743 376 *0.285) equals approximately 230 491 
862 poor people in rural areas, and that 25.7 % of the 346 604 302 people (346 604 302*0.257) gives about 89 
077 306 poor in urban areas. 
By adding the number of rural poor to the number of urban poor I found the total number of poor in India: 
230 491 862 + 89 077 306 = 319 569 168. Taking the number of rural poor, divided by the number of total poor 
and multiplying the sum with 100 we find the percentage of all poor residing in rural areas. (230 491 862 
/319 569 168)*100= 72.125... ≈72,1 %. This number might be a bit higher. Recall that we in the introduction 
found that the total number of poor in India is 317 720 611 (if 27.5 % of the total population is poor), relying on 
this number instead of rural poor plus urban poor we find that 72.545≈72.5 % lives in rural areas. 
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delivery system that is operating at the door step of the farmer.
34
 According to Banknet India 
((date lacking), [online]) they also aim at making such credit available relatively cheap since 
the cooperatives, as a principle, do not pursue the goal of profit maximisation. In 1951-1952 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI was established in 1935 and envisaged a special role in 
developing the agricultural credit sphere) organised an All India Rural Credit Survey which 
reported an utter insignificance of the cooperatives in providing rural credit as the banks‘ 
share in the rural credit market turned out to be as low as 0.9 per cent (Jha, 2010, p. 42; Dhage 
and Lobo, 2010, p. 215-216).  
The Government of India (GoI) decided that they needed to take further action to 
ensure the unbanked population access to financial services and decided to nationalise the 
commercial banks that were active in the country. Furthermore the RBI initiated priority 
sector lending norms and concessional interest rate for the weaker sections. The goal of the 
nationalisation was to improve the rural access to credit through priority sector lending and 
healthy competition.
35
 This transformation of the banking system happened in phases 
beginning with the 14 largest commercial banks in 1969, and in order to push rural branch 
expansion, banks were required to open two rural branches for every one branch opened in an 
urban area. This has lead to the establishment of 20 253 rural, and 12 522 semi-urban 
branches of 99 commercial banks across rural India (Karmakar, 2008, p. 35). 
 Notwithstanding the expansion though, the commercial banks failed to fill the gap 
generated by the cooperatives in making credit available to the masses of the rural population. 
Therefore, to further complement the provision of rural credit, the government passed the 
Regional Rural Bank Ordinance in 1975, which was later replaced by the Regional Rural 
Bank Act, 1976 (Jha, 2010, p. 43). The Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), which are established 
and maintained with very large, continuing government investments, were set up to provide 
subsidised loans to small and marginal farmers and to landless labours (Robinson, 2001, p. 
211). They are unique institutions in the sense that they are set up as local banks aiming at 
combining the same familiarity with local conditions which the cooperatives possess, while 
providing the commercial range of operations (Jindal, 2008, p. 67; Jha, 2010, p. 44). The 
                                                 
34
 The cooperative credit body is made up by a 3-tier structure. The Primary Agricultural Credit societies (PACs) 
operating at the grass root level, followed by Central Co-operative Banks at the district level and the State Co-
operative Banks at the Apex-, or state level. Moreover the cooperative credit structure is divided into two 
separate arms, one for short term credit and another for long term credit. 
35
 The nationalisation had four main objectives. First it was to prevent a few corporations from controlling all the 
banks, secondly the government wanted to mobilize public savings, thirdly they aimed at limiting the 
concentration of wealth and economic power by using resources mobilized by banks to achieve egalitarian 
growth, and fourthly they wished to pay more attention to priority sectors as agriculture and small industry 
(Basu, 2008, p. 20). 
28 
 
network of Regional Rural Banks consisted of 14 446 branches as on March 31
th
 2004 (Jha, 
2010, p. 44). 
According to Rao there is now at least one retail credit outlet on average for every 
about 5 000 persons living in rural areas (Rao, 2008, p. 58). Nonetheless, Basu argues that the 
majority of the rural population appears not to have access to finance from a formal source. 
―Indeed, bank branches in rural areas appear to serve primarily the needs of richer borrowers: 
some 66 per cent of large farmers have a deposit account; 44 per cent have access to credit. 
Meanwhile, 70 per cent of marginal farmers do not have a bank account and 87 per cent have 
no access to credit from a formal source‖ (Basu, 2008, p. 23).36 In one of the thematic 
workshops I attended during the Annual Forum on Microfinance, Prof. K Elumalai (who 
acted as the chair person for our group that focused on ‗Credit‘) explained the exclusion, and 
self-exclusion, from formal banks in the following manner:  
 
We all know it very well. We have all types of financial institutions [naming all the different 
forms and subtypes of formal banks]. In addition we have the moneylenders who play a very 
important role. As of the RBI report, the RBI acknowledge that despite so many institutional 
missionaries in this country, more than 50 per cent of the credit is met through the 
moneylenders only. Therefore their [the banks‘] primary job is not done, even though we have 
all these missionaries with us. Even today the farmer for his basic lacks, whether it is for health 
or for providing education for his children, he early morning at the time of sunrise goes to the 
moneylender. And why he goes to the moneylender? Because the moneylender does not insist 
on security, he does not give for any loan applications and whatever the money is demanded it 
is given, immediately. Whereas any person wanting to go, first of all they are shy of going to 
the banks, whether it is a public sector bank or any bank, the reasons are many. Even the bank 
officers they don‘t give proper treatment to the poor, which is the main reason. Second reason, 
for the bank it takes months to get it [the loan], and if you go to the bank and you ask for 
10 000 Rupees, you will be given 5 000 Rupees only. Remaining 5 000 will go to somebody 
else, but that is another matter. The banks will lend at rates of 12-14 per cent, but if you add the 
time spent going to the bank, the days you go the wage is gone, you need to see the cost of the 
wages for the numbers of times spent for travel, and also the cost of travel.  [...] Banks are 
there, but the banks are unable to meet the basic needs of the common man [in reference to 
extensive paperwork, demand for collateral, not providing loans for purposes such as marriage, 
hospital bills, education etc.].
37,38 
 
                                                 
36
 Data collected from World Bank and the National Council of Applied Economic Research - the Rural Finance 
Access Survey (RFAS) 2003 which covers 6 000 rural households in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (Basu, 
2008, p. 22-23). 
37
 Jaipur, 23.06.2010. 
38
 I will suggest the following literature for supporting and verifying Prof. K Elumalai‘s statements; 
 -Regarding corruption/bribes, reluctance to serve poor, lack of collateral, and cumbersome, untimely and costly 
procedures for opening an account or seeking a loan see Priya Basu, ―A Financial system for India’s Poor,‖ 
2008, p. 21-26. 
 -Corruption is also addressed by Thomas Fisher and M.S. Sriram, ―Introduction to the financial sector in India,‖ 
2002, p. 39. 
-The cost of having to make multiple trips to the bank in order to obtain a loan is documented by Marguerite S. 
Robinson, ―The microfinance revolution,‖ 2001, p. 211. 
- For a broader understanding of the connection between subsidised credit and financial provider‘s preference to 
serve non-poor see Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, ―The Economics of Microfinance‖, 2005, p. 8-11. 
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4.3 Maturing of the banking system and the present financial state 
In July, 1991, the Government of India (GoI) introduced a large variety of schemes to 
liberalise its economic and political power. For the banking sector the liberalisation meant 
that private sector banks and new foreign banks were permitted to enter the previously 
monopolistic market, and that greater competition consequently got infused in the banking 
system (Jha, 2010, p. 49). The GoI also made it easier for banks to reach poor clients by in the 
year 2000 declaring that priority sector lending includes: ―Micro-credit provided by banks 
either directly or through any intermediate; Loans to self help groups (SHGs) / Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for on lending to SHGs‖ (RBI FAQs, (date not 
available), [online]). As banks are obligated to ensure 40 per cent of the total credit to priority 
sectors (with 18 per cent for agriculture) through priority sector government schemes, this 
announcement enabled banks to reach their targets by providing MFIs with bulk loans, and/or 
have formed and trained SHGs linked to them at little or no cost to the bank under the SBLP. 
In addition to this, NABARD provides subsidised refinancing support to banks for loans made 
to SHGs (Harper, 2002, p. 176).
39
   
The pressure from above and the competition from within the banking sector seem to 
have led many banks to engage in finding new and creative solutions for inclusion of the low-
income population who do not live close to a rural bank outlet. Though some financial 
providers still are at an early stage when it comes to developing and taking advantage of new 
technology, services like mobile cellular banking, mobile transaction devices, Banking 
Correspondents and Banking Facilitators,
40
 ‗low limit credit cards‘, etc. are strongly 
contributing to reach formerly unreached borrowers (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 109-114).  
                                                 
39
 NABARD was established in July 1982, as per recommendations of the Committee to Review Arrangements 
for Institutional Credit for Agriculture and Rural Development. The Committee concluded that ―new 
arrangement would be necessary at the national level for achieving the desired focus and thrust towards 
integration of credit activities in the context of the strategy for Integrated Rural Development. ... The Reserve 
Bank had onerous responsibilities to discharge in respect of its many basic functions of central banking in 
monetary and credit regulations and was not therefore in a position to devote undivided attention to the 
operational details of the emerging complex credit problems‖ (NABARD: Genesis and Historical Background, 
(2007), [online]). NABARD was to attain to the entire undertakings of the Agricultural Refinance and 
Development Corporation and the functioning of the RBI relating to refinancing co-operatives and the RRB (Jha, 
20103, p. 44-46). 
40
 In short a Banking Correspondent or a Banking Facilitator can be understood as someone, for example a shop 
keeper or a retired government official, who provide or promote services on behalf of a bank in a village where 
the bank does not have a branch. The difference in terminology has been summarized in Microfinance India – 
State of the sector report 2008 (p. 70), as follows: A BC can; identify clients and activities, process applications, 
form groups, disburse small value loans, recover loans, collect small deposits, sell insurance products and handle 
small remittances. The BF‘s three first activities are; verification of primary client information, creation of 
financial literacy and debt counselling and follow-up for recovery of loans. The role of the BC is to put through 
transactions as agents of a bank and he can bind the bank in finance transactions. The BF on the other hand 
cannot put through transactions and cannot bind the bank as he is not authorised to deal with money. 
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        India is presently one of the world‘s fastest growing economies with an annual average 
growth rate of more than 8 per cent. In the last three years the Indian economy have 
preformed creditably with a 9.6 per cent growth in gross domestic product (GDP) during the 
financial year 2006-2007, 8.7 per cent in 2007-2008, and a 6.7 per cent growth rate during 
2008-2009 (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 1).
41
  The growth rate in agriculture (forestry, hunting, 
fishing or cultivation of crops and livestock production) during 2008-2009 though, 
experienced a significant decline to about 35 per cent of the previous year when it registered a 
2.6 per cent growth in GDP (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 1; Srinivasan, 2008, p. 1). That about 70 per 
cent of the country‘s population, the approximate percentage residing in rural India,42 is 
contributing to less than 20 per cent of the overall growth GDP clearly reflects that the 
country‘s enormous institutional financial structure is not inclusive enough,43 and it implies 
that the wealth is concentrated with elites in the cities.  
Public sector banks, including nationalised banks, the State Bank of India and 
Regional Rural Banks, accounts for 73 per cent of the commercial banking and 52.4 per cent 
of the assets of all financial institutions in the system, and they thereby dominate the banking 
system (Basu, 2008, p. 21). Keeping the majority of India‘s banking sector under government 
control underpins Basu‘s argument that there is a belief that banks will serve the rural poor 
and small-scale industry only if they are mandated by policies to do so (Basu, 2008, p. 21). 
This stance on banking, the so called ‗social banking‘, has formed the basis for maintaining a 
government-dominated banking system in which suggestions of bank privatisation are being 
branded as ‗anti-poor‘ (Basu, 2008, p. 21). At the same time, government policies to support 
rural lending through their incredible network of bank branches, such as the priority sector 
credit schemes, do not appear to have realised their full potential.  
 
Year after year, banks report having fulfilled the priority sector lending targets. But it seems they are 
able to get round the target by subscribing to other eligible instruments, for example, by investing in 
bonds issued by apex banks such as the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development 
                                                 
41
 The decline should be seen in connection to the global financial sector melt down during in which many 
economies around the world registered a decline in their GDP. N. Srinivasan, the author of Microfinance India - 
State of the Sector Report 2008 and 2009, argues that India‘s large domestic market, and the creditably swift 
actions taken by the GoI and the RBI in sustaining liquidity flows and greater public expenditures, ensured that 
India‘s economy performed commendably under difficult global conditions (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 1).  
42
 There are of course be some non-agricultural activity going on in rural India, but I am under the impression 
that most rural residents included in the formal economy conduct work that will be included/calculated in the 
country‘s agricultural growth. 
43
 There is some confusion as to this number. If growth in agricultural GDP only is 35 per cent of 2.6 that would 
result in a 0.91 per cent growth during 2008-2009, which again is 13.6 per cent of total GDP growth that year (to 
find the percentage: 6.7*X/100=0.91 gives 91/6.7=13.582). According to World Bank webpage though, growth 
in agricultural GDP as percentage of total GDP is 17 per cent, and they report overall growth in GDP to be 7.7 
per cent as of 2009 (World Bank, 2010c, [online]; World Bank 2010d, [online]) 
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(NABARD) and the Small Industries Development Bank (SIDBI), instead of direct lending (this is 
expected to change, in light of the recent policy that makes investments in bonds issued by certain 
institutions ineligible for classification under priority sector lending). Even when banks do lend directly 
to priority sectors – for example, to agriculture- the benefits tend to be captured by the larger and more 
prosperous farmers, while marginal and small farmers remain largely excluded and have to rely on 
moneylenders (Basu, 2008, p. 27).  
 
A way to tackle this problem, Basu suggests, can be by making priority sector lending 
obligations tradable. The most competitive lender would get paid by the banks that are less 
well-placed to effectively take on their priority lending requirements (Basu, 2008, p. 30). 
Basu might be correct in her assumption that both banks and poor would benefit from this 
solution, but I will suggest that making lending obligations tradable must be done with some 
caution. One could end up in a situation in which all branches operating in a difficult 
geographic environment might find it advantageous not having to struggle with reaching the 
unbanked, thus by getting rid of their quota they legitimise not having to serve certain 
segments of the community. Furthermore it might contribute to increase the already excessive 
competition that is going on in certain ‗easily reached‘ areas.44 
As it is a given that all the segments of a country need to develop for the country to 
experience overall economic development, it should be needless to say that it is essential that 
further agricultural development takes place in India. Microfinance has emerged partly as an 
answer to the large gap between the demand for financial services compared to what and who 
is being supplied by the formal banking sector, and partly as an answer to dealings in the 
informal credit sphere. The next part of this chapter will explore how informal moneylenders 
are perceived, how they might be better fit than the formal banks to serve the rural poor, but 
also in what ways the services they provide are insufficient to secure the unbanked population 
access to the financial services that they require. 
 
4.4 Moneylenders filling the gap for finance left by the formal financial sector 
Even without access to financial services through the banking system, poor households 
seldom lack financial intermediation all together. They typically have multiple credit sources 
in the village economy, as well as ways to save and insure.
45
 Introductory in this chapter I 
pointed out that the informal sector is regarded as an unorganised and non-institutional 
sphere, but although the Indian informal financial market is uncontrolled and unregulated by 
                                                 
44
 We will discuss competition at length in chapter 8 named ‗Competition leading to an overestimated outreach‘. 
45
 The alternatives to the formal sources can be pawnbrokers, professional moneylenders, landlords, 
shopkeepers, traders, employers, kin, neighbours and/or friends who are willing to provide the person in need 
with money, food, work or other necessities 
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the formal sector, it cannot be said to be completely unorganised. Within the informal 
commercial market we find dynamics of local socioeconomic processes, political alliances 
and associated information flows which creates market shares that tends to be controlled by 
particular patrons. As the patron often is regarded as a political, social and/or economical 
superior in the locality, other less fortunate villagers often turn to him in need of (financial) 
assistance. One can therefore argue, as Robinson does, that social networks and alignment, 
political alliances, religious affiliations and landlord-worker relationships among other bonds 
are contributing to form part of a local political economy (Robinson, 2001, p. 50, 131-132).  
If the Indian rural informal credit market was small, or if it was large but characterized 
by free competition, we would not have to bother with a part dedicated to moneylenders in a 
thesis on microfinance. But numbers show that the overwhelming majority of India‘s 
population live in rural areas, that most of the people excluded from formal financial services 
reside here, and that the poorer a group is the greater is the exclusion. Further we know that 
high interest rates, patron-client relationships (bonds of loyalty or interdependence) and 
political and social networks rather clearly can reflect that moneylenders generally do not 
need, or wish to be, very competitive. This assumption can be underpinned with what Ray 
describes as ‗interlinked credit transactions.‘ He writes:  
 
A majority of village moneylenders do not pursue usury as their sole occupation. Most of them are also 
wealthy landlords, shopkeepers, or traders dealing in the marketing of crops. Given a segmented 
market, it probably won‘t come as a surprise to learn that landlords tend to give credit mostly to their 
tenants or farm workers, whereas traders favour lending to clients from whom they also purchase grain. 
Thus segmentation often takes place along occupational lines, and the complementary of some product 
relationship (tenant and landlord or farmer and trader) facilitate the credit relationship (Ray, 1998, p. 
541, the author‘s emphasis).46 
 
4.5 Correcting for market failures in the formal economy 
This part will discuss how the informal financial credit market in many cases substitute, and 
in other cases correct for market failures in the formal economy. Recognising that persons 
from all socioeconomic layers of the population participate in the informal commercial credit 
market, and that many act as both lenders and borrowers, this chapter will mainly focus on 
lending that is provided by more resourceful villagers and is directed towards resource wise 
inferior villagers (patrons providing loans to clients).
 47
  I have chosen to define the informal 
                                                 
46
 Ray describe a tendency towards segmentation in a credit market when many of the credit relationships are 
personalised, they have taken time to build up, and when it is common that the lender sticks to a fixed clientele 
whose members he lends to on a repeated basis (Ray, 1998, p. 540).  
47
 The typical person who becomes a commercial money lender is often also a local patron. This means that he or 
she, it is mostly males that fits this description, is superior in terms of resources and power. Because of his 
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commercial moneylender (for which I use ‗informal lender‘, ‗moneylender‘ and ‗local lender‘ 
etc. as synonyms in this text) as informal lenders of all types who provide credit (repeatedly if 
not as their primary occupation) with the expectation of benefiting financially from the loan.  
In the former chapter we found that imperfect information and lack of collateral were 
the two of the main obstacles that hindered formal banks from directing services towards the 
poor. Local lenders have the advantage of information concerning the characteristics of clients 
relative to banks as they themselves live in the locality, they have networks of information 
flows and often guide clients in how to use the resources provided by them. Proper collateral 
can furthermore manifests in many more forms for a moneylender than for a bank.
48
 A large 
landowner might see great value in a small plot of land bordering to his property, or he might 
require inexpensive/free labour on his farm or in the house. He therefore accepts a poor client 
putting up land or his own / his family‘s services as collateral. The reasons why banks cannot, 
or often wish not to, accept labour or a small plot of land as collateral witness about an 
imperfect market of some kind. While there can be many answers as to why, the most obvious 
are that resale of labour powered by banks (as banks seldom need the services of unschooled 
poor) may be indistinguishable from slavery, and that resale of land may be constrained by 
informational problems in the proper identification of the owner or a buyer (Ray, 1998, p. 
537).
49
 
The demand among low income households is typically for short term loans (often for 
working capital or to cover consumption needs, medical expenses, ceremonies and the like) 
that are made available quickly in convenient locations through easy processes (Robinson, 
2001, p. 187), and that entail appropriate, thus often differing, repayment schedules 
                                                                                                                                                        
financial/political/religious/social position in the locality the patron will have less well-off villagers (clients) 
turning to him for assistance. This is not to say that the patron must be the wealthiest person in the village, but he 
tends at least to be financially independent and in a position to control and arrange his household‘s resources. 
Moreover, he tends to be economical, or political (in the sense that he is in a position to for example gain control 
over government sponsored/subsidised goods that was meant for less fortunate villagers, or be in a position to 
influence village affairs and settle local quarrels) superior the majority of the people he provide resources to, 
though it happens that local patrons also borrow from their (resource wise) inferior clients. Personal 
characteristics such as persistence, ability to lead others, political interest, intelligence and ingenuity will 
furthermore contribute to determine who becomes a successful patron. 
48
 Collateral in the informal sector can be thought of a something that express the intention of repaying. The 
value of collateral is determined by the notional value of the asset, not the expected sales value. A local lender 
can for example see great value in a relatively inexpensive ring which was given to a borrower by her bellowed 
grandmother, as it is very likely that the borrower will be under the lenders control until she can reclaim her ring. 
The formal bank, on the other hand, cannot sell the ring in case of default to regain the money lost, and it is 
therefore off no valuable to them.   
49
 G. Milroy Paul, Director of Habitat for Humanity, expressed that the latter is a significant problem in 
relevance to Housing Microfinance in India, as he on more than two occasions during his presentation at the 
Annual Forum talked about how ―clients seldom have clear legal land title ownership rights‖ (Jaipur, 
22.06.2010.) 
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conditional to the borrower‘s cash flow. As we can read from the quote included in the former 
part discussing the banking system (and from the many that will follow in this thesis), the 
formal banks are not perceived to provide such services. There is little doubt though, that 
moneylenders provide such loans. However, there is considerable controversy about the 
interest rates associated with them. The alternatives in the informal sphere are typically 
diverse and often overlapping, but in the literature we mostly to meet three main views that 
aim to sum up moneylenders and their ways of conducting business. The arguments falls 
along a continuum of informal lenders, but we can broadly characterise them as follows; 
‗malicious and monopolistic‘, ‗providing a much needed value for the people‘ and 
‗moneylending conducted under monopolistic competition‘ (Robinson, 2001, p. 177-185). 
There are two more categories of informal credit providers; one refers to assistance 
from/between relatives, neighbours and friends,
50
 and the second to people who become 
lenders rather accidently.
51
 My intention is to leave out the discussion of the latter two 
categories as they are less relevant for the discussion of whether or not there is a need for a 
different approach through which financial services should be provided.
52
 We will address the 
three main views because it is relevant to know them in order to understand the situations the 
range of people that meet their financial needs through the local lenders might be faced with. 
This chapter furthermore ends in a discussion of the factors that work against financial 
inclusion in the informal market. 
                                                 
50
 Robinson, referring to Carstens 1995, argues that such loans usually carry no, or sometimes low, financial 
interest, but that they may entail social, political and economical obligations ranging from providing free labour 
to committing reciprocal future loans, from providing information to rendering political support (Robinson, 
2001, p. 173). If such low (if any) interest loans are based on reciprocity, a form of ‗I help you out, expecting 
that you will help me out in the future‘ mentality works behind them, they might furthermore be thought of as a 
broader informal mutual insurance relationship. There are of course an opposite to the friendly neighbour 
argument as well, people taking advantage of their less fortunate family members or friends, but the main trend 
in the literature seems to be that friends and family are trying to help each other out. 
 
 
51
 An ‗accidental moneylender‘ I would define as somebody that happens to have / come across surplus money 
and is surrounded by people he is ‗obligated‘ or expected to share his (rise in) fortune with. Surplus money can 
come about by striking a good deal, or for example by experiencing a rise in income (though maybe only 
periodically) as children move out of the household, have finished their education and began to contribute to the 
households earnings, or parents die and the person inherit their resources.
 
See Erik G. Jansen‘s Competition for 
scarce resources, 1986, p. 132-137, for an example of an accidental lender. 
52
 Such loans are relevant in the sense that they assist people who experience cash shortage, but because people 
rely on commercial informal lenders in addition to the loans made among neighbors, relatives and friends (a 
support which is likely to continue even if the clients borrow in the formal sector), it is the moneylenders we will 
focus on in this thesis. If people do not rely on additional services from commercial lenders, they are probably 
not in dire need a formal loan either, but it might nevertheless be beneficial. An accidental lender who becomes a 
full time lender will be addressed as a ‗regular‘ lender in this thesis. 
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4.6 Moneylenders as malicious monopolistic agents 
The people advocating moneylenders as ‗malicious‘ argue that moneylenders conduct 
exploitive credit practices and charge exorbitant interest rates as a mean to make the borrower 
default so that the lender can seize the borrower‘s assets, force him or her into bonded labour, 
extracting substantial profit, or gain the borrower‘s produced goods at below market prices. 
The rationale behind why some view moneylenders as being exploitative is the fact that 
borrowers typically are poor persons with few other options through which to obtain capital, 
while the interest rates charged by the informal lenders typically are well above those found 
in the formal sector. The poor are furthermore seen as vulnerable persons that are driven to 
pay usurious rates out of desperation (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 27).  
The fear for an informal credit marked dominated by malicious lenders has not come 
about without a reason. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) recite Bhaduri (1973), 
who argues that: ―By keeping farmers perpetually in debt, moneylenders strengthen their 
bargaining power in order to tighten the squeeze‖ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005, p. 28). Robinson provides us with an example from her fieldwork in the Telengana 
region in Andhra Pradesh:  
 
In this area, as in some other underdeveloped parts of India, a bonded labourer‘s full-time work pays 
only the interest on the loan; it neither repays the loan principal nor provides subsistence. ... In most 
cases the labourer ends up having to reborrow from his lender or employer, perpetuating the bondage. 
The lenders only concern in such cases is to ensure that the labourer has enough food to be able to work. 
Some female bonded labourers are required to provide sexual services to the lender, in addition to their 
agricultural or domestic labour‖ (Robinson, 2001, p. 208). 
 
Though there is no arguing whether exploitative moneylenders do exist, all informal lenders 
do not fall under this category.
53
 The reason why some persons are allowed to conduct 
malicious practices, according to this view, is that clients are unable to substitute the lender‘s 
services and must thereby accept whatever conditions / interest rates he demands. 
Furthermore ―exploitation is possible since moneylenders have local monopoly power; that 
power is ‗protected‘ because potential competitors lack the necessary information and 
connections to break into local markets‖ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 28). 
                                                 
53
 I personally believe that the people who conduct malicious practices in many cases do so because of their 
nature. A person who begins with moneylending probably do not automatically start to speculate in bonded 
labour or land alienation if he is a good man with high moral standards and merely wish to make a profit from 
the interests or to help out a family member in distress.  
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4.7 Moneylenders providing a good value and much needed service for the people 
The school of thought that developed primarily at the Agricultural Economics Department of 
Ohio State University in the early 1980s advocate that informal commercial moneylenders 
provide credit to low-income rural households at reasonable interest rates, as the interest rates 
required by them simply reflect the transaction cost and risk associated with lending to the 
poor (Robinson, 2001, p. 180-222). In some cases the cost associated with handling many 
small clients is high. The lender has to deal with clients who wish to borrow small amounts 
instantly, who lack a steady income flow and who do not have much savings (if any). They 
will therefore need individualised repayment schedules, and the possibility that they might 
have a hard time repaying is present. Due to the patron-client relationship it is furthermore 
common that borrowers repeatedly turn to the lender for assistance (in terms of acquiring 
advises concerning loan utilisation, to postpone repayment or to ask for some form of aid to 
cover the household‘s subsistence inevitabilities). The patron-client relationship is by no 
means merely a one way affiliation that enables a patron to extort clients; the clients are also 
able to take advantage of this bond as they can argue that ‗their patron‘ is expected to help 
them out. Both the expectations to the lender and his dealing with many and diverse clients 
can contribute to high transaction costs and a high degree of risk.    
On the other hand, the lender has a network that can provide information about 
potential borrowers, and as he tends to stick to a limited clientele he already knows most of 
the people he lends to. He often lives and works in the locality, so checking up on the clients 
should be fairly easily obtainable at a low cost. The lender is in a position to exert much 
pressure on a borrower to repay since the client is likely to be more dependent on the 
goodwill of the patron than what the patron is on that particular poor villager, and the lender 
might be associated with other influential villagers, lawyers or government officials that will 
allow him to push certain borders when redeeming money. Viewed from this angel there is 
thus little to support the argument of a high degree of risk, and it suggests that the transaction 
costs might not be unreasonable high. 
Moneylenders manage risk in a number of ways, but what appears to be a general 
trend in the data Robinson (2001) provides, is that the interest rate vary with the degree of 
poverty a person live in and the size of the loan. ―[T]he poor are charged higher interest rates 
because they have low bargaining power, and because the transaction costs to lenders in 
making small loans are essentially the same as those in making larger loans. If interest rates 
were the same, smaller loans would be less profitable‖ (Robinson, 2001, p.198). 
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4.8 Monopolistic competition sets the boundaries for informal lending 
Why can we argue that moneylenders are experiencing to conduct business under the 
regulations of monopolistic competition? Stiglitz provides us with a definition of what 
monopolistic competition is. He begins by explaining that when a single firm supplies the 
market, economists refer to it as a ‗monopoly‘ and when a few firms supply the market, we 
have an ‗oligopoly‘. From there he continues: 
 
And even when there are many firms, each may produce a slightly different good and may thus perceive 
itself facing a downward-sloping demand curve. Economists refer to such situations as monopolistic 
competition. In all of these situations competition deviates from the ideal of perfect competition, where 
each firm is so small that it believes there it is nothing it can do to affect the prices (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 77-
78, the author‘s emphasis). 
 
 
 
        Interest rate/ 
     Price Demand 
      Marginal Revenue 
         q            
  
   p    Marginal cost = Average Cost 
 
 
          q                q                  Clients/Output 
 
Figure 4.8.1, Monopoly pricing
54
 
 
As we are talking about moneylenders, the figure cannot be applied as a textbook model, but 
it does give us an idea about how the market works.
55
 What we can read from the figure is 
that the downward-sloping demand curve gives room for the lender to alter his interest rates 
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 The figure is based on a figure presented by Stiglitz, 2000, p. 79. 
55
 In a market characterised by free competition, the moneylender would have to set his interest rate at p  where 
marginal cost (MC) = demand (D). This means that if the moneylender sets his interest rate higher than p  , the 
clients would have turned elsewhere because his product could be substituted, or found, in another location at a 
lower price. In situations with monopoly pricing the level of outcome, or the number of clients (q  ), is lower than 
the competitive output (q  ). Strictly theoretically, perfect competition means that a firm sets the extra gain it 
receives from selling one more unit of output, the marginal revenue, equal to the marginal cost to maximise its 
income. That the demand curve has a downward-sloping shape translate into that the firm will have to lower its 
price on the extra unit it wants to sell, and therefore also on all the previous units (as price discrimination is not 
an option). 
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without losing all his clients. As the moneylender tends to be a powerful villager he might 
furthermore be in a position to price discriminate which regular firms are not. This means that 
he does not have to lower his prices for all just because he provides some with a loan at a 
lower rate of interest. The other distinction we have to remember is that the lender might face 
some competition because the village economy is not necessarily characterised by his 
monopoly, ergo monopolistic competition. The lender might therefore have to offer his clients 
something extra, additional services, to keep them from shopping around for credit.  
Robinson argues that the large number of lenders in these markets can give the illusion 
of competition, but that the new entrants normally do not compete for the borrowers of 
established lenders due to the interlinked transactions and their entrance do therefore not tend 
to drive interest rates down (Robinson, 2001, p. 182-183). ―Those who want to expand their 
lending typically do so through credit layering: providing credit to linked borrowers who tend 
to onlend to their own interlinked borrowers. ... Having no incentive to do otherwise, 
moneylenders maintain high interest rates and ration credit‖ (Robinson, 2001, p. 183). 
Monopolistic competition, her model of it,
56
 does certainly contribute to explain differing 
interest rates between informal lenders, but I wish to point out that anecdotal evidence imply 
that ―money lender‘s interest rates have declined in areas where SHGs and MFIs have become 
operational‖ (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 88).57 This suggests that microfinance is in a position to 
challenge informal lenders relative monopoly, which, even if informal lenders continue to 
prosper, perhaps can contribute to lower excessive interest rates in the informal sector. 
 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
So far we have found that it appears to be a mismatch between the services provided by 
formal banks and the financial requirements of the poor as the banking sector shows signs of 
rather considerable financial exclusion of low-income rural residents. We have documented 
that informal lenders might be better able to meet the genuine credit needs of the poor as local 
                                                 
56
 Robinson argues that her variant of monopolistic competition differs from the classic model in two closely 
related ways. Firstly, entry to the market is free, but only to a certain point. New lenders can enter the market 
freely as long as they do not lend to borrowers that are already served by other moneylenders in the area. 
Secondly and directly related, long term profit is possible to obtain, which she argues it not the case in the classic 
monopolistic competition model (Robinson, 2001, p. 182-183). 
57
 In an attempt to find out more about this I sent an e-mail to Mr. Srinivasan and asked whether he knew of any 
studies undertaken on this matter since, proving a link between lowered interest rates in the informal sector and 
microfinance. I have extracted a part of his reply: ―There have been a few studies which indicate that money 
lender's interest rates have declined. I am unable to give you the references offhand as I am in Ethiopia now on a 
mission. But you will find references in this year's State of the Sector report 2010 which will be released on 15 
November 2010‖ (24.09.2010). The 15th is unfortunately also the deadline for this thesis, but please see the 
report for further reading on the subject. 
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lenders timely provide a more flexible range of (credit) products, and we found that the 
informal lenders often are more willing to serve poor people as they are better equipped to 
gather information about the borrowers, and that they can accept collateral in forms which the 
formal banks cannot. Nevertheless, we also found that informal lenders tend to stick to a 
limited clientele of people whom they usually interact and trade with in other markets, and 
that this can have an excluding force on potential borrowers who are outside the local lender‘s 
(preferred) network. We have documented that local moneylenders often experience to 
conduct their business in a relatively monopolistic manner, which may result in excessive 
interest rates, credit rationing, exploitation in terms of providing loans to seize other people‘s 
assets or to secure bonded labour and (social) humiliation of the borrower and/or his 
household members. As the dealings in the informal sector grants local lenders relative 
monopoly power which we saw other informal lenders have a hard time to challenge, formal 
providers of finance might be the only ones who can enter the market and perhaps infuse 
competition in the sector. These findings post a strong need and an ample space for innovative 
approaches through which one can serve the financial needs of the rural poor through the 
formal sector.  
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5 
What shape has the microfinance movement in India taken, and how 
does it aim to correct for market failures in the formal economy? 
 
Microfinance in India is primarily provided through two approaches, the Self Help Group-
Bank Linkage Programme (SBLP) and the Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). In the SBLP the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD) are promoting relationship banking, i.e. improving existing relationships between 
banks and the poor through social intermediation of NGOs (non-governmental organisations). 
In India the SBLP is the approach which has been able to reach the most clients. In addition to 
this, we find the microfinance institutions (MFIs).
58
 The expansion of the MFI approach in 
terms of client acquisition was initially off to a slower start than the SBLP, but in the last 
years it has gained pace and it can seem like the MFIs might catch up to the SBLP within 
long.  
One cannot consider the MFI approach and the SBLP approach to be two different 
movements; rather one can regard the whole movement to be made up by two facets. 
According to Dr. Navin Anand,
59
 one is the socially oriented approach adopting the self help 
group model which is looking for social, economic and political empowerment of women as 
an end.
60
 The second facet is a pure microfinance approach wherein the microfinance 
institutions see providing microfinance as an end. These MFIs are also concerned about 
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 The range of providers of microfinance can broadly be categorised as ‗formal institutions‘ and ‗semi-formal 
institutions‘. According to Rao: “The former category comprises apex development institutions, commercial 
banks, regional rural banks, and cooperative banks that provide microfinance services in addition to their general 
banking activities and are referred to as microfinance service providers [the microfinance service providers are 
associated with India‘s SBLP]. On the other hand, semi-formal institutions that undertake microfinance as their 
main activity are generally referred to as microfinance institutions (MFIs)‖ (Rao, 2008, p. 57). At several points 
in this thesis I will address the microfinance sector in general, thereby not differentiating between the formal and 
the semi-formal institutions, the MFI approach and the self help group-bank linkage programme. In such cases I 
have chosen to disregard this difference in terminology and refer to both categories as ‗providers of 
microfinance‘ or ‗formal institutions providing finance‘. 
59
 Dr. Navin Anand is the Resource Person and Moderator for the Microfinance Community, Solution Exchange, 
working at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in New Delhi. This information was 
expressed by e-mail, 12.01.2010. 
60
 This incorporates various initiatives of ministries like Rural Development, Social and Economic Justice, 
Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development (Department of 
School Education and Literacy and Department of Higher Education), Department of Cooperation, Ministry of 
Agriculture; National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development/Reserve Bank of India, and projects 
initiated by Non-Governmental Organisations and/or International Agencies. 
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socioeconomic development of poor, but do not necessarily undertake the responsibility of 
taking it up as a key agenda.  
This chapter will examine in what ways microfinance is expected to tackle the market 
failures we found to be present in the formal economy in order to reach the poor and to 
improve the formal sectors competitiveness relative to informal lenders. We will first take a 
brief look at the history of microfinance as well as the two approaches, before we proceed to 
explore in what ways the mere workings of microfinance is expected to correct for poor 
borrowers lack of collateral and the imperfect information that causes adverse selection and 
moral hazard. To do this we will rely on the relevant algebra that we have explored in chapter 
three and four (which can be found in Debraj Ray‘s Development Economics (1998) and 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch‘s The Economics of Microfinance (2005)). 
 
5.1 The origin of microfinance 
As an attempt to reach the poor clients that are served badly, or maybe not at all by regulated 
financial institutions and the informal financial service of moneylenders (neighbours, relatives 
and friends), the notion of microcredit was born (the origins of microcredit in its current form 
is generally traced to the mid-1970s when Professor Yunus started the first Grameen Bank
61
). 
Microcredit is the provision of very small loans that essentially is used by low income 
households with few assets that can be posted as collateral. The loans are repaid in small 
weekly, biweekly or monthly amounts, and the entire loan is usually repaid within a short 
period of time. 
 
Gradually, a paradigm shift took place- from the delivery of government- or donor-subsidized credit to 
the development of sustainable financial intermediaries that capture local savings, access commercial 
finance, and lend these funds to low-income borrowers at interest rates that enable full cost recovery 
and institutional self-sufficiency‖ (Robinson, 2001, p. xxxii).62  
 
The microcredit industry had begun to recognise that the poor required a variety of financial 
products besides credit to meet their needs, and the concept of microcredit evolved into 
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 Though Mohammad Yunus is often recognized as the initiator of microcredit, others similar initiatives 
originated in the 1960s and 1970s. Self Employed Women‘s Association (SEWA) established SEWA Bank in 
India in 1974 (SEWA, 2009a, [online]), and according to ACCION‘s webpage ACCION International begun as 
a student-run volunteer effort in the shantytowns of Caracas, Venezuela, it was founded in 1961 and has been 
a leader in microfinance since 1973 (ACCION, 2007a, [online]; ACCION, 2007b, [online]). ―Acción 
International launched the first micro-credit organization in Recife, Brazil, although several others followed, 
such as Bank Rakyat in Indonesia and BancoSol in Bolivia. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is only one of 
these initiatives‖ ((the author‘s emphasis) Sola, 2007, [online]).  
62
 According to Robinson this ―microfinance revolution‖ first occurred in Indonesia in the 1980 and then in 
Bolivia in the mid-1990s (Robinson, 2001, p. xxxii). 
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microfinance. Microfinance tends to be a ‗savings first approach‘ which typically involves the 
provision of thrift, credit and other finance services such as money transfer and 
microinsurance products of very small amounts to the poor, with the aim to raise income 
levels and improve living standards. As a solution to the lack of appropriate collateral, and to 
correct for imperfect information about borrowers, microfinance rest on collective security as 
a means to secure loan repayment through social sanctions and peer enforcement.  
 
5.2 The self help group-bank linkage approach 
As a response to the discussion ‗A National Regulatory Framework for Microfinance Sector‘, 
that is currently running in the Solution Exchange Microfinance Community,
63
 Mr. A. P. 
Fernandez, former Director of Myrada and presently the Chairperson of NABARD Financial 
Service Limited (NABFINS), shared his article Is Micro Finance leading to a Macro Mess -
 the AP Ordinance on November 9
th
 2010. The following is an extract from the article and 
shows the origin of the self help group-bank linkage programme (SBLP):  
 
To explain this a little further, we need to briefly trace the history and the concept of what a real SHG 
is. This history has been buried under media coverage promoting the fast growing Neo-NBFC model. 
Between 1984-1986 Myrada (an NGO) worked with the primary Cooperative Societies as the base 
institution. It realised that far from fostering the interest of all, the benefits went to a few powerful 
families including the President, Secretary and a few others. They borrowed at the official rates (6%-
8%) and on lent to others at rates ranging from 30% to 40%. The poor were dependent on the powerful 
for jobs, immediate loans etc. Myrada encouraged them to challenge this situation. They broke away 
and formed small groups - the members were self selected; we later realised that the groups were based 
on affinity among the members. Affinity in turn was based on relations of trust and mutual support 
which existed before we entered. This was later called social capital and was the strength of people on 
which Myrada built. After several rounds of discussions they decided to return the loans they had taken 
from the Cooperative to their respective group. Myrada encouraged them to meet weekly; each member 
contributed to the agenda which comprised issues related to health, domestic problems, need for credit 
etc. They were encouraged to save and Myrada staff kept records of meetings and accounts. When they 
wanted money, they were encouraged to take loans from their savings which meanwhile had been 
deposited in a local Bank. These groups were the real cooperatives. Myrada approached NABARD in 
1986 with a request to support this complimentary/alternate mode (Fernandez, 2010, [online]). 
 
Finding the formal financial system inadequate to cater to the financial needs of the rural 
poor, NABARD decided to engage in the project with MYRADA in 1987. Their aim was to 
combine the safety and reliability of the large network of formal finance that exist in India 
with the convenience and flexibility that is associated with informal finance. MYRADA was 
to form affinity or ‗saving and credit‘ groups (later renamed ‗self help groups‘) that after 
extensive training would be linked to the formal banks. The success of this field level 
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 An email based community in which practitioners, scholars and others can raise concerns and share knowledge 
and experiences in regards to the microfinance sector. 
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experiment encouraged NABARD to launch a pilot project in 1991-1992, and steady progress 
of the project resulted in the mainstreaming of the SBLP in 1996.  
To correct for the shortcomings in the formal economy providers of microfinance use 
collective security / social capital as a means to secure loan repayment through social 
sanctions and peer-enforcement. This goes for banks and for most MFIs, though MFIs also 
rely on joint liability groups which will be discussed shortly. Each promoting/providing 
organisation/institution has its own procedures and requirements, but a tendency is that clients 
themselves form groups made up by five to twenty people who must agree to co-guarantee for 
a loan taken by anyone in the group.
64
 The group meets on a regular basis, usually once a 
week, biweekly or monthly, together with a staff member from the respective institution or 
organisation to collect and/or deposit money. The staff member is expected to provide the 
clients with some basic training in how to handle money (increase financial literacy, and in 
some cases literacy in itself), he or she is to raise health awareness, to teach human rights, and 
to instruct the clients in how to deal with social issues such as early marriage, polygamy, 
divorce and dowry (Kabeer, 2005, p. 100-102; Aminur Rashid, 1997, p. 201). 
After six months of being in a group, pooling their savings, receiving appropriate 
training and inter-loaning from their common basket of resources, the SBLP requires that the 
group goes through a grading. The group‘s activities are reviewed by a committee (made up 
by bankers, NGO staff, a grading agency or others) that decides whether or not the group is 
prepared to handle the responsibility that comes with having relatively easy access to rather 
large amounts of money from the formal banks. The first grading, though the processes might 
differ depending on the people in charge of making the decision, will usually be an 
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 It is mostly women that are microfinance clients. From a developmental perspective the main arguments to 
focus on women is that at any level of poverty, women tend to be the poorest, and girls are typically the most 
deprived (Robinson, 2001, p. 8). Furthermore it is argued that a destitute mother is more likely than her husband 
to spend income on the welfare of her family (Fisher and Sriram, 2002, p. 130; Greeley, 2005, p. 25), and that 
she will prioritise to create a safe and healthy environment for her children by spending more on consumption 
goods, household articles and education. Her contribution to the household might gain her more respect within 
the family unit, which has proven to give greater power in renegotiating daily chores and greater influence in 
household's decision-making processes (Kabeer, 2005, p. 87; Fisher and Sriram, 2002, p. 128-129).  Kabeer 
further documents that clients of MFIs are more likely than non-members to vote at local level elections, to 
participate in election campaigns and to express a desire to contest at local elections (2005, p. 118-119). 
Morgan Brigg, on the other hand, refer to Rahman who has argued that even though the official line is 
that targeting women brings about faster improvements in family conditions and solidarity for women, the actual 
reason for excluding men has much to do with the ease in disciplining the different genders. Rahman found that 
(Grameen) bank workers regarded men as arrogant and difficult to deal with. He claimed that Grameen staff 
preferred to focus on women as they tended to be shy, passive and submissive, and because they were easily 
traceable in the village because of their constrained mobility (Brigg, 2006, p. 80)
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assessment of the creditworthiness the group.
65
 If the committee decides that the SHG is 
ready to graduate, the group‘s savings is placed in a group deposit account in the name of the 
group at the bank before the members can begin to borrow. SHGs usually borrow at about 12 
per cent per annum, plus an additional interest charge decided on by the group which goes to 
the groups pooled resources (Basu and Srivasatava, 2005, p. 11). Banks typically provide the 
group a loan amounting up to four times the group‘s savings, and the group will distribute the 
amount borrowed amongst them as they find it to be fit. The SHG funds may be distributed 
either to one or more members of the group who are personally responsible for repayment to 
the group, or spent collectively by the group. The group‘s funds are rotated through lending 
within the group, but the SHG as a unit is responsible for repaying the bank. Thus, the group 
members save, borrow and repay collectively, which gives them the advantage of lowered 
transaction costs in dealing with the banking bureaucracy, and access to (larger) amounts of 
formal credit despite the fact that they (usually) lack material collateral. According to the 
Report of the Committee on Financial Inclusion the ―SHG – Bank Linkage Programme can be 
regarded as the most potent initiative since Independence for delivering financial services to 
the poor in a sustainable manner‖ (C. Rangarajan, 2008, p. iv, [online]). 
 
5.3 Microfinance institutions 
Scholars trace the microfinance initiative in India back to the undertakings of Ela Bhatt and 
her efforts to provide financial services to poor women working in the unorganised sector in 
Ahmedabad. Bhatt contributed to found the Self Employed Women‘s Association (SEWA) in 
December 1971, which registered as a Trade Union in 1972, and in 1974 SEWA established 
its own bank (SEWA, 2009a, [online]; SEWA, 2009b [online]). Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) can broadly be defined as ―institutions other than banks that are engaged in provision 
of financial services to the poor‖ (Jindal, 2008, p. 69). This very broad definition includes a 
wide range of providers that vary in their legal structure, mission, and methodology. 
However, according to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) they all share the 
common characteristic of providing financial services to clients who are poorer and more 
vulnerable than traditional bank client (CGAP, 2010, [online]). The MFIs that operate in India 
today can be broadly sub-divided into four categories of organisational forms; NGO-MFIs, 
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 To assess this, the committee tends to look into group dynamics such as the participation of members, why the 
people have come together, cohesion in the group, the record keeping of the group, goal-oriented action 
undertaken/planed by the group, democracy in decision making and collective leadership within the group. They 
will decide whether the group is functioning as it should, how the group‘s saving and repayment discipline is and 
whether the group is sustainable or not.   
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Non-Profit Section 25 Non-Banking Financial Companies-MFIs, (Mutual Benefit) 
cooperative MFIs and For-Profit Non-Banking Financial Companies-MFIs (K. Muralidhara 
Rao, 2008, p. 59-61).
66
 Some MFIs provide loans through SHGs in the same way as described 
above (expect for the processes of bank linkage), some provide individual loans, and the most 
recent model adopted by Indian MFIs is that of Joint Liability Groups (JLGs). In the 
Intellecap White Paper ―Indian Microfinance Crisis of 2010: Turf War or a Battle of 
Intentions?‖ it is stated that:  
 
Unlike the SHG model wherein the loan is given to the group and the bank does not track individuals‘ 
credit history, in the Grameen-inspired JLG model the loan is given to the individual (usually by the 
MFI), backed by the group guarantee; and an individual credit history is created, even though it may be 
skewed by the group guarantee scheme (2010, p. 1 [online]). 
 
A. P. Fernandez argues that:
 
 
 
They have instead formed Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) which experience has shown are neither joint 
or mutually liable or groups. Several policy makers in Government have supported the JLGs in 
preference to the SHGs since, the evidence shows, the JLGs are by far the quickest and cheapest way of 
disbursing credit. The SHGs require investment in institutional capacity building - which NABARD has 
supported since 1992; but it takes time - at least 6-10 months during which savings are promoted and 
internal lending starts before the Banks advance a loan. But today the name SHGs is a veil used by the 
neo NBFCs that covers (and justifies) many animals (Fernandez, 2010, [online]). 
 
5.4 To tackle market imperfections through a group lending approach 
It is by providing financial services to the poor through a group lending approach that 
practitioners of microfinance expect to correct for the imperfect information that banks used 
to experience about borrowers and the clients‘ lack of proper collateral. The advantage of 
group lending is, on the lender‘s part, that he can transfer the job of screening potential 
borrowers, monitoring their efforts and enforcing contracts onto the clients. For the borrowers 
group lending means that they access loans that otherwise would have been inaccessible, or at 
least not been available at such low rates of interest (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005, p. 113-114). Below we will explore in what ways the group lending approach is 
expected to correct for adverse selection and moral hazard. From there we continue to take a 
closer look at the benefits as well as the costs of having to attend group meetings, and on how 
the requirement of group lending might contribute to exclude poor people from accessing 
microfinance. Rounding off this chapter I will sum up what we have addressed which will 
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 Due to the scope of this thesis and the little relevance the different categories of MFIs have for this thesis, I 
will not discuss them further here, but I do recommend Muralidhara Rao‘s ―MFIs in India: An Overview,‖ p. 59-
62, and Krishan Jindal‘s ―Regulatory Framework from MFIs,” p. 69-78, for further reading on the subject. Both 
articles can be found in ―Microfinance in India,” edited by K.G. Karmakar, 2008.  
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help us determine to what extent the group lending approach actually corrects for market 
failures in the formal economy. 
 
5.5 Tackling the problem of adverse selection 
Recall from chapter three that the problem of adverse selection occurs when lenders cannot 
distinguish inherently risky borrowers from safer borrowers. The lender is forced to charge all 
clients higher rates of interest in order to compensate for the possible default of unsafe 
borrowers. ―The inefficiency arises when this implicit subsidy is so large that safe borrowers 
leave the market rather than shouldering the burden - namely, when the presence of risky 
borrowers raises the interest rate to levels that are simply unaffordable for safer borrowers‖ 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 89). Promoters of microfinance believe that 
lending to groups with joint responsibility might mitigate this inefficiency.  
 A common feature of SHGs is that the group members themselves decide who they 
wish to make partners. All members know before signing up that in the event of default no 
one in the group is allowed to borrow again. This provides the incentive to form a group with 
much caution so as to weed out the borrower who could jeopardise the creditworthiness of the 
group as a whole. The potential borrowers will, for their own good, make use of all the 
information available to them about their fellow villagers to find the people who are less 
likely to default. As the clients are faced with the prospect of joint responsibility for a loan, it 
is clearly better for safer customers to stick together, ―... this induces a form of self-selection 
that no individual-based banking scheme can mimic‖ (Ray, 1998, p. 579, the author‘s 
emphasis). According to Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch this practice, given that the 
safe borrowers actually can choose, leaves the less safe borrowers no choice but to form 
groups with other risky types (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 89). Ray argues 
that group formation has the property to drive risky types out of the market, seeing that their 
riskiness now is born by other borrowers instead of by the bank alone (Ray, 1998, p. 580).  
Believing that the government targeting to reach priority sector poor somewhat 
counter that risky borrowers get pushed out of the market, how than will group formation 
benefit the lender and the safer clients? Ultimately, this boils down to that risk is transferred 
from the bank onto the riskier borrowers, and that, effectively, safer clients pay lower interest 
than their counterparts as they no longer have to cross-subsidise the riskier clients. The only 
persons who have to repay for a default loan is the defaulter‘s group members, and it is 
believed that they will strive to do so in fear of being denied future access to financial 
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services. The bank does not necessarily obtain more information about who the risky 
customers are through the group lending approach, but it can take advantage of the fact that 
the group members themselves might have good information about fellow members and 
therefore rely on that the joint liability gives the members incentives to use their information 
to the bank‘s advantage.  ―Strikingly, the result is that group lending methodology does the 
trick even though (1) the bank remains as ignorant as ever about who is safe and who is risky, 
and (2) all customers are offered exactly the same contract‖ (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005, p. 90). 
Karmakar, on the other hand, notes that most groups neither are formed naturally nor 
voluntary, but that people come together in need (Karmakar, 2008, p. 50). This might affect 
the natural selection referred to above, but as shown by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
(2005, p. 94-96), this should not raise the interest rates charged by the bank to such a level 
that it will drive the safer customers out of the market.
67
 Their analysis show that regardless 
of whether risky and safe customers happens to be in the same group, all customers should be 
interested in borrowing at the going (cost covering) rate charged by the bank. ―The bottom 
line is quite surprising: in principle, the group-lending contract can help lenders reduce 
interest rates- even where neither the bank nor the client have information about who is safe 
or risky! In the process, adverse selection can be mitigated and greater number of worthy 
borrowers can get access to credit‖ (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 96). 
Group lending thus, has two effects for the borrower which cuts in opposite directions. 
―First, relative to individual borrowing, it increases the risk on any one borrower for a given 
level of project riskiness: this is a cost. Second, it creates pressure for peer monitoring to 
lower the level of project riskiness: this is a gain‖ (Ray, 1998, p. 580, the author‘s emphasis). 
According to Siglitz (1990), under some conditions, the gain from such procedures outweighs 
the loss and leads to better overall institution (Stiglitz referred to by Ray, 1998, p. 580).  
 Because banks taking advantage of the group lending methodology should be better 
insured against defaults, average interest rates for both risky and safe types can be reduced (or 
be kept low despite information asymmetry) while the banks still makes a profit (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 90). As an additional force working to encourage banks to 
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 Their analysis merely aims at showing the potential for gains as it draws on specific assumptions about the 
nature of risk and the role of limited liability. Furthermore it assumes that groups are made up by two persons 
who borrow at the same time. We knows that groups can be made up by somewhere around 5-20 persons who all 
pool their savings, and that all the clients seldom borrow simultaneously. This means that there is more than one 
member who can compensate for a defaulter (i.e. less amount per person), and that sequential lending hinders 
that all borrowers should default simultaneously. This just post an even stronger argument that group lending in 
fact can tackle adverse selection.  
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lend to the poor is that NABARD refinance loans made to SHGs at a subsidised rate. The 
banker I met with in Uttarakhand summarised the scenario the State Bank of India branch he 
worked in was faced with in the following way:  
 
SHGs are always welcome, no much rules are there. Only minimum rules; they should be combined for 
six months only and have had the first grading, they should be holding the meetings every month, they 
are doing some sort of activity. That‘s all, than we are providing them finance. We have provided it to 
so many groups. It is no denying of finance to SHG because all money we are getting refinanced by 
NABARD, so it is always a profitable venture, we are not losing anything. We are able to finance the 
SHGs, we are able to get the money whatever we finance and we are able to get the interest difference. 
That is our profit.
68
 
 
Providing microfinance through a group lending approach should both encourage banks to 
lend to the poor, and it should encourage the safe customers, who no longer have to cross 
subsidise the more risky, to re-enter the market. 
 
5.6 Mitigating moral hazard 
Let us recall the problem of moral hazard addressed in both the previous chapters; once a loan 
has been made, the lender might face the risk of strategic default due to difficulties in 
monitoring the borrower‘s actions. The borrower might not put in the required work to 
succeed, or she can pocket the money and run after profits have been realised. Group lending 
with joint responsibility is argued to circumvent the moral hazard problems since the group 
members, who often live and work closely together, is expected to impose social or economic 
sanctions on each other. Social sanctions typically involves excluding ‗problem‘ borrowers 
from privileged access to input supplies, from further trade credit, from social and religious 
events, or from day-to-day courtesies (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 109). 
Such measures of monitoring each others‘ actions and inflicting penalties upon those who do 
not put in the required effort, thus burden the group with excessive risk, might be impossible 
for an outside bank to match (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 96-97).  
Although joint responsibility can be a door opener for poor people who are excluded 
from formal financial services, it does not automatically translate into peer pressure and 
repayment. Kabeer reports that even though the pressure exerted on those who did not come 
up with their weekly repayment was strong, the support for tactics such as penalties, 
persuasion by staff, pressure to leave the group or reconsideration of loan terms in reclaiming 
borrowed assets was very low (Kabeer, 2005, p. 104-106). Milgram, who has studied 
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 Uttarakhand, 26.09.2009. 
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microfinance in the Philippines but whose data still finds relevance in this thesis, shows that 
even the tactic of peer pressure can fall short when a client finds herself bound to divert her 
loan to cover essential family needs instead of spending it to earn an income. The other group 
members, understanding the rationale for the defaulters prioritising, may choose not to exert 
the pressure that the MFI expects because they know that they would have acted in the same 
way if they were in the defaulter‘s situation (Milgram, 2006, p. 177). As the client is most 
likely forced to default due to circumstances beyond her control, this is not a case of moral 
hazard. However, it brings about one very important point; a genuine financial difficulty that 
results in an involuntary default might actualise unwillingness to repay (strategic default) 
from the rest of the group. If more than one person in a group has taken a loan, and somebody 
defaults, the rest of the group automatically lose their right to future credit unless they can 
cover for the defaulter. Because the group‘s credit rating is destroyed anyway, the group 
members experience little incentive to repay (imposed by themselves at least), and might 
strategically default and pocket outstanding debt (Ray, 1998, p. 580, referring to Besley and 
Coate, 1995). As the women themselves distribute the formal borrowing under the SBLP, 
these groups might be more exposed to such a threat (in absence of regulations on how many 
that can borrow at the same time), than SHGs for whom sequential lending is a requirement. 
Given sequential borrowing the defaulter might still spoil the other members‘ chance of 
obtaining future credit (when no considerations are taken and the lender does not satisfy with 
disclaiming the one who did not repay), but it will not lead to strategic default by the others as 
they have not yet received loans. 
 The mutual coverage for defaulters has been documented to lead to considerable 
resentment on the part of the clients themselves, and their spouses (Kabeer, 2005, p. 106). 
Data collected in India, Nepal and Bangladesh all express that hostility and coercion that 
hinder group unity might arrive when members vigorously monitor each other‘s consumption 
and repayment patterns (Rankin, 2006, p. 194). Fernando shows that a group leader, in 
consultation with a field-officer (MFI staff), can intervene to such a degree that she plays an 
important role in regulating the entire consumption of a family as well as their social 
expenditures (Fernando, 2006b, p. 218). The latter implies that group pressure is applied on 
the entire family, and such interference may in turn cause conflicts between, and within, 
households. 
Monitoring each other and being risk averse might furthermore be costly. A cost that 
is likely to increase if the borrowers do not live and hold their meetings in close proximity. In 
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cases where the travel to check up on the other members are time consuming and relatively 
expensive, monitoring might be imperfect and the door is once again opened for moral hazard 
to enter back into the picture. ―Why should I work hard if I am liable for penalty when my 
partner shirks- even when I cannot control their action?‖ (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005, p. 87). What is changed in such scenarios relative to individual lending 
though, is that the borrowers now carry the risk of a group member defaulting. The provider is 
more likely to receive full repayment as the group will have to cover for the defaulter in order 
to access future services, and because it holds the group‘s pooled savings.69 
 
5.7 The self help group meetings 
SHGs usually meet regularly together with a representative of the associated NGO, MFI or 
bank to carry out their transactions. These meetings have some obvious and simple 
advantages both for the lender and for the borrowers. The most prominent advantage of group 
meetings for the borrowers is that the bank comes to them, whilst for the lender it is that he 
can handle multiple small sized savings and loan transactions in a relatively short period of 
time, as he is only faced with a single deposit and a single withdrawal per group.  
The argument that lending through a group approach is not time consuming is 
challenged for a number of reasons. First of all it is common to meet stories in the scholarship 
on the subject which tells of microfinance lenders that do not leave the village, the home of a 
defaulter, or finish off a meeting until all clients have deposited the correct amount (or it has 
been done on their behalf). Second of all, the travel back and forth to group meetings can 
impose a rather substantial cost on both the lender and the borrower, especially in areas with 
low population density or harsh geographical conditions. Consider for example this statement 
by Father Francis who is now working with SHGs in the Chamoli district of Uttaranchal.   
 
After coming here, in a way, I was a bit discouraged also. As we do in the plains, it is very, very 
difficult to do in the hills. If you are in the plains you can visit that district, maybe five-six villages you 
can cover. You can see our animators [staff in charge of forming, training and handling the SHGs and 
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 In this respect one should note that peer pressure is not the only way to secure repayment by providers of 
microfinance. Fernando reports that a staff-member might threaten a potential loan default with a law suit or an 
arrest, and he can, with the help of a government official, threaten to withhold whatever government assistance 
that is available to the client. The poor respond to these threats because they fear that they will have to mortgage 
the house or their land, which in turn can lead to the loss of these properties, in order to raise the funds needed to 
cover potential legal fees or bribes to the local government officials or policemen (Fernando, 2006:211). Others 
mention stories of ―forced‖ acquisition of household utensils, livestock or other assets of defaulting members 
(Montgomery referred to by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, 100). The fear of peer pressure and 
threats made by staff can, together with the risk of co-guaranteeing for others‘ loans, have an excluding effect on 
people, especially on those who hold the financially weakest positions in the community. 
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their requests] they are working, and you can evaluate. We can also make sure that they are visiting the 
villages and conducting their meetings. It is very, very easy. But after coming here, once you go to one 
village, you come back, that is the end of the day. Because you reach there, it takes nearly two hours, 
than from there is a two hour climb to reach top hill. Then, after reaching there, you have to find the 
people and bring them from the fields, than you can make the meeting.
70
  
 
What we can read from the Father‘s statement is that it is very unlikely that the associated 
women would be included in the formal financial sector if his (or another) NGO had not been 
working in the area. The distance from the clients‘ village to the nearest bank branch (which 
was in the town Father Francis and I met) is, as stated above, a travel that takes about four 
hours each way. For this reason alone, it is fairly safe to assume that many of the associated 
clients would rather borrow from an informal source in need of cash than to lose workdays, or 
spend (in relation to their income) a substantial amount of money on repeatedly having to 
travel back and forth into town in their attempt to obtain a formal loan. By bringing the bank 
to the women, the lender/facilitator thus offers the same convenience as local moneylenders, 
but at better terms. The clients access credit, a safe place to save and the interest rates in the 
formal sector are (assumingly) less than what they are in the informal sector, and as we in the 
example above refer to groups that are part of the SBLP, the bank‘s interest rates are regulated 
with a interest ceiling on 12 per cent per annum (plus the additional two per cent that the 
women have decided and imposed on themselves, resulting in an annual 24 per cent). In this 
case the group lending approach lower the transaction cost associated with formal finance for 
the clients, but the cost to the bank/facilitator is proportionally higher. When NGOs take on 
the responsibility of forming and grooming groups nevertheless, the bank will not be affected 
by this in the way that it would have been if it was to promote its own groups (if the bank was 
an MFI). The adoption of the Banking Correspondent (BC) and the Banking Facilitator (BF) 
model finds its relevance in enabling banks to reach poor clients more cost efficiently in areas 
like this; characterized by poor infrastructure, relatively low population density, low levels of 
literacy and a relatively undiversified economy.  
The cost of transportation to the meetings is not always born by the financial 
institution alone. Often, especially in remote areas, the clients have to travel a bit to reach the 
meeting place. Together with the opportunity cost of attendance (i.e. lost income due to time 
away from paid labour or less time to perform ones obligation in the household) this 
requirement can present a barrier for people to participate in SHGs. From what I learnt during 
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the fieldworks the question of an opportunity cost introduces two issues I wish to address.
71
 
First of all, for it to present a barrier we must assume that attending a meeting comprise of 
time away from paid labour, and second of all, that people attends the meetings themselves. 
  The problem with the first assumption is that it takes for granted that people actually 
work every day, or at least often enough to make attending group meetings a liability. In 
Uttarakhand I discussed rural employment with the NGO manager, Mr. Dayaram.
72
 He 
explained that villagers in theory were guaranteed 100 days of employment through the 
government scheme NREGA, but that through his work he had become aware that the 
villagers in the area seldom accessed this.
73
 
 
Government is corrupt in its policies, each and every policy. ... So many holes, just like the NREGA. 
Villagers never, so many villagers get only ten days. So this is very poor, the Act status is very bad, 
program status. ... Implementation is this; all families have job cards, certificate for working. They 
demand for work, and within 14 days they get work, and within 15 days they get money. ... BC [Block 
Development Coordinator/Block Development Official (BDO)] do this, clarify this work. But if any 
job-card person was in writing to say that ―I want to work‖ to Block Coordinator, he never received 
this. They don‘t receive this thing, because if they receive this thing, within 14 days, compulsory get me 
job. But they have not money. (Monica: They say they have no money? But the government has 
provided the money?) Has given the money. Government send to CDO, chief development official, 
district level, and district level official send this money at block level, after demanding the work, after 
processing the work, the BDO, block level official, gives this money in Panchayat. This is the process. 
But government not processed this money in time, they say.  
  
According to Mr. Dayaram both the district level officials, block level officials and the village 
Panchayat was scheming of the funds made available by the government for implementing 
NREGA. This resulted, according to him, in that the unemployed villagers did not receive the 
employment they were entitled to and thereby seldom earned the 10 000 Rupees yearly which 
NREGA is meant to ensure. Part of the operations of Mr. Dayaram‘s organisation is to raise 
awareness about the government schemes available in the area. In this respect the NGO 
workers conduct ‗interviews‘ with the clients, and as Mr. Dayaram walked me through some 
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 Throughout this thesis I have chosen to nickname this person Mr. Dayaram. We met in Uttarakhand on 
September 26
th
 2009, and I am very grateful for the contributions from this passionate and straightforward 
person, but I do believe that his openness and almost disrespectful (in the intriguing and well meant sense) way 
of formulating resulted in statements and arguments that I prefer not to ascribe his real name for the sake of the 
well running of the associated NGO. 
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 NREGA is short for the (Mahatma Gandhi) National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which aims at 
enhancing the livelihood security of people in rural areas by guaranteeing hundred days of wage-employment 
(100 Rupees per day) in a financial year to a rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled 
manual work. Panchayats at districts, intermediate and village levels is the principal authorities for planning and 
implementation of the scheme (―The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act‖, (2005), 
[online]). 
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of the questionnaires they used with answers from local women, it became quite clear to me 
that people‘s right to employment under NREGA was not common knowledge in the area. 
         
Next, who gives you this work? They say; ―Gram Pardan gave this work.‖ But not Pardan, not the 
BDO, not the CDO and not anybody person, this is his right, his right to get this work, to get this job. 
But they say, Gram Pardan. (Monica: And what is Gram Pardan?) Gram Pardan is a village Panchayat. 
Head of the Panchayat, this is Gram Panchayat, Gram Pardan. Every family has a right to work. Nobody 
mercy, no mercy, no mercy Gram Panchayat, Panchayat secretary, no mercy village Panchayat Gram 
Pardan, no block officer, district officer. No mercy! This is our right, it is included in our constitution 
that you should have. But they don‘t know, they say; ―the mercy of Gram Pardan we will take this 
work.‖  
... Without work order, if you do any work, you don‘t claim for payment. After work order, if I 
demand some work, within 14 days the block officer give me work order. Then I will do work. Without 
work order I do this work, no payments, no claims, no any claim. (Monica: You can‘t claim payment?)  
Payment, so many, accidental claim and so many, our rights are finished. I ask, you know work order, 
she says: ―no.‖ She doesn‘t get work order, never get work order, she says; ―mercy of Gram Pardan‖ ... 
If Government decided not give to you work within 14 days, than you have right to unemployment 
money, but for unemployment money your rights start when you write him for work. If you don‘t 
demand work you never [get it]. (Monica: And this was the block level?) Yeah, also village level 
secretary, Panchayat secretary also. If you write to them, he receive you application [which he 
apparently seldom does], and receive your demand letter, within 14 days they don‘t give to you work 
order, you are unemployed, which is a right. She say; ―No, I don‘t know, what is unemployment?‖ Get 
only ten days [work]. They don‘t know.  
 
If people do not have wage employment on the days of group meetings, which is likely if the 
trend of employment should be as low as ten days like Mr. Dayaram showed me from some of 
the questionnaires, the opportunity cost of attendance would not be a problem. Although, if 
group meetings are held on the few days (regardless of whether it is 10 or 50) that people 
actually have work, the opportunity cost might be extremely high.  
The second assumption, that opportunity cost must be seen in relation to people having 
to attend meetings, was something that Father Francis expressed frustration with reference to 
during our conversation: 
 
Once you say SHG nowadays, what I see is that they see it as a small bank, mini type bank. Give the 
money, go back. That sort of thing, nothing else. So I convince the people it is not a small bank business 
here. Thing is that sometimes to children no, they give the money [clients to their children], they say: 
―just go on, give to that lady,‖ and then they go to the village for grass cutting or-. They don‘t even 
come for the meeting! I say, if this is the case, we shall stop it here, we shall break it here. This is not 
the purpose. 
 
On the one hand, when people fail to show up for meetings, they miss out on whatever 
teaching provided by the NGO, the group unity might be weak, and subsequently the expected 
empowerment and the possibility to fight pressing issues may pass the clients by. But on the 
other hand, if merely one or two persons send their children in cases when they are unable to 
attend, all will still deposit the correct amount, no default is occurring, and the group 
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members will continue to have access to a safe place to save and a formal source from which 
they can borrow. The persons attending the meetings can furthermore raise their worries and 
try to find effective solutions to their problems regardless of whether or not all are attending. 
The cause of concern lies in whether or not people not showing up for meetings will lower the 
attendance discipline of all. If people starts to absence for the sake of convenience, and 
everybody feel that they should not have to go as their neighbours do not have to go, the 
social collateral, saving discipline, group unity etc. might all be at risk.
74
 
 
5.8 Are poor persons the clients of choice? 
In the introduction to this thesis we saw that the Report of the Committee on Financial 
Inclusion (2008) documented that: ―The poorer the group, the greater is the exclusion‖ (C. 
Rangarajan, 2008, p. i, [online]). This does not cohere with NABARD‘s vision in respect of 
rural finance, which is: ―To facilitate sustained access to financial services for the unreached 
poor in rural areas through various microfinance innovations in a cost effective and 
sustainable manner‖ (NABARD: Vision and Mission, 2007, [online]). Hulme argues that the 
assumption of microfinance automatically being about working with the poor and poorest 
needs to be dropped unless the MFIs can provide clear evidence that it is the case (Hulme, 
2007, p. 20). Srinivasan reports that except by the government-sponsored programmes that 
are mandated to focus on the poor, studies and anecdotal evidence points to that it is mainly 
upper strata poor and not so much the ultra poor that is being covered through this approach. 
 
In terms of coverage, well-endowed and high-growth areas have been prioritized. The expansion within 
such areas has also not consciously targeted the poor. The most vulnerable are not clients of choice, for 
most organizations engaged in SHG promotion or MFI lending. In poorly endowed, backward and 
remote areas, even the better-off among the poor do not get covered as these areas are not yet the 
microfinance map [sic]. Hardcore poor remain excluded; so are remote areas.   
The very poor with no resources may not be fitting clients of the financial system till the time 
their capacities are built. The others are potential clients of the system. But banks and MFIs tend to 
cherry-pick their clients. The products and processes by design or default exclude the more vulnerable 
of the poor. Expansion into remote areas is fraught with risks and additional costs and long breakeven 
periods; hence the lack of focus on such areas (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 3).  
 
During the bus ride to visit Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd., I got the opportunity to talk to a 
man representing an NGO working in the north eastern region of India. He and the man 
sitting next to him on the bus shed some light on one of the reasons why MFIs and the SBLP 
have not been able to, or interested in, putting certain areas on the microfinance map. The 
north eastern NGO worker began by explaining how the presence of microfinance in the rest 
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of the country had passed them by and that it was not until recently that a couple of NGOs 
had become aware of the phenomenon. According to him though, this was nothing new as 
most sanctions provided by the Government of India seldom reached the area, or at least not 
the common villagers. As he was attending the Forum to learn more about microfinance, we 
began to discuss which approach would be the best option, the MFIs or the bank-linkage? He 
was very clear in his case; microfinance had to be provided through an MFI.     
 
Because going to the government, state government will be of no help. Not at all. (Monica: Why?) You 
see, Government of India is really doing good things for giving good sanctions to the people of 
Nagaland and the surrounding areas, but the politicians, or bureaucrats, and a little bit of underground 
people is there, terrorist like, so this gets it. It never reaches the common people, not to talk about this 
poor people! (Monica: But can‘t the underground people become a problem?) No, not at all because 
now the underground people problem in Nagaland is solved, we don‘t have it. In Assam we have, and 
Manipur, apart from that we don‘t have much problem. So setting up this microfinance will never be a 
problem.
75
 [A fellow participant took the recorder to comment on this and argued:] But the political 
situation of each state is different, so, they miss utilise the funds for their party‘s purposes or they make 
corruption and get into the family only, not reaching the other people. That is what is happening, that is 
why he said that the state government cannot help. Because each state has different political party ruling 
the state and those parties still believe that it is their own state and they can do whatever they want. 
(Monica: So in such places MFIs are better options than the SBLP?) But MFIs will not go, because 
organisational activities will be very difficult for them to manage. That is why they are not going.        
 
According to a note in the State of the Sector Report 2009, ―… actual coverage of poor is 
neither guaranteed nor clearly evident from several studies. Those below poverty line form a 
significant part of banks‘ and MFIs‘ customer base, but microfinance caters to non-poor and 
transient poor in large numbers‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 21). The group lending approach in 
itself might work discouraging on the poor who fear that they will not be able deposit the 
weekly/monthly requirements, who do not have the time nor can afford to prioritise group 
meetings, who fear that the responsibility of having to cover for other group members or who 
fear being vigorously monitored by them. Based on what Dr. Anand at the UNDP office and I 
discussed, I will furthermore suggest that there is a need for segmenting the group of people 
that we refer to as ‗the poor‘. Due to the popularity of providing microfinance through a 
group based lending approach, some poor becomes less reached than others. Dr. Anand 
pointed out that amongst the group that is being target as BPLs (persons Below the Poverty 
Line) and/or relatively poor persons, there is a whole range of vulnerable people being 
excluded. Despite the fact that lending through a group based approach is aiming at including 
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the poor and empowering them through SHG participation, the group lending approach as it is 
today might exclude the people that for different reasons are not strong enough, or numerous 
enough to link with the mainstream.  
 
Certainly there is a need for segmenting the poor. There is a variety. Some are vulnerable, some are 
disabled, challenged, means physically and visually challenged, and some are senior citizens and poor 
and not even in SHGs. Those are all excluded, so right now we talk about financial inclusion and social 
inclusion, but there is a need for a more proactive approach. This means holding hands of those who are 
not included, because if they had that power they could have included in the mainstream. But the 
problem is because they were not strong enough to link with the mainstream, that‘s why they are still 
excluded. ... So I think if we can segment, and then after segmentation try adopt various strategies for 
inclusion. To give an example, you will not find five physically or visually challenged people in a 
village,
76
 so than you can‘t form a group. You need a mechanism of individual lending also.77  
 
5.9 Balancing regulations and implementation 
Despite the fact that default of one member supposedly is equal to exclusion of the whole 
group under the microfinance approaches (as this is the main factor which tackles adverse 
selection and moral hazard), it might prove to increase efficiency in the sector as a whole if 
this rule is not complied in an absolute sense. It can be beneficial for the sector if the group 
members who have not defaulted, and cannot be held responsible in case of a default, were 
allowed to continue to borrow and save while the staff merely tries to collect as much of the 
problem loan as possible (for example by using the defaulter‘s savings to repay) and only cut 
the person who defaulted (if that is called for) and replace her with an alternative borrower 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, p. 113). ―This is a natural route to improving 
efficiency (and equity), even as it undermines the strict reading of group-lending contracts‖ 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, p. 113). However, this is a fine line to balance. 
On the one hand joint liability loses its quality to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard if 
the lender is too yielding. On the other hand, if the lender is not yielding, the rest of the 
borrowers (with deserving and profitable projects) will go unfinanced just because the first 
member of the group to obtain a loan defaulted and the rest of the group was not yet in a 
financial state to cover for her. 
 
5.10 Does the group lending correct for market failures in the formal economy? 
We have seen how lending through a group based approach can contribute to mitigate the 
market failures in formal sector banking as social capital has proven to substitute physical 
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collateral, and joint responsibility is able to tackle the problems occurring from imperfect 
information. But as we have also noted, group lending has its downsides. It might have a 
discouraging/excluding effect on (truly) poor people, it might be both time consuming and 
costly, and inefficiencies occur when good projects go unfinanced due to the default of a 
single member. These inefficiencies should nevertheless be seen in comparison to the non-
defaulting, but still formerly excluded, members‘ probability of accessing formal services if 
microfinance had not been an option in the area. All the (formerly unbanked) members now 
accessing services through the microfinance approaches outweigh the number of clients being 
excluded due to these new inefficiencies.  
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6 
The size of microloans 
This chapter aims to discuss the relation between the size of microloans and the impact a loan 
has on the lives of poor persons. My suggestion is that the amounts being distributed under 
these approaches, as they are today, might be too small to successfully make an impact, or a 
real dent, on poverty (in terms of raising all borrowers above the poverty line). However, I 
will argue that a microloan might still help counter some of the core components of poverty 
such as hunger, health related issues, humiliation, extortion, discrimination and so on. This 
chapter begins with a discussion on the connection between income and nutrition which will 
enable us to say something about the impact microfinance might have on components of 
poverty. Next we will turn to the cost of climbing above the poverty line, and it is in this 
section I will present the reasoning for why I propose that a microloan might be insufficient to 
raise the majority of microfinance clients out of poverty. This part also provides us with the 
logic behind why there is still is such a large dependence on informal credit in India.  
 
MFI and donor hype has created the impression that microfinance is a cure for poverty. This is 
encapsulated in the work of the Microcredit Summit and the thousands of well-intentioned but 
misguided supporters who believe that microcredit it the answer to the problems of poverty. This is a 
potentially dangerous line of argument as it distracts attention from the fact that poverty reduction 
requires action on many fronts: social safety nets for the poorest and most vulnerable, an effective 
education system, low-cost and reliable health services, governments that can provide social inclusion 
(and thus maintain law and order) and sound macroeconomic policies, and many other issues (Hulme, 
2007, p. 21). 
 
According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines microcredit is the provision of 
financial services and products of very small amounts, not exceeding 50 000 Rupees.
78
 In the 
State of the Sector Report 2008 (p. 3) N. Srinivasan reported that the average loan per client, 
both in the case of MFIs and in the SBLP, was between 3 500 and 5 000 Rupees. In the State 
of the Sector Report one year later, he welcomed the development that average loan size had 
increased significantly, although particularly in the case of MFIs. Average loan size provided 
through this approach increased from Rs. 4 200 to Rs. 5 200 (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 4, 50), and 
in the case of the SBLP the average loan size disbursed in 2008-2009 was Rs. 74 000, ranging 
from Rs. 37 300 in the case of cooperative banks to Rs. 86 000 delivered by Regional Rural 
Banks (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 30). If we rely on the average of 17 to 20 members in a SHG (as 
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found in data provided by Basu and Srivastava, 2005, and Harper, 2002, respectively) we find 
that per capita loan is somewhere between 3 700 and 4 353 Rupees through this approach.
79
  
According to Allen, these amounts should be well above what the poor need:  
 
... [I]t is also necessary to recognize that the scale of their [the poor‘s] needs (and the priority) may 
differ from those of the not-so-poor and the rich. While the principal aim of better-off may be to access 
large, credit-based lump sums to finance full-time growth-oriented enterprises, the poor are likely to 
need very small sums (less than US$20 and as little as US$1), derived from a mixture of savings, 
insurance and incremental amounts of credit to manage their combined business and household cash 
flow (Allen, 2007, p. 56).
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Based on what was made known to me during the fieldworks, I will, as others have before me, 
nevertheless stress that the average microloan provided in India might be too small.
81
 Writing 
this makes me feel a bit uneasy as it somewhat implies that microfinance is not a fitting tool 
for lessening the financial burden of the poorest among the poor,
82
 that easing liquidity 
problems is not important, or that a microloan should always be invested in a microenterprise. 
This is not what I wish to argue. For some an initial loan to purchase a sewing machine might 
enable them to work their way out of poverty, or be adequate enough for them to avoid having 
to borrow from, and promise loyalty to, a local lender. Some might merely need to borrow in 
order to cope with an unexpected medical bill or to attend a wedding in the village. In other 
cases though, and more often, truly poor persons have already accumulated a relatively large 
debt to an informal source and will not be able to pay off what they owe, while putting the 
rest towards an income generating activity and thereby come clear of their financial 
difficulties with a microloan of 4 000 Rupees. However, microfinance has the property to 
directly affect everyday concerns of the poor. To see this, we will turn to the relationship 
between nutrition and work capacity.
83
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 Implying that the underlying idea of microfinance is wrong; that poor persons cannot be helped by an initial, 
relatively small, inexpensive and unattached loan. That such loans will not enable them to buy what they need 
for production purposes, produce something they can sell to whomever they chooses and earn enough money to 
pay back the loan with interests, still having enough left over to buy new inputs the next morning without having 
to reborrow. 
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 We are now only concerned with microloans. Microfinance is a much broader basket of services, which often 
complements the microloan. Many of these services (for example savings, a credit card or insurance) might 
contribute to ensure against households having to prioritise in the ways we will discuss below.  
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6.1 Income and nutrition 
Let us now draw the concept of microloans down to regard the poorest of the poor. This is 
people that seldom invest their loans in risky projects or use them to start new micro 
enterprises, rather they borrow in order to smooth consumption and to cover external shocks 
(medical bills) or compulsory expenditures (participating and contributing in festivals). 
According to Robinson, the first thing many poor families do when they experience a rise in 
income is to improve their nutrition and send their children to school (Robinson, 2001, p. 38). 
The benefits from improved nutrition, except the obvious avoiding death by starvation, is that 
there is a clear link between good nutrition and the body‘s capacity to perform income 
generating tasks.  
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Figure 6.1.1, the Capacity Curve
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The idea behind the capacity curve is that one can think of work capacity as a measure of 
nutrition in terms of total tasks an individual can perform during the period under review.
85
 
As we can see from the figure (by following the curved line from left to right and reading on 
the vertical axis how ‗hard‘ a person can work relative to the nutrition he consumes on the 
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horizontal axis), most of the initial nutrition goes into maintaining ‗resting metabolism‘.86 
This translates into that a person‘s work capacity does not increase proportionally with the 
amount of money he spends on nutrition. Once resting metabolism is taken care of we can see 
how the curved line raises steeply; this means that the person will be able to work much more 
efficiently with just a little more food in his belly. All the way to the top right the curve is 
flattening out, this reflects that there is only so much a person can eat and still be able to work 
more efficiently than what he did before (diminishing returns as the conversion of increasing 
nutrition into work capacity has natural limits). Now, not only is there a connection between 
how much/good a person eats and the effort he is able to put into his work, but there is also a 
connection between how much work he does and what he earns.  
 Imagine that the straight upward pointing line is the expression for what an Indian 
villager earns per unit of firewood he cuts down and brings to his employer. In this example 
we find that he earns ten Rupees per unit. What is important to remember at this point, is that 
the effort the man is able to put into his work is constrained by the capacity curve. From the 
figure we thereby can read that if the employee gathers five units of firewood; he earns 50 
Rupees that day. The problem arises when the employee only have these 50 Rupees to spend 
on nutrition because the capacity curve reveals that he is only be able to gather two units of 
firewood the following day when he has eaten for Rs. 50. Two units of firewood result in a 
salary of 20 Rupees to invest in nutrition, but the constrain curve then reveals that the man 
will only be able to provide less than half a unit to his employer after having eaten for as little 
as Rs. 20. The man will not be able to work his way out of this situation until he by some 
means is able to buy food for at least 70 Rupees (which implies, as can be read in the figure, 
that he can provide seven units of firewood and earn a new 70 Rupees to spend on food). The 
capacity curve is naturally more suggestive than what it reflects an unconditional correlation. 
However, it enables us to see the benefits from a small microloan in the fight against poverty, 
or at least in the battle against one of the core components of poverty, that is, under nutrition. 
By taking a microloan of 100 Rupees the man is able to work more efficiently (provide more 
units relative to the amount he has to spend on food not to fall back down the constraint line), 
and thereby create a surplus of cash or time given that the repayment schedule and interest 
rates concur with his income flow. When the worker is able to eat for 100 Rupees he can 
work hard enough to produce twelve units of firewood. This effort will earn the man 120 
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gradients across cell membranes (Ray, 1998, p. 273). 
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Rupees, and as he only needs to eat for 100 Rupees to keep up the intensity at work, he can 
save the 20 Rupees surplus and still make 120 Rupees the following day.  
In this example we have held aside some very relevant points that will affect the data 
implied by the capacity curve. We have assumed that the employee is single (with no 
financial obligations), and does not have to spend money on anything but food. If we assume 
that he is the sole provider for a family of four, the income/nutrition have to be divided on 
four people instead of one. This entails that even if the man provides seven units of firewood, 
and earns Rs. 70, he is not in a position to eat for 70 Rupees. As we have established, 70 
Rupees is the key number in this example. If the man gets less nutrition than this, he will slide 
back down the capacity curve.   
Based on the workings of the capacity curve one can argue that there is a link between 
who makes more money in a low-income household and the division of nutrition in it. The 
well documented assumption that women in low-income families tend to be poorer than the 
men living in the same household directly relates to what we have discussed above (though 
other factors are of course also contributing to determine intra household discrimination).
87
  
One might not like it, but it is hard to reason against that the people expected to bring home 
the highest salaries should be given more of the household‘s resources (if the resources are 
scarce) as that in turn will feed more of the household‘s members. When such prioritising has 
to be made, this naturally contributes to discrimination within the household in terms of 
denial of nourishment, medical care and for example education. It is typically female 
household members and elderly persons that become discriminated against. This is because 
women tend to earn less than men, that is, if they perform wage labour at all seeing that 
women often have greater responsibility within the household (taking care of children, 
prepare meals, fetching water, clean the house, tend to the sick and so on), and because the 
old might, for natural reasons, be unable to go off and perform manual labour, and they are 
often less attractive on the job market as younger people typically are able to work more 
efficiently. I know I am crossing a line and am about to enter an ethical debate, but I cannot 
go there as it is not relevant for this thesis and I do not have the space to elaborate on it. My 
aim was merely to account for the economics that often work behind why many people 
prioritise as they do (the rational for why discrimination of some might be for the greater 
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 For example the article Poverty: Background & Perspective written by Mari Marcel Thekaekara address how 
women tend to be poorer than men living in the same household (2008, [online]).  
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good) and the effects of such prioritising. We will now turn to the impact a microloan might 
have on households with scarce recourses.  
In respect of food deficient households a small microloan can do a lot of good. If we 
consider the example above, providing a onetime loan of Rs. 100 might be enough to enable 
the worker to create a surplus of Rs. 20 from that day onwards. This is only in theory of 
course,88 but the theory allows us to see a tendency; a well nourished person is likely to work 
more effectively than a person starving. By focusing on the tendency, we will find that at, say, 
15 per cent interest per month, a 100 Rupee loan can easily be repaid within a month. If the 
works six days a week, spends 100 Rupees on nutrition, and earns 120 Rupees each day of 
work, he is left with a surplus of 480 Rupees at the end of the month. The four Sundays he 
does not work he does not need as much nutrition and therefore eat less, say for 70 Rupees, 
resulting in a total of 280 Rupees. At the end of the month he is thereby left with 200 Rupees 
to repay his debt of 115 Rupees (the initial loan plus 15 per cent). The next month he begins 
by eating the rest of the surplus from the past month, 85 Rupees, not as much as Rs. 100, but 
still above the key number of Rs. 70 resulting in him being able to create further surplus. The 
rest of the family will also need food during the first month so naturally the man will have to 
take a larger loan in order to feed the other household members, and he is likely to have 
expenditures other than on nutrition, but this is not relevant for the point I am trying to make. 
Except for the period of repayment and the total sum of the interest charge, the mechanism is 
the same whether he takes a 100 Rupee loan or he borrows 1 000 Rupees.  
A microloan, implying that there are no strings such as bonded labour attached to it, 
might enable a family to create a surplus that in time can contribute to create equality within 
the household (if we assume that for example alcoholism or the like does not drain the 
households cash flow, and that the family is committed to prioritise necessities instead of 
luxury goods
89
). A surplus might for example serve as insurance in case of an income earning 
family member falling sick, or cover medical bills of all the household members as there is no 
longer a need to prioritise nutrition for some over the health of all.
90
 Nor would there be any 
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 People tend to spend money on other things than food, the worker might not meet employment everyday and 
he might probably not be able to convert nutrition into working capacity and further into cash as convenient as I 
did above. 
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 Alcoholism among men was one of the top reasons the NGOs I visited with in Uttarakhand gave when I asked 
them why they had chosen to direct their services mostly to women. 
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 In respect of covering medical bills I wish to include a statement made by Mr. Harish Chotani during his 
briefing of the theme based workshops at the Annual Forum, Jaipur, 23.06.2010. ―If you go to the villages and 
you talk to people, not so much in the urban areas, you ask them how much they spend on own health you know, 
they will give you a range of something like 5 000- 10 000 Rupees in a year. That much of the money is 
equivalent to NREGA‘s 100 days of employment, if they get that.‖ This implies that the surplus might need to be 
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immediate need to discriminate in terms of nutrition in the household, which in turn might 
contribute to more family members having additional income earning days each year seeing 
that a healthy body is more resistant to diseases and that better nutrition is likely to increase 
productivity. Children might be allowed to attend school longer as the family becomes less 
depended on them to bring in extra cash, or the family might be able to put aside cash to 
secure a daughters marriage with a good man. If a surplus covers the domestic needs, people 
furthermore avoid having to borrow in the informal sector out of necessity if this is something 
that they wish to steer clear of. 
 
6.2 The cost of climbing above the poverty line 
Christina Barrineau, the senior technical advisor to the Year of Microcredit, was asked in an 
interview what she thought the results of the UN‘s Year of Microcredit were, and according to 
Thomas Dichter this is what she replied:  
 
People stopped seeing microcredit only as a ten-dollar loan to a woman buying a goat, and started 
seeing the poor as masterful business people, tremendously entrepreneurial – people who have 
fundamental business skills and really warrant access to financial services that will help them grow their 
wealth (Dichter, 2007, p. 1). 
 
 Dichter continuous to argue that the ―view that the poor as budding entrepreneurs, who, with 
access to formal financial services, would pull themselves out of poverty, through business 
development, asset accumulation and wealth creation lies at the core of the new high profile 
of microfinance‖ (Dichter, 2007, p. 1). In the following parts of this chapter I will contest this 
view mainly for two reasons. First of all, not all poor wish to, have the investment 
opportunities to, or the business savvy to become self-employed entrepreneurs. Second of all, 
the size of the loans that people receive as microfinance clients might restrict the possibilities 
that they have to ―unleash their entrepreneurial instincts‖ (Dichter, 2007, p. 1). 
According to Kamakar, several cycles of lending in SHGs may result in reversing the 
conditions of abject poverty and ensure that production/investment credit is met eventually. 
―In other words,‖ he writes, ―the SHG members are developed into microentrepreneurs. This 
process is necessarily long and takes time‖ (Karmakar, 2008, p. 15). But not all poor wish to 
become, or have the opportunity to become, self-employed entrepreneurs. Hulme and Mosely 
advocate that opportunities for credit-financed self-employment are very limited for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
rather large for a family to cover health expenditures without falling into debt, and it post a strong need for 
health insurance among the rural poor. 
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poorest, and that the risk associated with self-employment is unreasonable high (Hulme and 
Mosely, 1997, p. 123). Food-deficit borrowers who are unable to utilise their credit, or to 
market their output, may end up having to eat their loan. In turn, such an event can ―lead to 
humiliation and the diminishing of an already low level of self-confidence‖ (Robinson, 2001, 
p. 21). To minimise risk many poor therefore prefer to work as wage labours for others 
(Fisher and Sriram, 2002, p. 27, 77).
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The most common example people referred to when I asked the participants at the 
Annual Forum their opinion on the average size of microloans was that it costs (depending on 
who answered) between 30 000 and 50 000 Rupees to buy a buffalo. ―And also you know, the 
whole microfinance limit of 50 000 needs a relook. To buy two buffaloes today, which is at 
minimum around 60 000 Rupees, definitely doesn‘t fit into microfinance, and at least four 
animals are needed today for a household to come out of poverty.‖92 Let us assume that a 
client has been in a group for several years and is in her third or fourth loan cycle allowing 
her to take larger loans. At most, as per the guidelines of the RBI, the woman can take a 
50 000 Rupee loan. According to some of the participants at the Annual Forum, this will buy 
her one animal.
93
 I am not trying to say that one animal is worse than having none, but if the 
revenue to be gained from just one animal does not cover the cost of acquiring it, the client is 
stuck with a large debt and a new animal to feed. If the client find herself bound to sell the 
animal, her bargaining power is likely to be low, and she might have to sell it for less than 
what she paid. Another concern refers to how borrowers that have been able to invest their 
initial loans in an income generating activity, for example by establishing a small shop,  might 
experience trouble with staying above the poverty line as long as they only are allowed to 
borrow Rs. 50 000 at the time. Not only can they not borrow more than 50 000 Rupees, they 
also have to repay the whole amount before taking a second loan. The following quote 
summarise the point I am trying to make well. ―Sir, my requirement is huge, because I need 
around one lakh [Rs. 100 000] working capital, but these people are giving only term loans 
which I need to repay immediately, then I cannot maintain my stock.‖94 A relevant question in 
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 The already economically active poor often have more investment options. They know their business and 
understand their financial needs well, something that makes them better fit to expand their enterprise or to 
diversify their investments to avoid risk. Focusing on less poor might also result in more wage labour becoming 
available to the people who fear self-employment.  
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 Ms. Chandra Singh representing the NGO MYRADA provided this statement during the round table of the 
State of the Sector Report 2010 (Jaipur, 23.06.2010).  
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 Naturally the client can by hens instead of a buffalo, and she might sell the eggs to finance the hens, but for the 
validity of the discussion let us assume that it is buffalos she needs as that is what most of the participants 
referred to when we discussed the amount needed to climb above the poverty line. 
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 Stated during the roundtable on the State of the Sector Report, Jaipur, 23.06.2010. 
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this respect was raised by one of the other participants at the Forum during a bus ride we took 
to visit with Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd. in Phagi: ―Even in India, in certain situations, a 
buffalo cost more than 50 000 Rupees, a good buffalo. If you give loan of only 20 000 
Rupees, the 30 000 balance, where he or she will meet?‖ Given that the profit of having one 
animal outweighs the cost of acquiring it, a microloan might still be insufficient to purchase 
the animal, and the client must meet the balance elsewhere. The same goes for the person who 
cannot maintain her stock. If she chooses to complement her formal borrowing from a local 
lender, we once again face the scenarios we discussed in chapter four.  
In the ―Report of the Technical Group to Review Legislations on Money Lending‖ it is 
stated that: ―Notwithstanding concerted and multi-pronged efforts to extend institutional 
credit to all sections of society as also other initiatives for increasing the outreach of banks by 
using SHGs and MFIs as intermediaries, the dependence on moneylenders has not decreased 
in rural areas and has, in fact, increased in several regions‖ (Gupta (Chairman), 2006, p. 11). 
The interlinked transactions and bonds of loyalty working in the informal sector affect the 
dependence on informal sources, but seen in light of the argued outreach of the microfinance 
sector, and the fact that microfinance in India indirectly set out to challenge these 
relationships (directly by providers who offer debt-swap schemes), there appears to be a fault 
in the mere practise of microfinance as the dependence on informal finance is still strong.
95
 
Based on the statements above I will suggest that this default might partly be explained by the 
size of the microloans. 
 
6.3 Graduating into mainstream banking 
Another point that relates to the size of microloans is the problem of graduation from a SHG 
membership to being able to take an individual loan. In theory this sounds quite straight 
forward; build an assets base during the group membership and when you are no longer 
                                                                                                                                                        
The quote is retold in full in chapter eight, and we will discuss the problem of staying above the poverty line (by 
maintaining the stock) shortly under ‗Graduating into mainstream banking‘. 
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 However, clients might now be in a position to renegotiate better terms with their respective lender based on 
the possibility of obtaining formal credit If we rely on the anecdotal data reported by N. Srinivasan presented in 
chapter four it should be just to argue that given that a local lender‘s monopoly power is being challenged by 
providers of microfinance, the ‗something extra‘ services that lenders provide in order to keep clients from 
shopping around for credit also is affected by the infused competition in the credit market. Viewed from a 
different angle though, if clients need to borrow from an informal lender in order to cover their outstanding 
formal debt, the moneylender has the upper hand and might raise his interest rate. If the client turns to the lender 
in desperation because a whole group of people, SHG members and staff from the respective institution or 
organization who rely on that the one person about to default repays, might impose extreme pressure on the 
borrower, the lender‘s bargaining power becomes strengthened. 
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vulnerable or have enough savings or resources to post as collateral, you go to the bank and 
get an individual larger loan. In practise, I learned, it was not that easy.   
 
Initially, what we have been thinking in SHG programme, once the members who exhibits some three 
or four loan cycles track records, than they will be graduated to the mainstream banking as individual 
clients. So when I was working in the retail banking, only some five per cent of such clients actually 
graduated to that level, but during that time also, when we interacted with such clients they felt unhappy 
with dealing with the bank because when they were in groups they got collateral free loan. When they 
mainstreamed into the mainstream banking they need to go through all the collateral steps and all which 
they were unable to fulfil. The group got five lakh [500 000 Rupees] loan immediately showing their 
track record, but as an individual for taking just one lakh or two lakh loan she found it very difficult. 
She could not establish contacts and convince the managers. They were all saying [the managers] there 
is rules only, saying there is no scheme like that only.
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There is no doubt that some long established and well functioning groups can obtain sufficient 
credit for some of the group members to build an assets base that will be accepted as 
collateral in the formal banks. However, the 50 000 Rupees limit might restrict clients from 
reaching that state, as might the group lending approach. First of all, as we saw in the former 
part ‗The cost of climbing above the poverty line‘, people sometimes need more than 50 000 
Rupees just to maintain their stock and keep their investment profitable. If their small shop is 
not sufficient to post as collateral for amounts larger than Rs. 50 000, the borrower will 
possible have to sell everything that is in her shop each time before filling it up again in order 
to repay the initial 50 000 Rupee loan and being granted a second loan. That is if the borrower 
is not in a group in which sequential lending is a requirement, then she might not obtain a 
second loan until a number of other group members also have borrowed and repaid their 
loans. Odds are that a business with a very limited range of merchandises left (only the 
products that others have not found worthwhile to buy yet), will not be very attractive. When 
money stops coming in, or comes in at a very slow pace, making repayments becomes hard. 
Had the borrower half way into the repayment period of one loan been granted a second loan 
(or been granted a larger loan the first time around), she could have refilled the most popular 
goods while still providing the less attractive commodities for those who suddenly should 
need/want that particular unpopular colour on a fabric or a new radio. 
Because of the 50 000 Rupee limit it is reasonable to argue that a person who wish to 
graduate from group lending wish to borrow even larger amounts.
97
 As we saw in the former 
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 Roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010, Jaipur, 23.06.2010.  
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 The motivation from some to graduate into mainstream banking can also be that they are unhappy with the 
requirements that being in a group put on them, that they merely wish to have access to formal financial services 
on the same terms that the non-poor have. However, as we will discuss in the next chapter, and as we saw the 
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quote obtaining larger amounts for the borderline poor (or no longer poor per the definition in 
this thesis) can be problematic. Below we will see how this might also work inviting for the 
people who are not poor to engage in microfinance. 
 
Mostly people [in the farming sector] take working capital as their loans. They require 5 000-6 000 
Rupees per acre going by the theoretical assessment, which comes to about 50 000- 60 000 per annum if 
there is one cycle of crops. If there are two cycles of crop, definitely same money will be rolled out 
again. So there is working capital need of 50 000 say for five acres. The land costs, as it is of today, one 
lakh Rupees per acre. That comes to five lakh Rupees of security. For a 50 000 amount of loan, that 
whole land has to be mortgaged to the concerned bank or lending agency. So it is injustice on part of 
lending agencies. You see, if I extend loan to an industry, I am satisfied with 10 to 20 per cent of 
security, primary security and collateral security put together. But when it comes to extending loans to 
farm sectors, the poorer sectors, security is ten times what the loan is. If you take 50 000 loan, then your 
whole of land is mortgaged. Everywhere you go you have a stamp on that, that this land is mortgaged to 
such and such bank, so this is first of all an injustice to this sector.
98
  
 
A red thread in this thesis relates to why the number of microfinance accounts is larger than 
the number of poor households. There is one rather clear connection that can be read from the 
quote above; if a person participate in a SHG (say one made up by richer persons who can 
accumulate a rather large savings pot fairly quickly) she will be granted a microloan up to 
50 000 Rupees without putting forward external collateral and with few questions asked by 
the banker. If she is not in a group, she might have to mortgage five acres of land to obtain the 
same amount. For this reason it can be suggested that the workings in formal banks, their 
procedures, regulations and sometimes even handling of clients that are not well-offs, might 
both discourage the relatively poor from graduating, as well as be too cumbersome for the 
middlemen (those richer than the poorest but still poorer than the well-offs) to obtain formal 
credit, and thereby invites the people (just) above the poverty line to take advantage of the 
financial services that were initially meant to be directed at the poor. If less-poor start, or 
engage in, SHGs in order to enjoy the comparatively hassle free services of microfinance, this 
affects the reported number of poor households that are actually being reached through the 
microfinance approaches.
99
  
There is one more issue that needs to be addressed when we discuss graduation from 
group lending; what happens to the members who are not ready to graduate when people 
                                                                                                                                                        
theory working behind in chapter three that is seldom an option before the poor can post acceptable collateral, 
i.e. is no longer poor per the definition in this thesis.    
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 Expressed on the bus ride to visit with Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd. in Phagi, Jaipur (25.06.2010). 
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 If we consider that poor people sometimes dislike, fear, or becomes powerless in terms of making decisions 
being in a group with richer clients (something which will be discussed in the next chapter), we might also view 
richer people entering SHGs with poorer clients as serving an excluding/disabling factor for the poor that 
initially was meant to benefit from microfinance, or as a factor that even makes poor clients retreat from group 
membership. 
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begin to leave the group? The ultimate scenario would be that all the group members were 
able to graduate at the same time. For this to work out, it is important that the group has 
received adequate training (financial literacy), established a good saving and repayment 
discipline, and that the clients follow each other in terms of loan size and savings during 
group membership. If one person has been a member of a group simply to access a safe place 
to save, she might still be in her first loan cycle when others are graduating, and if seven 
people graduate from a group of seventeen, the group‘s savings (material collateral) will be 
severely reduced, as will the social collateral the group constitutes as in the eyes of the 
provider. It might be hard for newcomers (substitutes) to enter the group as they will have to 
match the savings of the ‗older‘ members, and it might not be desirable to invite richer 
persons (who will have less trouble raising the required amount) into the group because of 
local power dynamics that thereby can become transferred into the group democracy.
100
  
Microfinance is, as the name imply, an incremental approach. It should therefore not 
be expected to generate instant results, and graduation to mainstream banking will thereby 
also take time, but how long is too long? Are there flaws in the design through which 
microfinance is being provided that restrict poor, in the process of reaching a not-so-poor 
state, from becoming non-poor? Inspired by the discussion on graduating clients during the 
roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010 at the Forum, I will suggest that there 
appears to be a need for making the transition from group lending to individual lending easier, 
and I am under the impression that the time aspect regarding clients not being able to borrow 
more than 50 000 Rupees at the time (after having proven capable of repaying large sums) 
might disable borderline people from climbing above the poverty line and staying there. I do 
not know how, and even if, a specific graduate product will be realised, but I do recommend 
that it should be looked into as there in my view appears to be a need for it. 
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7 
The quality of groups 
 
This chapter aims to examine the quality of groups. With the word ‗quality‘ in reference to 
self help groups I mean that a good group should possess, or be characterised by, certain 
qualities in order to function well both in the eyes of the provider and in terms that benefit the 
members. A good quality group is characterised by a strong saving and repayment discipline, 
by cohesion, enthusiasm and goal-oriented action. In such groups all the members actively 
participates in the meetings, and they discuss, seek solutions to, and if possible address 
concerns such as alcoholism (with its accompanying problems), child marriages or for 
example a violent husband. Financial literacy among the members needs to be adequate, the 
collective wisdom of the group should colour the credit decisions being made by individuals, 
and all the decisions the group as a unit makes should derive from collective leadership. The 
quality of a group is important as all of the attributes listed above contributes to determine the 
sustainability of the group, the potential empowerment of the members, and to reveal how 
well its members will function as social collateral / social capital in securing loan repayments, 
both in terms of peer pressure, assisting troubled members and covering for members bound 
to default (as members of a quality group can be expected not to default strategically). 
The first issue we are to address in this chapter relates to the mix of people that makes 
up the best groups. After a discussion on homogeneity, we will move on to see how the 
processes through which groups are formed affect the quality of the groups. This will lead us 
to addressing how the requirements for forming a group (the processes) have begun to affect 
the way clients perceive self help membership. The last part of this chapter will tie together 
the issues we have addressed by discussing the risks associated with low quality groups. 
 
7.1 Homogeneity in self help groups 
What form of social ties that makes up the most reliable groups in terms of repayment and 
empowerment has been tried answered by many a scholar and practitioner of microfinance. 
As can be seen in the empirical evidences presented by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
(2005, p. 99-108), there is no simple answer to this question as different factors play different 
roles when it comes to securing loan repayment. They report, for example, that borrowers 
living in close proximity are better able to monitor each other and in that way increase the 
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likelihood for repayment, while in other cases, groups made up by friends, neighbours and 
maybe even family (people living in close proximity) is reportedly softer on each other which 
reduces average repayment rates (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p.  99-108).   
Rankin‘s study in Nepal shows that women tend to self-select group members that possess 
significant assets, or who is from an identical caste or have the same ethnicity (Rankin, 2006, 
p. 102). Based on that people are expected to be risk averse, it is not unlikely that this 
phenomenon is relevant in the Indian context as well. Gunasekaran argues that group 
members ―are expected to have similar social identity, heritage or similar occupations in order 
to maintain its coherence and smooth functioning without much conflict‖ (Gunasekaran, 
2010, p. 114). And according to Dr. Anand at the UNDP office, the characteristics of 
homogeneity are changing:  
 
Earlier there were religious groups, there were caste-based groups, but now through SHGs these social 
networks, the point of affinity for the social networks, is economics and livelihood. Not caste and 
religion. The fabric is different, like Hindus, Muslims; all are joining together for their social and 
economic benefits.
101
 
 
In my view the best requirement for forming a group might be economic equality as people 
with equal economic background probably face a lot of the same pressing issues. A woman 
can find comfort in not being ‗the only one‘ who struggles to feed her children, who is in 
bonded labour to a patron that takes advantage of her, or who goes home to an abusive 
husband who has spent the family‘s income on alcohol. Moreover it is more likely that such 
problems will be addressed in group meetings if no superior member possesses the power to 
undermine the importance of the poorer members‘ realities, and if people feel less shame 
discussing them because the rest of the members also face similar problems. In chapter four 
we found that an economically superior villager was likely to be superior in terms of social 
status and perhaps political importance as well, so if we mix richer persons and poorer 
persons in the same group, it is possible that the richer client will be in a position overrule 
decisions suggested by the poorer (financial as well as non-financial). She might be more 
educated and thereby possibly more literate and have better communicative skills vis-à-vis the 
poorer members and she is therefore likely to take, or be delegated, a position as the leader or 
spokesperson for the group. Furthermore, the inferior members might find it problematic to 
criticise, or denounce, a richer member if she does not take actions that benefit the group as a 
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whole (for example ‗rules‘ over the groups credit and distribute it as she pleases) due to her 
superior status and probably also influence in the community.  
Viewed from a different angle, one can speculate that the benefits from having a richer 
person in the group is that this person might have less respect (in a good way) for authority 
persons, and thereby pressure the other members to raise their voices against injustice, or be 
able to take up, and present well, the group‘s concerns or requests directly with relevant 
government official, banker, Panchayat or the like. Furthermore she is in a stronger financial 
position to cover for members defaulting and thereby ensure that the group continues to have 
access to formal financial services. But is power imbalance within a group a larger problem 
than it is a good? Seeing that the whole concept of SHGs is to enable the poor to act and 
speak as a group, and to stand together against injustice, that the meetings are meant to be a 
platform for raising issues that the group members struggle with, and that the staff attending 
these meetings are expected to assist the group in order to find the best possible solution to 
any problem, to educate them, and to help them realise their goals, I believe that it might at 
least be an unnecessary risk to take. 
 
7.2 The processes through which groups are formed 
The process through which groups are formed is likely to affect the quality of the groups. The 
reason why the SBLP require a six month training period before a group is linked with a bank 
(in theory), is to ensure that the group is capable of, and willing to, take on the responsibility 
of having relatively easy access to financial services, and it is to ensure that the group 
members have all the necessary prerequisites for experiencing empowerment in financial as 
well as non-financial terms. Several of the people I talked with during the fieldworks 
therefore expressed to feel a bit alarmed when they discussed group formation as many of 
them were under the impression that the processes now are being cut back on in the name of 
personal winning, reaching targets and becoming significant players in the eyes of donors.  
The following first three statements were uttered during the Annual Forum and show 
how some of the participants feared that providers of microfinance have began to focus less 
and less on the quality of groups by taking shortcuts in the initial group formation process in 
order to make more groups faster to earn more incentives.
102
 The fourth statement is included 
to provide an alternative perspective which also might contribute to explain the rush of getting 
                                                 
102
 This will also be addressed in the next chapter concerned with excessive competition, though there the focus 
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through the initial months of forming quality groups. During the roundtable on the State of the 
Sector Report 2010 Mr. Harish Chotani was the first to raise his concerns in this regard: 
 
But my personal feeling is that in the last two years in the SGH system ... I don‘t see at the grass root 
level any worker who is asking somebody to form a group for the group sake. They simply say: ―Didi, 
sister, you want money? Form a self help group I will see to it that you can have money.‖ This has 
become the situation now, which very clearly says that there is greed pollution.
103
  
 
A fellow participant acknowledged Mr Chotani‘s arguing and said: 
 
Here in north I have seen that the people do want to take the shortcuts, whether he was mentioning the 
SHG vs. the JLG [joint liability groups]. We used to prescribe seven days training for the JLGs, 
probably now JLGs training would be happening in one hour. One hour, one hour before the group‘s 
recognition test and what they have to know that is what amount of loan they are going to take, what is 
their starting amount and how long they have to pay. ... Before the people were seriously doing those 
processes, now the processes have been shortening in the name of innovations, because people are 
hurrying to deliver the money. 
 
A third person at the roundtable raised his arm to comment on this and offered the following 
experience with the phenomenon:  
 
In fact, I was overhearing the conversation between my wife and our servant maid. She said [his wife] 
servant maid wondered quickly to go away, she said [the maid] I have to go to this organisation to get a 
loan, she said [his wife] last time you said you were with some other MFI, she said [the maid] I‘m still 
there madam, this is a new company saying they are willing to give me so if I don‘t go in time I lose 
this. Please let me go.  
The whole problem is staring with implementing of innovation is changing the SHG 
methodology. Earlier we waited for six months to give them the loan. We assured they were all properly 
trained and that they were really empowered with information and capabilities and all that. Nowadays 
what is happening is morning just form somebody as a group, and in the evening start lending. 
 
During my first fieldwork, Mr. Kunwar at HARC also addressed this problem, but he 
approached it from a different angle. Rather than to put all the blame on the carelessness of 
banks, NGOs and MFIs, he pointed his finger in the direction of the government‘s targeting of 
self help groups.
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Mr. Kunwar: What‘s happening is that, see, I‘m a Government servant, given a target that within 
two months I have to make ten SHGs or else I‘m fired. So than what will I do? 
(Monica: You will make ten SHGs!) And that is the only way I can make ten SHGs. 
Monica:  Will the government tell him to make ten SHGs or else be fired? 
Mr. Kunwar: Yes. But you see, it‘s not the, it is target oriented. We have to achieve the target that 
this year we will have to make X groups. So there are certain SHGs that have never 
been made through a process. When they are through certain processes they are good 
SHG, and those are mostly formed through NGOs as they have taken the time to 
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develop them. The Government has not the time to spend so much time for a 
particular SHG, they cannot. 
Monica:  Will he be fired him if he can‘t ensure a 100 per cent repayment from the groups also?  
Mr. Kunwar:  It is like, automatically he‘ll be fired. 
Monica:  So he‘ll put a lot of pressure on the women? 
Mr. Kunwar:  He will not even put the pressure on the women, he will simply go to a powerful 
person in the village and say; ―please, this is my problem,‖ then the powerful villager 
will help him. 
Monica:  That can‘t be good. I can see why it is effective, but— 
 
That the processes through which groups are formed have been cut back on became quite 
clear to me during the fieldworks. This does of course not apply for all NGOs, MFIs and 
banks engaged in group formation, but according to the people I talked with it was not a 
phenomenon restricted to only a few areas either. This tendency possibly results from, and 
should therefore be seen in connection with, the increased competition in the sector of 
microfinance. We will discuss the scale of this amplified competition the following chapter.
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7.3 Forming a group for the wrong reasons 
The other side to this coin relates to the people taking a loan. As in the situations describe 
above, the motivation that encourage people to form a group will also affect the quality of the 
group. The main reason why most clients of microfinance choose to come together in an SHG 
is to access a safe place to save and to obtain (relatively inexpensive) formal finance. Other 
benefits such as access to insurance, money transfer, leasing services and pension schemes are 
now gaining importance, but the supply of financial services like these is still lagging behind 
in terms of accessibility. If people have to invest a lot of time and money in order to obtain a 
formal loan, this is likely to affect the quality of the group positively, and given proper 
training and encouragement, the group members is hoped to come together and assist each 
other in non-financial areas of life as well.
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Several of the people I talked with during the fieldworks reported an increasing trend 
of clients, and possible clients, showing little interest in building quality groups. I will suggest 
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that this is connected with what we documented above; that it is no longer a strict requirement 
in all microfinance promoting and providing institutions that groups go through extensive 
training and creates an assets base by saving and interloaning before they obtain credit. 
 There is actually no big secret to this trend. Imagine that you, the reader, wanted to 
apply for a loan, but when you got to the bank, the branch manager told you that you first 
needed to find 10-20 other people that were willing to co-guarantee for your loan. Not only 
that, you would also have to pay if one of the other members in the group you joined 
defaulted, and you would have to attend weekly, bi-weekly or monthly meetings where you 
would have to deposit a (fixed) amount of savings every time. If you fail to show up for a 
meeting you will be fined. If you suddenly find yourself short of cash for a meeting being 
held on Friday, as you do not get paid until Monday, a large group of people might come and 
sit outside your house (or worse) until you are able to get a hold of the money you are 
expected to deposit. On top of this, the group decides on an extra interest charge that will be 
put on your loan additional to the rate of interest being charged by the bank. 
 Viewed from this angle, it should not come as a surprise that the poor also wish access 
to the same financial services that you and I have. Microfinance through group lending can in 
this respect be seen as a ‗second-rate service‘, as Harper calls it. He draws the parallel 
between group-based microfinance delivery systems (as temporary low-quality expedients) 
and shared toilets, primary schools of 60 children and clinics without doctors. ―These are the 
best that can be provided at the present time for some people in some places, but they are 
recognized as fundamentally unsatisfactory. Microfinance groups are the same‖ (Harper, 
2007, p. 36). What still encourage the use of a group lending approach is that the 
disadvantages of this form for financial inclusion might be outweighed by the advantages of 
having access to formal finance. I agree with Harper that group lending should be a temporary 
stop on the path to individual borrowing, but for many this is, as of yet, the best available 
option. Exclusion from the formal economy is in most cases due to deep rooted market 
imperfections in the sector, and the practice of group lending has proven to tackle many of 
these flaws. This is also the reason why many of my informants expressed a deep concern 
with people taking advantage of micro financial services without respecting the group lending 
methodology.  
Only a couple of minutes into the conversation I had with Father Francis, the Father 
expressed a concern with what Mr. Dayaram called the ‗subsidy culture‘ of people:107 
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So as I said; the moment you enter the village, what they say is: ―Sir, what are you going to give us?‖ 
They know we are coming from an institution, and that the institution has a project, and that they have 
something to give us. So what are you going to give us, that is the first question. Therefore, to form 
SHGs is very difficult.
108
 
 
During the roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010, Mr Dubey and Ms. Singh put it 
this way: 
 
They have the back to back centre meetings. Ten o‘clock this meeting is happening, eleven o‘clock that 
is happening. On Wednesday two centre meetings, Thursday two centre meetings, one centre meeting is 
happening on Friday. They know, or they don‘t know, [even] the names they don‘t know. This one gave 
250 [Rupees], that gave 300, another gave 230. They know- ... that‘s it. 
 
―They associate with the leader you know,‖ Ms. Chandra Singh replied. 
 
7.4 The risk associated with low quality groups 
If people agree to form SHGs just because they want a loan (and I do understand this wish), 
the potential non-financial gains from being in a group is likely to go by unrealised. Forming 
groups without being interested in, or having to go through, the training and grooming period 
might nevertheless have negative effects both for clients and for the providers. Some groups 
might be made up by quite a few persons that have no interest in actually borrowing, but that 
have been told to join by other villagers who plan to get into debt. Based on data gathered in 
Peru, Wright argues that a highly personalised nature within groups makes it hard for group 
members to denounce a corrupt leader. According to her, the outcome of microfinance is 
directly affected by the wider power dynamics which shape social interaction (Wright, 2006, 
p. 159). If we accept this statement, one can suspect that similar problems exist in the Indian 
SHGs also as we here too find a high reliance on personal bonds seeing that it might be 
essential for a household's survival to foster and maintain good relationships with kin and/or 
patron. This argument implies that some villagers have the power to request that others should 
agree to form a group with them just because they say so. From what Mr. Kunwar expressed, 
the person requesting that other villagers should join/make SHGs does not even have to be a 
member of a group themselves. ―He will simply go to a powerful person in the village and 
say: ‗please, this is my problem,‘ then the powerful villager will help him.‖ If the ‗collateral‘ 
members do not fully understand what obligations agreeing to co-guarantee for a loan taken 
by another person entail, they may involuntarily be dragged into debt. Some are not forced 
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into becoming members; they simply choose to lend their names out as proxy borrowers 
against a fee. N. Srinivasan reported a case in which a woman had borrowed ―Rs 4 million 
from different MFIs using several individual women as members of group [sic]. These 
members had contributed to a chit fund run by woman entrepreneurs with the help of the 
money they borrowed from the MFIs‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 73-74). When some of the 
members failed to repay the chit fund, the lady who ran it fled which resulted in widespread 
default by many members to the tune of 4 million Rupees (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 74).   
The initial processes of group formation are also meant to enhance financial literacy. 
There is little doubt that the poor understand their needs, and that the poor are capable of 
utilising a loan in the most beneficial way for the family, that they understand interest 
charges, and that they are capable of paying back money borrowed (at fair terms). But one of 
the participants at the Annual Forum raised the following point: ―Literacy is in terms of 
understanding the advantage of insurance, the advantages of savings, and so on. If somebody 
decides to cut back on expenditures, for example say let‘s have a low cost marriage, than it is 
financial literacy.‖109 For financial literacy to be exhibited in this term, the support of being 
part of a group might prove beneficial. If a marriage reflects the status of the client, the client 
might be tempted, or expected, to spend more money on the wedding celebrations than what 
he or she (or their families) can afford. Having to borrow money in order to arrange a 
wedding is not a new phenomenon, but when it happens is does witness about that social 
status trumps the financial literacy people are expected to exhibit. During the Annual Forum 
one example was given though which shows how social status in fact took the backseat during 
a number of weddings: ―In Rajasthan we can see an example of this. In a small district 25 000 
marriages happened in one day, in a single function! That is financial literacy.‖  
The fear among my informants for low quality groups can be summarised as follows; 
if groups begin to lose their reputation as a substitutes for physical collateral, providers of 
microfinance might begin to rethink their involvement with poor clients and one might expect 
to find even greater reluctant to serve the formerly unreached segments of the population. 
Engaging in microfinance might furthermore contribute to make the lives of poor borrowers 
even more rigid (involuntarily) if they do not fully understand the responsibility a group 
membership entails, and the process of empowerment have little chance of being realised if 
the quality of the group is low. 
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8 
Competition leading to an overestimated outreach 
 
If we recall the discussion about competition in chapter four, we know that healthy/perfect 
competition should lead to a scenario in which clients (the demanders) are at the centre of 
attention. Providers of microfinance (the suppliers) will force each other to improve the 
services they supply (or not yet supply, for example insurance, credit cards, mobile cellular 
banking, or training of some sort) and make it available on better terms (such as larger 
amounts, longer repayment periods or shorter time to process loan applications) at lower costs 
(at the interest rate reflecting the cost of providing the product). The down side to competition 
is that pressure on institutions and organisations to reach clients might result in lower quality 
services, an increased pressure on clients to obtain formal debt and harsher practices in 
redeeming money. In India the excessive competition in the sector has to a certain extent 
manifested in the form of multiple lending/borrowing. Multiple lending has in many cases led 
clients to accumulate more debt then what they are capable of handling which have resulted in 
poorer loan recoveries and allegedly even poor farmers taking their own lives. This is a 
worrying development which needs to be addressed. The aim of this chapter will be to 
examine in what ways the sector and policy makers creates, as well as cope with, the problem 
of multiple lending. The chapter begins by discussing the processes leading up to this 
development by taking a closer look at the competition that is going on between providers of 
microfinance. As we address the competition amongst bankers, organisations and MFIs in the 
Indian sector of microfinance, we will also touch upon how this competition might have lead 
to lower quality services being delivered by providers of microfinance, and we will explore 
the quality on the argued financial inclusion of banks. In the latter part of this chapter we will 
discuss multiple lending/borrowing, how it results in an overestimated outreach of the sector, 
and the gap between regulations and implementation which has been argued to allow multiple 
lending to take place. 
 
8.1 Competition in the sector of microfinance 
Competition between the providers of microfinance is mainly in respect of market share, 
clients, funding and staff. ―NGOs compete within the same area to mobilise people in the 
groups and to have a larger number of groups mobilised so that they become significant 
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players in the eyes of donors, funders and lending banks‖ (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 85). 
Srinivasan reports that some banks compete with each other in terms of providing NGOs with 
cash incentives to link groups to their branch (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 85), and the banker I talked 
with in Uttarakhand expressed how they attracted clients by offering a revolving fund from 
the government for 10 000 Rupees to boost group activity as soon as a group chose to, and 
qualified for, linking with the branch. ―Everybody in the area gets it!‖ 
Although the banker was excited by this offer, a rural NGO worker also operating in 
Uttarakhand expressed a concern with regards to the incentive and the effect it could have / 
have had on the quality of the groups in the area. The following section is a part of the 
conversation between NGO manager Mr. Dayaram and me. 
 
Mr. Dayaram: The reason for the first grading is failure of Government side. After first grading 
government will provide 10 000 Rupees for, just like rewarding fund, but government 
have not money, so they are sliding to sliding this programme.
110
 One, just like our 
group‘s grading is date in August, but government haven‘t money, so they are not 
creating proper time, they are slipped on. They will be in September, October. 
Government have not money, so government not provide the subsidy for banks, than 
banks not provide loan for SHG. 
Monica:  So government does not provide subsidy to bank, and then the bank not provide the 
loan?  
Mr. Dayaram: Not only subsidy fund, on bank loan also [banks are entitled to refinancing from 
NABARD on loans made to SHGs]. This is the great problem for developing the SHG 
concept. But here is most problem in India; everybody person will a subsidy. From 
bank and government and others, so many institutions. They want subsidy. And the 
subsidy culture is our Indian philosophy and others, this is subsidy culture. And our 
country below poverty line always they are, they have not land, they have not any 
assets. They want government will provide so many programmes and so many 
schemes with subsidy. They are, they don‘t want to do it themselves, they want 
subsidy. And many groups are formed in our district for subsidy nature, and they are 
failure. Our organisation formed 22 groups, but we never say to him we provide to 
you subsidy, I am saying only and only you are upgrading yourselves. You are 
collecting some money and inter-loan, interlinking with each other. This is self help 
group! Than 22 groups is running very good. 
Monica:  So your groups, they don‘t, they have grading?  
Mr.Dayaram: First grading and second grading.  
Monica: But after first grading, if they don‘t get subsidy, that doesn‘t matter? They will still 
continue to save? Will they get bank-linked without getting subsidy first? 
Mr. Dayaram: They don‘t need bank linkage, this is same the bank linkage when you open the 
account. You are linkage with them. But not necessary for you‘ll take loan and you‘ll 
take subsidy, is not necessary. 
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Competition does not only occur in terms of banks trying to acquire groups, or in terms of 
NGO‘s trying to expand their client base.  
 
In the case of MFI sector, there are multiple levels at which competition has become a part of business 
environment. While competition is severe between the MFIs, there is also competition between MFIs 
and NGOs. MFIs and banks compete for clients in the same area especially in the more-developed 
geographies. ... Basically there are two areas in which competitive behaviour is witnessed. The first is 
that of client acquisition and the second is that of staff (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 85-86).  
 
With what comes next, my aim is to raise awareness of the link I will suggest exist between 
excessive competition and the market failure ‗imperfect information‘.  
 The whole idea behind group lending is that it is expected to correct for the market 
failures that excluded poor from formal financial services prior to microfinance. We saw in 
chapter five and seven that group lending does not always translate into the full repayment of 
all loans taken, but it is nevertheless expected to somewhat correct for the lack of information 
banks used to experience to have about potential borrowers. I agree with this, but I will also 
suggest that even though a group lending approach is able to correct for some information 
imperfections, reaching poor through providers of microfinance have raised information 
concerns in new areas.
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 I will not argue that any of the following is a major problem in the 
microfinance sector as repayment rates in general are reported to be high,
112
 but a tendency I 
noted during the fieldworks nonetheless, was that information imperfections in the formal 
sector now also relates to problems experienced by clients acquiring formal credit, and on 
behalf of MFIs regarding the ‗loyalty‘ of their staff. 
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8.2 MFI staff changing loyalty 
During the roundtable on the State of the Sector Report 2010 in the Annual Forum N. 
Srinivasan wanted the group to address the challenges the participants had witnessed with 
regard to Human Resources in the sector. He opened the discussion by saying that: ―In the 
sector we are facing a lot of difficulties in maintaining the talented people. People are also 
committing some fraud, and take away the groups also, when we take some disciplinary 
actions they go away with the groups, so we are facing lot of problems in the field.‖ One of 
the participants offered his view on the statement by arguing that: 
 
In the beginning of the MFIs, in their start ups, the staff get‘s more incentives. Once the operation is in 
place, after eight months, nine months, the incentives are dried up, because there are no more 
customers. Basically the incentive part is a bigger part for their salaries, so after nine months they try to 
find another MFI which is going to open in the area, or they want to jump to the next level, the branch 
manager, this is the problem. This is a problem in all sectors, this not only a particular problem of MFIs, 
but only the thing is that the client relation is so much weak from the organisation to the client. Only the 
person who has formed the group, he is only the contact person. Even the branch manager does not 
know who are the clients. So when he leaves [the person who formed the group], the problem is starting 
to come up. 
 
As an employee shift from one MFI to another, not only does he take with him the knowledge 
of the internal workings of the former MFI, but he might also take the client base he has 
established. In accordance with the concern raised above, staffs working directly with clients 
are the only ones who intimately know the people in the groups they are responsible for, and 
they therefore have the advantage of using this familiarity to shift the clients‘ loyalty. New 
MFIs entering an already occupied market might be motivated to hire staff willing to bring 
with them an already established (and trained) client base, as this will lower the MFI‘s start 
up costs. This again, might very well affect the likelihood for strategic default among clients. 
If clients are guaranteed a new (larger) loan elsewhere, and the person in control of their 
account with the former MFI will not inflict penalties upon them, the clients‘ incentive to 
pocket the money they have borrowed is strengthened. This will also affect clients that had no 
intention of changing MFIs in the first place as they know that they (in theory) no longer will 
be eligible for new loans from the initial MFI unless they are able, and willing, to repay the 
debt of runaway group members. One more issue working against the former MFI in such 
cases, is that the employee is likely to shift loyalty during the first year or so (if we are to rely 
on the quote). This means that the group‘s savings is not yet very substantial, so the incentive 
to stay might be lower than if the group had been together and pooled their savings for several 
years (in cases where the staff is unable to transfer the savings to the new MFI). If the revenue 
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from pocketing loans (and maybe sharing them) is bigger than the loss of savings, odds are 
that some clients, or maybe whole groups, will be tempted to go with the employee changing 
MFI. 
 
8.3 “Earn with the mind, work with the heart” 113 
As a group of us participating in the Annual Forum sat down for dinner the three gentlemen 
sitting next to me initiated a conversation about why and how all of us had gotten engaged in 
microfinance. One of the men used to be a journalist concerned with social injustice and said 
he felt the need to take some hands on action in trying to improve the lives of the people he 
had met with and written about. Another believed it to be unfair that he should have access to 
pension and bonuses in old age just because he was born lucky while so many of the 
hardworking people he interacted with during the day should not just because they were too 
poor to be included in the formal economy. He wanted to do something about that. I replied 
that I believed the concept of microfinance to be a tool that, when applied well, could help a 
lot of people in distress to improve their realities, and that I hoped to become a part of that 
movement one day. We all turned to the fourth man and (I at least) expected some kind of 
emotional or idealistic answer, but when he looked up from his dinner he said: ―I‘m in it for 
the money. Obviously, people need money to live, I need money.‖ The former journalist 
smiled at him with this kind of half laugh and asked: ―But you do believe in helping people? 
Or why else are you here?‖ The fourth man looked at him seemingly surprised and replied: 
―What do you mean? The organisation needed somebody to go, so it was my job to come 
here. Before I used to be an X, but when they offered me better job here, I took this one.‖ I 
stopped eating. It felt like the atmosphere in the room changed. The man who had initiated the 
conversation immediately began to account for all the great things that could be realised from 
microfinance. The former journalist looked at me; he raised his eyebrows and shook his head 
before he turned back to his dinner. I just sat there with my mouth half opened.  
What I am trying to say by retelling this story is that it is quite normal that people 
chose to change workplace if they get offered more money or better terms elsewhere. This 
statement might be the most obvious one I will ever make, but had you experienced the 
change in mood, seen the resentment in the eyes of those witnessing the fourth man‘s replies 
(including in my eyes I assume, because I did feel it), or heard the disappointment in the 
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voices of the people talking about how disloyal staff change MFIs just because they want 
more money, you would know that a lot of us have forgotten how obvious this fact actually is.  
I assume that this is connected with the mentality expected to operate among all persons 
working in sector of charity, or aid. Whether you are employed by Doctors Without Borders, 
Save the Children or The Red Cross, people are likely to assume that you are in that particular 
line of work because you want to help other less fortunate people. Microfinance is somewhat 
connected to this line of work as it focuses on assisting the poor, especially the most deprived 
and thereby also mainly women. Dr. Yunus (who has become the representative for 
microfinance worldwide) won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to extend formal finance 
to the unreached, and India‘s government has focused on providing microfinance through the 
country‘s banks as part of its attempt to alleviate poverty. It is not hard to see where people 
might get mixed up, where I got mixed up, but microfinance is not charity, it is business. It is 
about extending financial services and expecting to profit from them. It is (‗just‘) about 
providing the poor with the same services (though on worse terms) that the non-poor access. 
Yet, it is not fully perceived as an ordinary business, it is not an ordinary business, it is a mix 
of business and (sustainable) aid. It is in this mix, I believe, that the problem arises.  
Some begin to work with microfinance because it is the best job available at the time, 
others might experience that microfinance has found its way into their line of business. 
Imagine a banker, he might not have any particular interest in microfinance nor care too much 
about the deprived women in his community, but when an SHG walks in the doors to his 
office he nevertheless provides that group of poor persons with financial services. A man 
working hard to form groups of women, coach them and interact with them on a weekly basis 
might also do so just because he gets paid extra per group he forms. At the other end of this 
scale you find the people that have devoted their lives to assist the needy. Some have found 
microfinance to be the best tool through which they can do so, and they care deeply for both 
the clients and the approach(es). They will probably try to learn as much about the sector as 
possible, and try to improve whatever flaws they encounter. I suspect that you will find these 
people, with a deep personal engagement, quite high in the respective organisation or 
institution because a personal commitment often entails that a person will work hard to realise 
whatever scenario he or she dreams of. This might involve going to school and becoming a 
researcher, advisor or spokes person for the sector, or it might mean that a person will work 
his way to the top just so he can have a say in the institution/organisation he is associated 
with. Such persons might be the founders of an organisation, or for example the people 
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inviting you to a three days forum on microfinance so as to enable all the other ‗devotees‘ to 
meet, exchange ideas  and experiences, share problems and seek solutions. But when the 
people at the top of this pyramid goes in the trap of believing that all people working with 
microfinance are just as engaged in it as they are, the whole working of markets seems to get 
a bit neglected. That a lot of the people engaged in providing microfinance are idealists does 
not translate into that the providers are unaffected by competition. The actions taken by staff 
of microfinance providers (often a direct result of intensive competition) is what makes up 
this new imperfect information paradigm (new in the sense that strategic default used to be a 
result of a customer‘s own choice, while now persons in the formal credit providing chain 
might ask/tell a poor client to do so).  
The problem might be, as I see it, that the microfinance sector has become too reliant 
on individuals, or more exactly, the individuals at the bottom of the providing pyramid, the 
ones handling the clients. I will suggest that it is also amongst these people that you tend to 
find those who work with microfinance just because it was the best option available to them at 
a given time.
114
 Had all providers of microfinance truly been aware of the quality of the link 
between the organisation/institution and the borrowers, they would have worked actively to 
find a way to tackle the problem of staff running off with clients. They could have provided 
some incentives which lessened the temptation drawing staff to new institutions, or drawn up 
contracts that hindered staff from running off with the client base they had established. But 
this does not appear to be the case; employees are able to run off with formed and trained 
groups, and the practitioners and researchers at the Forum did expressed a concern with 
regards to the Human Resources in the sector. If the provider is new, and/or small, having 
only seven people working to promote groups, and three of these decides to change employer, 
the institution runs the risk of losing almost half of its clients. This can very possibly affect its 
sustainability as the institution most likely has borrowed the funds it lends out somewhere, 
and this money will have to be repaid. If the institution should survive, more money or more 
debt is infused in it, interest rates are likely to be raised in order to compensate for income 
lost, wages would probably be cut back on, and the pressure on the remaining staff is likely to 
increase, as will the pressure on, and supervision of, the clients. Based on this I will argue that 
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 Please note that I do not include all staff of all the providers of microfinance when I write this. A lot of 
people, regardless of their position, works in the microfinance sector because they wish to do exactly what they 
are doing, and they believe that what they do can help others. There are also some leaders of organisations or 
institutions, scholars or policy makers that do what they do just because it is good money to be made from doing 
it. As I stated above, this might not be a great problem in the sector due to the relatively high repayment rates 
that are reported throughout it, but it is nevertheless a problem, possibly becoming a development, which I 
believe needed to be addressed. 
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it is important to create a stronger link between the organisation/institution, staff and the 
borrowers, and that this link does not yet receive proper attention. 
 
8.4 Financial inclusion 
It is due to the fact that people now believe it to be worthwhile and profitable to supply the 
poor with financial services that the outreach of microfinance in India has become as great as 
it has. In certain cases though, the people believing in the concept are not the same as the 
people actually providing the services, the people setting the targets versus the people 
expected to reach the targets. We will now turn to address how some of the people argued to 
be financially included (targets being reached) still lack access to formal financial services. 
As this is a thesis on microfinance and outreach, I wish to once again point out that the argued 
outreach of the sector as a whole (narrowly defined) counts 76.6 million clients (before 
adjusting for potential overlaps), whereas that the broadly defined microfinance sector had 
more than 135 million clients by the end of March 2008. We have already seen that the sector, 
narrowly defined, counts more accounts than the number of poor households in India 
(between 61 and 63 million households), correspondingly we find that the number of accounts 
reported in broadly defined sector more than double the number of poor clients.
115
 According 
to the State of the Sector Report 2009 (p. 2) the number of low-income households in the 
country is about 130 millions, however, through e-mail communication the author of the 
report expressed that: ―130 million low income households refer to $2 per day PPP level in 
2001. As per more recent estimates, by 2004-05 this has increased to about 160 million 
households.‖ (E-mail communication with N. Srinivasan, 09.05.2010). This means that even 
if we were to discuss the outreach of the sector in comparison to all low-income households in 
India, microfinance still show a sizable outreach.  
 If providers of microfinance actually direct their services to poor and even low 
income persons, the financial inclusion of these segments seem well on its way to becoming 
realised. So why is there still such a large dependence on informal lenders in India? How can 
NSSO data reveal that despite the vast network of bank branches, only 27% of total farm 
households are indebted to formal sources (C. Rangarajan (chairman), 2008, p. 2, [online])? 
We found in chapter six that the size of the loans can account for some of the discrepancy in 
respect to the informal sector, and following I will introduce one more factor; holding a bank 
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 See the introduction to this thesis for references, definitions and calculations. 
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account, hence being included in the formal economy, does not necessarily translate into that 
the client has access to formal financial services. 
 
8.5 What does it mean to be financially included? 
When I came home from the Annual Forum and went through my notes I found that I had 
written down and underlined the following sentence (though formulated in a number of ways) 
on seven different occasions: ―Ghost accounts are not clients!‖ This represents that I on seven 
different occasions, during a forum lasting only three days, heard somebody argue that the 
financial inclusion in India was of a poor quality. According to the State of the Sector Report 
2009, RBI commissioned studies on the quality of the financial inclusion in several states and 
the studies reviled that inclusion levels were neither high enough to claim success nor was the 
effort sustained long enough to ensure that new clients actually used the facilities available. 
One study found that in Cuddalore (Tamil Nadu), a district that the State Level Bankers 
Committee had declared 100 per cent financially included, 25 per cent of households still 
remained excluded after full inclusion had been declared. According to the bankers this was 
due to the clients‘ unwillingness to use the use the facilities (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 115). N. 
Srinivasan extracted the following passage from the report: 
 
The team randomly selected some households within 1 km. distance from the branches to find out the 
reason for unwillingness. Everyone agreed that the signature on the survey form was theirs. But they 
were not aware that those officials who carried out the survey came for opening a bank account. They 
said that the surveyors had asked for their ration card and filled details from it without informing that 
they could open a bank account. They signed the survey forms thinking that the process was for some 
government scheme that would come in the future. It is therefore premised that the unwillingness was 
on the part of the bank to open the accounts rather than the other way around (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 115-
116). 
 
Srinivasan continues by showing that 72 per cent of the new accounts still had zero or near 
zero balance after one year, and that an additional eleven per cent had a balance of less than 
200 Rupees and at least one transaction during the year (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 116). After 
accounting for quite a number of similar discrepancies between argued outreach and actual 
financial inclusion in India, Srinivasan points out that opening of accounts seem to be the sole 
criterion on which performance is measured. ―Once the account is opened, it is deemed that 
the goals of inclusion have been realised‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 116).   
During the bus ride to visit with Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd. during the Annual 
Forum, Mr. Rajeev Deshpande offered his view on financial inclusion: 
So, presently the Indian banking system does not permit poor people to bank. Even if I send some 
people to open an account in banks, banks don‘t find time to open their accounts. That is the ground 
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reality, big banks, public sector, private sector, they don‘t have time to do the account opening. Public 
sector bank compulsions have to open certain amount of accounts, but only out of compulsion they 
open. Out of anxiety, out of interest they don‘t open.116 
 
Among the participants at the Annual Forum, it was widely agreed upon that just opening an 
account by no means constituted financial inclusion. 
 
One thing became very clear to me [from this discussion], the idea that inclusion means involvement of 
the banks, direct involvement of the banks is not applied. ... As we see every day, all these years, the 
cultural compatibility between the formal banker and the poor is very low. It will build up over a period 
of time, I understand, but we know that formal banks are hesitating, so we should make strong 
recommendations. ... You can always say that even in a loan of 500 Rupees it is not inclusion. 
Minimum somebody needs is 5 000 Rupees, 10 000 Rupees or 20 000 Rupees, first than we say, yes, 
they are financially included. Instead of just opening a passbook and not having any transactions.
117
 
 
Another participant argued that: ―Unfortunately RBI view inclusion as an end in itself, that it 
is a thing that has to be achieved in a three years time. Inclusion cannot be an end in itself, it‘s 
only the process.‖118 Viewing financial inclusion as the ultimate goal, and not paying 
attention to the quality of inclusion, opens for a gap that might be filled with ‗ghost accounts‘. 
A person cannot be said to benefit from having access to formal financial services when he 
does not know that a bank account has been opened in his name. As long as no transactions 
are being made, and there is little or no money deposited into the account, I will, like the 
people quoted above have, argue that financial inclusion is not taking place. Based on the 
testimonies of my informants and the literature familiar to me I cannot say how large the 
scope of this phenomenon is. It does certainly not apply to the entire range of clients that is 
argued to be included in the formal economy, or to all banks, but I am under the impression 
that the number of accounts that merely exists in terms of numbers might perhaps be 
significant.
119
 
 
8.6 Clients experiencing imperfect information 
As providers compete over clients, a new information imperfection has gained relevance in 
regards to poor people accessing formal loans. Clients now experience to be led astray when it 
comes to the cost of borrowing. In the informal credit market the cost of borrowing has 
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 Jaipur, 25.06.2010. 
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 Expressed during the thematic workshop on Policy initiatives, programmes and projects for financial 
inclusion the first day of the Annual Forum, Jaipur, 23.06.2010. 
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 Expressed during the same thematic workshop, Jaipur, 23.06.2010. 
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 The assumption is further strengthened by the fact that quite a few people merely lend out their names against 
a fee allowing others to form groups ‗with‘ them, or taking loans in their names (which we addressed in chapter 
seven).   
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mainly been a result of the negotiation between a client and his patron, while in the formal 
sector interest rates have been more regulated as the Reserve Bank set a maximum percentage 
that banks can charge on credit. The newness of this market imperfection should be seen in 
light of greater access to formal finance amongst the poor, but the fact that interest rates on 
formal finance now is left almost entirely to the discretion of the provider in cases of MFIs, is 
nonetheless a new information imperfection that needs to be addressed. 
Based on ―Microsave’s Focus Note 8” by Graham Wright, N. Srinivasan states that 
the consequences of the competition are that clients will be more demanding and will apply 
their freedom to choose MFIs according to their personal comfort (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 87). 
But according to Mr. Nair, the director of the NGO InSET India (Initiative for Social & 
Economic Transformation), the reality does not always reflect the presumption. 
 
Monica: But as there are many MFIs operating in this area, why don‘t clients just shop around 
for credit? 
Mr. Nair: There is no strict evaluation of the MFIs in India by the government agencies. 
That is why, in my coming presentation, I am proposing that as one of the points 
actually. You will see from that, everything is clear, because there is no strict 
evaluation in India there is no transparency available, so they can do whatever they 
do. 
Monica: But the clients, if I go to you and you say I pay eight per cent, and I go to another guy 
and he says 56 per cent, than I will go to the cheapest guy? 
Mr. Nair: But there is a gap in the information. Poor fellow, I am the borrower, I don‘t know 
whether money is available at cheaper rate of interest.  
Monica: But if it is a small village with two MFIs operating in the same village, one cheap and 
one expensive, all the villagers talk to each other, don‘t they? They will know that 
these guys are no good. 
Mr. Nair: Actually, the agents are doing it. If you give me at the rate of 12 per cent, you tell me 
very privately: ―Mr Nair, don‘t tell I am giving you loan at 12 per cent. You say I am 
giving out loan at 36 per cent.‖ So the poor fellow knows only 36 per cent he is 
giving. Actually, this is very cheaty. 
Monica:  This is common? 
Mr. Nair: Many MFIs are applying this, therefore we are trying to bring out a law to regulate 
them actually, so whatever being charged should be known to the government, 
through their annual report or their balance sheet. 
 
As we can see from conversation with Mr. Nair‘s, the freedom to choose MFI according to 
personal comfort might not reflect that clients are in a position to take advantage of the 
competitive environment and thereby access to the best services that the MFIs have to offer 
due to this ‗new‘ information imperfection. In worst case scenarios this results in excessive 
interest charges by the provider (or the staff), and it is these rates (demanded in the ‗cheaty‘ 
way or merely shielded from the public eye) which presently is causing all the commotion 
with regards to poor people becoming debt slaves due to microloans. Mr. Nair also advocates 
the need for a law to regulate the MFIs, and during the Forum he was not the only one who 
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did that. We will discuss the need for such a law, as well as the reactions that came against the 
state government of Andhra Pradesh (AP) when they recently decided to regulate the MFIs in 
the area, in the last part of this chapter. First we will turn to explore the most well-known 
outcome of competition, multiple lending/multiple borrowing. Excessive competition, and 
there from multiple lending, is typically associated with a few southern states.
120
 I aim to 
show that multiple lending is in fact a rather large phenomenon that is not only restricted to 
these areas, which furthermore implies that the argued outreach of the microfinance 
approaches in India is likely to be overestimated. 
 
8.7 Multiple lending, are repayments real or myth? 
In the State of the Sector Report 2009 N. Srinivasan points out that MFIs report client data 
which can be overlapping as customers sometimes borrow from more than one MFI in areas 
where competition is intense. He argues that overlaps also exist between banks and MFIs in 
case of SHG lending, and that multiple membership of SHGs can be another source of 
potential overstatement of client numbers (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 21). 
 
This report being one with a tight deadline, does not (and cannot) research in to the issue; but points out 
that overlap of clients between SHGs and MFIs and multiple loans by same individuals and households 
is a factor. Some adjustments for the overlap is made, but I would not say that it would be statistically 
satisfying. Even in case of MFIs multiple borrowing clients is rampant in some states. I am hoping that 
some studies would be available this year to get a fix on this and provide a better basis for computing 
the penetration of microfinance (Email communication with N. Srinivasan, 09.05.10).  
  
During the round table on the State of the Sector Report 2010, multiple lending naturally 
became a subject of discussion. N. Srinivasan then pointed out that: ―If you recall, last year‘s 
[report] Andhra Pradesh shows that for each poor family there are eight accounts.‖ The 
statement clearly indicates that multiple borrowing is happening, at least in Andhra Pradesh, 
though the number should be seen in light of non-poor being able to take advantage of the 
services provided by microfinance practitioners. The Kolar experience (in Kerela) came about 
(partly) as a result of a borrower having managed to accumulate a microloan debt amounting 
to 0.7 million Rupees, also a clear example of multiple borrowing.
121
 But if we are to accept 
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 ―The four southern states (AP, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerela), with 20% of India‘s rural population, 
account for 54% of SHGs and 75% of SHG bank credit‖ (Sinha, et al., 2009, p. 4-5). ―The microfinance 
penetration index shows that the gap still exist in the Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
(BIMARU) states and northern region. … The intensive coverage of microfinance in Tamil Nadu, AP and 
Karnataka needs greater in-depth study and analysis‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 4). 
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 To learn about the Kolar incident please see: Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report 2009, 
(Srinivasan, p. 8, 71-72).  For a report that explores what went wrong in Kolar and the spinoffs it had to nearby 
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that multiple lending/borrowing mainly is a result of intense competition, it should be legit to 
argue that this is not a very common phenomenon in comparatively ‗low competition‘ areas 
such as the northern belt and hill areas. The experiences I made during the fieldworks 
however, contradicts this assumption as many of the people I interacted with, and/or 
interviewed, raised a concern that there might be more bubbles waiting to burst in other parts 
of the country as well.   
 In Uttarakhand Mr. Kunwar expressed his concern in the following manner:  
 
Everybody is making SHGs, so some times, what is happening is that one SHG is countered by four 
departments. ... At the moment we are in a very confusing state in Uttarakhand, one member is member 
of three SHGs. One SHG of this department, one of that, there are different schemes. And you have 
same people in the village. What to do? By three names and three places the same person is there. I 
think this is the confusion for the people making the schemes, in the top. There is a lack of coordination 
amongst the departments.
122
  
  
From Rajasthan, Mr. Dubey told of similar happenings during the roundtable on the State of 
the Sector report 2010: 
  
Last week I got an offer from one MFI. They were running two branches in Rajasthan and they asked 
that whether I could take over their clients because they don‘t want to operate in Rajasthan. So I asked 
my assistant to go and visit that. ... Out of out of 200 clients, they were having only 200 clients in three 
months, 60 clients were already from our! And I heard 20-30 were under the CRT[?] and JRT[?] or 
what so ever, so I was not able to take those clients, because I see the situation is going to come, if the 
merger is going to come, the same clients would have been taken five loans from one MFI. 
 
To lay emphasis on the quotes above, I find it fitting to include what one of the other 
participants at the roundtable bursted out with after Mr. Dubay had finished his story: ―In 
Statmaggar we call it a payback scheme!‖ The mere fact that northern state microfinance 
practitioners have nicknamed multiple borrowing ‗payback scheme‘ rather clearly reflects that 
clients have (easy) access to multiple loans outside the southern states as well.  
There is a clear link between multiple borrowing and the question; why do people 
choose to borrow from multiple sources? The answer though, is many folded and does of 
course vary with individual needs and preferences. Some take multiple loans because they are 
easily available, some get pressured by family members or authority persons in the village to 
borrow, some are not actually borrowing but merely lending out their name against a fee, 
others again might be bound to approach multiple sources as the size of one microloan is 
                                                                                                                                                        
towns see: ―Competition & Role of External Agents‖ by the Association of Karnataka Microfinance Institutions 
(AKMI), 2010, [online].  
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 Kaleshwar, 26.09.2009. 
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inadequate to cover their needs. In need of raising larger amounts (from the formal sector), 
multiple borrowing from providers of microfinance has become a well know option to the 
formerly unbanked clients. 
 
With regards to this multiple lending, I have some perspectives I want to share. During one of my field 
visits I was visiting a grocery shop in Madhya Pradesh, and I started interacting with that one person, 
she had borrowed from five sources. This has happened some two years back. Then I asked; why you 
have taken five loans from different players? [She said] ―Sir, my requirement is huge, because I need 
around one lakh [Rs. 100 000] working capital, but these people are giving only term loans which I 
need to repay immediately, than I cannot maintain my stock. The nature of fiscally offered is also not 
suitable for me, and the amount also is not adequate for me. So if somebody comes from single source 
and gives me, I am ready to take it.‖123 
 
As we have already discussed the size of microloans, I will not address it any further here, I 
merely wanted to include the quote as it reflects the connection between the size of loans and 
multiple borrowing. Moreover the example will work as a reminder to that the AP Ordinance, 
which will be discussed briefly, might cripple the possibilities poor people have of working 
their way out of poverty by restricting them from borrowing from multiple formal sources. 
The conversation additionally took place in Madhya Pradesh which further indicates the 
outreach of multiple borrowing/lending. The above quotes, none of them from the areas in 
which competition assumingly is intense, implies that the argued outreach of the microfinance 
sector can be overestimated even after some adjustments to the numbers has been made.  
Providing borrowers with multiple alternatives for credit might contribute to 
undermine the repayment discipline of borrowers as it enables them to juggle between the 
different providers, repaying one loan with another, or defaulting with one while retaining 
their relationship with the next. One of the participants at the Annual Forum argued that 
people having borrowed from multiple sources put a lot of consideration into creating a 
repayment schedule that (barely) allows them to have continued access to formal finance: 
  
They usually repay one institution this month, thinking that I will not repay this one this time, because 
they need to pay the other one. Next month I have to pay this one, than I pay that one next time. It is 
actually lots of overdue, you know! Taking different loans for different purposes, they are continuously 
in debt. It is very time consuming. If they could only have gotten everything from one, they would be 
free of the headache of repaying and borrowing from all the different MFIs.
124
 
 
One more example of this can be found in the quote of Mr. Dubey in the former chapter: 
―they have the back to back centre meetings.‖ During the roundtable on the State of the Sector 
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 Stated during the roundtable on the State of the Sector Report, Jaipur, 23.06.2010. 
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 Expressed during the bus ride home from visiting with Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd, Jaipur, 25.06.2010. 
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Report 2010, Mr. Srinivasan asked the participants whether they were under the impression 
that clients successfully juggled various loans, or if they believed it to be a sign of distress. To 
this Mr. Dubey replied the following: 
 
Once you go and see the delivery of the loans, and the receiving of the loans, this is over a period of 
time. Second thing is that when money is in the hand, people can‘t keep for long to repay the money 
loaned, either that would be utilised into consumption, or, if not, would go for the productive purposes. 
So, that‘s why I am convinced, somewhat, that we have to see the cycle how loan is coming to that 
group, first, and what is the use of that money. Rather than saying that one person is taking loan from 
one institution and repaying that one other person loan. But always there is scarcity of the money, so it 
cannot go long. If it is continuing for last three years, I don‘t see that this is going to go more than four 
year, five year. 
 
If clients are unable to utilise loans efficiently, to generate the required income to repay their 
total debt, default will occur. In the beginning it might be relatively easy to keep up the 
juggling, which can make it harder for the institutions to see the warning sign until it is too 
late unless other clients come forth and tells on the potential defaulter. This again, depends on 
whether or not the other group members also have borrowed from multiple sources, and on 
how well they know the potential defaulters situation. Either the potential defaulter is able to 
borrow more money and keep juggling until he by some means gets the money to repay all 
the loans he has taken, or he might choose to repay only one of the institutions and in that way 
at least hope to maintain his relationship with that agency. One person pocketing three loans 
might nevertheless mean that three SHGs (60 people) risk going unfinanced, that these people 
will be angry and possibly take action, and that the three institutions he defaults with will do 
everything in their power to redeem the money lent. 
Multiple lending/borrowing becomes a problem when clients accumulate more debt 
than what they are capable of repaying. Not being able to repay is likely to impose hardship 
on the poor borrower in terms of physical and/or verbal abuse from the lender, other group 
members or even give the defaulter a bad reputation in the community at large. Some lenders 
will also take control over the defaulting borrower‘s assets in order to cover the amount 
outstanding. A person who is unable to repay runs the risk of destroying the credit worthiness 
of an entire, or multiple, groups of people. As we saw in chapter five, people experiencing 
repayment problems might become subjects to strict surveillance by others to the extent that 
the household‘s entire expenditure pattern is vigorously monitored by a group (leader) or the 
lender, and the harassment of defaulters has allegedly become so harsh in some areas that 
poor borrowers have began to take their own lives due to their microdebt. 
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8.8 The gap between implementation and self-regulation 
The overriding objective of microfinance is to provide poor persons with services and 
products that can help them cope with everyday factors of stress and concern. Guided by this 
ideal, most providers of microfinance are fairly free to choose who they direct their services 
at, the range of products they deliver and the requirements they set for delivering these 
services. In case of MFIs, even the cost (interest rates) they place on the clients is left to the 
discretion of the provider.
125
 This freedom is to a certain extent resulting from the lack of a 
monitoring agency that controls the procedures in the MFI approach. The lack of a monitoring 
agency is also contributing to (the problem of) multiple lending. The only way an institution 
can know if an applicant is free of external formal debt is to trust that the client or his peers 
will tell whether or not there are any loans taken elsewhere, or if institutions working in the 
same area by their own will choose to exchange client information.
126
 
On the first day of the Annual Forum I attended a group discussion (theme based 
workshop) on ‗Credit‘. As one can suspect, discussing credit brought up the issue of an 
insufficient regulatory framework. I have decided to retell some of what was being said in the 
form of a summary of the discussion. The summary is complemented with quotes from the 
participants to put focus on the points I have found to be most relevant for what we will 
discuss below. The statement that initiated the following part of the group discussion was: ―At 
present, the microfinance sector in India is not regulated, unfortunately.‖ A couple of people 
immediately contradicted this. They argued that there are policies meant to regulate the 
dealings in the sector, and although nobody denied this, the majority of the participants 
argued that the policies were no good as they were not implemented. A man argued that there 
is a loophole though, moral suasion. NABARD or the RBI can step in and exercise this moral 
suasion when the self-regulation is not being complied. But according to another participant 
moral suasion does not carry any way; ―Sa-Dhan127 has circulated this ‗Code of Conduct‘128 
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 Banks, at least, needs to keep costs within the regulatory framework set by the RBI. 
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 During a theme based workshop I attended during the Annual Forum we discussed the likelihood for MFIs 
willingly sharing their client lists. One man argued that the MFIs should be motivated to share client information 
as they themselves ultimately would be the losers if multiple lending resulted in poor quality groups and 
increased possibility for defaults. The idea was welcomed by the group, but we recognised that it would be 
difficult to implement this. ―Who will give you the data unless you have the authority to collect it?‖ ―Data is my 
life line, as an MFI this is my lifeline, why will I give it to you?‖ ―Here, this is my clients, please don‘t lend to 
them‖ (Jaipur, 23.06.2010 ). Furthermore there is an ethical dilemma, is it fair to expose clients‘ lives like that?  
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 ―Sa-Dhan (‗The association of Community Development Finance Institutions‘) set up by micro-finance 
organisations (MFOs) in India‖ (Fisher and Sriram, 2002, p. 36). 
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 The ―Code of Conduct‖ refers to principles, values, standards, and rules of behaviour that Sa-Dhan has 
suggested should guide the decisions, procedures and systems of MFIs. The suggested ―Code of Conduct‖ can be 
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for quite some time now, and Sa-Dhan is a network of MFI associations themselves. If this 
group itself does not follow this, than what is the point of asking somebody else to come and 
tell what needs to be done, say that this is the moral suasion, do it yourself?‖ ―The Indian 
expectation is that self-regulation does not work out, at all. We people tend to, if there is a 
rule some are not even willing to follow, but if there are no rules, we are definitely not 
bothered at all.‖ ―Let‘s not call it moral suasion,‖ a man responded, ―call it a formal 
regulation, then there is a threat, where is that in Sa-Dhan?‖ The topic under debate turned 
towards who should have the responsibility of writing down these formal regulations, and 
who should make sure that they were followed. ―The whole stick with the Reserve Bank is 
that they will move out of private sector lending and then the funds, or the tap, will be closed. 
As simple as that, public sector bank window will not be open. That is the threat RBI uses 
short of the regulations.‖ ―Yes, I am not denying the policy, but the warning should be a 
formal regulation, and then you need an Act.‖  
As many have before us, we began to debate the need for a regulatory Act. This is 
nothing new; the need for an Act has been discussed for years, as have the suggestions of 
what should be written in it. ―Act has been holding flat for last hundred years! [Everybody 
laughs, and the man corrects himself] or the last three years, but it just doesn‘t seem to move.‖ 
According to one of the participants though, it just had. He said that in the Pondicherry 
conference he had attended it had been decided that NABARD was going to be regulator of 
the MFIs. This did not sit well with quite a few of the participants, and the debate ran hot. 
Everybody was speaking in each other‘s mouth, not agreeing on whether or not NABARD 
should, and would, become the watchdog in the MFI sector. After a while the ‗Rapporteur‘ 
Mr. Ratnesh took the word. He wanted to sum up what we had discussed so as to prepare the 
presentation that would be made for the rest of the participants at the Forum the following 
morning. ―Can I than safely assume that I am speaking for the group when I say that 
microfinance bill, which has been hanging by for quite some time, needs to come in shape, 
needs to be implemented. First than we will realise its shortcomings, because you see, 
everything is in the draft form, how do you react to a draft unless you know what kind of 
annual it is going to generate?‖  
                                                                                                                                                        
read in full on the following link: <http://www.sksindia.com/downloads/sa_dhan_core_values.pdf> (Sa- Dhan, 
(date not available), [online]). 
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Only a few minutes prior to the workshop I had been discussing the lack of a 
regulatory framework in the case of MFIs with Mr. Nair. He did not participate in the group 
on ‗Credit‘, however he had reflected over the subject. 
   
Mr. Nair: See, one is, there is already regulations. Other is implementation. You have a law, but 
you are not implementing in a proper spirit. What is the use of such kind of law? The 
implementation is very poor in India. Government may be saying that this is the 
maximum interest you can charge, but, implementation side is very poor, so the public 
do not know, the government does not know how much per cent a particular MFI is 
charging. 
Monica:  What is the regulation, do you know? How much are the MFIs allowed to charge? 
Mr. Nair: Regulations knows, but again, this is bribery system. The government official takes 
money, cover up the story and don‘t issue the information to anybody. 
Monica:  But in theory, what is the interest charge for MFIs? 
Mr. Nair: See, normally government fixed is 12 per cent, but they [MFIs] are charging more 
than that, because if you want to run the organisation for 12 per cent interest you 
won‘t be able to manage it actually. An independent department or an independent 
‗watchdog‘ to see if the rules and the regulations are meticulously and rigorously 
followed by MFIs is needed. 
Monica:  Who should be that watchdog? 
Mr. Nair: Government itself. 
Monica:  Government itself, but if the government is corrupt than? 
Mr. Nair: No, as a whole government is not corrupt. The people working in that, the 
bureaucracy working in that, the staff working in that. 
Monica:  But won‘t the staff working as watchdogs also maybe, possibly?  
Mr. Nair: See, normally watchdogs are not corrupt. People working under the watchdog are 
corrupt. The agency might not be corrupt, but the clerk attached to the judge might be 
corrupt. That is what happens in India.  
 
In accordance with the statements of my informants, the lack of an (implemented) formal 
regulatory framework for MFIs has gained much attention from both clients, scholars, 
journalists, practitioners and policy makers over the last few years.
129
 The problems of having 
an unregulated sector relate, on behalf of clients, to who is being reached, how many times 
each client is being reached, and at what cost to the client he is being reached. In the media, 
the focus has mainly been on the exorbitant interest rates (resulting from a lack of 
transparency in MFI practice as well as an unwillingness, or incapability, to follow the 
suggested ‗Code of Conduct‘) that MFI allegedly charge, and how these drive poor farmers 
into take their own lives. Andhra Pradesh (AP) is the state in India that has gotten the most 
negative attention both from Indian news papers and from abroad.
130
 The accusations against 
MFIs resulted in the passage of an Ordinance by the State Government which was 
                                                 
129
 This escaladed after the conflict between the State (Andhra Pradesh) and the MFIs reached a fever pitch in 
2006 when district authorities closed down about 50 branches of two major MFIs in the Krishna district after 
allegations of usurious interest rates and coercive loan collection (Shylendra, 2006, p. 1, [online]). 
130
 Only a week ago I read an article on farmer suicides in AP due to microfinance in the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten The article was named: ―Ba om smålån, ble gjeldsslaver,‖ translated into English that means ―Asked 
for small/micro loans, became slaves of debt.‖ (Østgårdsgjelten and Harbo, 2010, [online]). 
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promulgated on October 15
th
 2010. Even though regulations have been requested for quite 
some time, critical reactions to the ordinance came about immediately after it was broadcasted 
(and in my view for justifiable reasons). In the Deccan Chronicle on October 21
th
 2010, one 
could read the following: 
 
In another blow to the micro finance industry, banks have halted disbursements of sanctioned and 
approved loans to companies operating in the sector. The development was confirmed to this 
publication by industry sources who refused to be identified given the sensitive nature of the 
development. 
Earlier, these firms had been barred by the Andhra Pradesh government from collecting their 
dues till they were properly registered as mandated by a new ordinance. On Friday, the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court is scheduled to hear the petition of the micro finance institutions against the ordinance. 
According to industry sources, banks have already stopped the disbursal of around `175 crore to `200 
crore to around 44 MFIs this week because of the stalled recovery of micro loans from MFI customers 
in Andhra Pradesh (Deccan Chronicle, 2010, [online]).
131
 
 
 In response to the discussion ‗A National Regulatory Framework for Microfinance Sector‘ 
(from the email based Solution Exchange platform I introduced in chapter five) I have, just 
during the last week, received the two articles: ―Indian Microfinance Crisis of 2010: Turf War 
or a Battle of Intentions?‖ (An Intellecap White Paper, 2010, [online]), and ―Is Micro Finance 
leading to a Macro Mess, The AP Ordinance‖ (Fernandez, 2010, [online]) as well as 13 web 
links to some of the recent posts (blogs and articles) which address the situation in AP.
132
 I 
have yet to come across, or more correctly to receive, a publication which is not somewhat 
critical to the ordinance.
133
  
The Ordinance (‗Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (regulation of money 
lending) Ordinance 2010‘) is, according to the Intellecap White Paper (2010, p. 2, [online]), 
built on four premises: 
 
                                                 
131
 One crore equals ten million. 
132
 For those who wish to read more about the situation in AP, the posts can be found on <http://microfinance-in-
india.blogspot.com/> ([online], 17.11.2010). 
133
 It should be noted that the ordinance has only been in working for about three weeks as I write this, and that I 
have not prioritised to find any publications praising it either due to the time that is available to me before this 
thesis is due, ergo ‗received‘. I do nevertheless feel that it is justified to argue that the ordinance have some 
obvious flaws which, in my view, contributes to weaken its status. For example: ―The definition of Microfinance 
Institution as it stands in the ordinance includes banks, and even SERP [the Society for Elimination of Rural 
Poverty which is an autonomous society of the Department of Rural Development, Government of Andhra 
Pradesh] and its federations as these entities are either ‗providing loans to low income clients or offering 
financial support to them‘ [though it does not apply for banks, SERP, nor their federations]. The definition of 
low income client is not available either in the ordinance or anywhere else. This leaves wide scope for 
interpretation. The requirement of display of interest rates does not define ‗interest rate‘. Whether flat rates, 
monthly rates and other confusing rates can be displayed?‖ (Srinivasan, 2010, [online]). From the following 
discussion on the ordinance‘s regulation of multiple lending/borrowing it should furthermore become clear that it 
might be beneficial for both clients and the MFIs if the national level Act came into working within long. 
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a) MFIs charge usurious interest rates; 
b) If clients fail to pay on time, MFIs use coercive methods 
to collect the interest; 
c) These practices are forcing the poor to commit suicide; 
d) MFIs make huge profits and have no social mission to 
help the poor.
 
 
 
The Intellecap White Paper further argues that:  
 
Through its allegations, in the extraordinarily-phrased Preamble, the Ordinance strongly suggests 
government dissatisfaction with, and even broad antipathy towards, the entire MFI industry. However, 
these premises may not tell the whole story. With the fullest respect, it is possible to read into these 
allegations signs of a state government unhappy that its programs (and perhaps the individual influences 
of some members of government) are being undercut by the MFIs (An Intellecap White Paper, 2010, p. 
2, [online]). 
 
This might especially be seen in the fact that the ordinance makes it mandatory for all private 
institutions engaged in micro-lending to register (and specify their areas of operations, their 
procedure and so on) with the district Registering Authority, the Project Director of District 
Rural Development Agency (for rural areas), while granting the Registering Authority the 
power to ―at any time, either suo moto or upon receipt of complaints by SHGs or its members 
or by members of the public cancel the registration of an MFI after assigning sufficient 
reasons for such cancellation‖ (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010, p. 3, [online], the 
author‘s emphasis). According to the Intellecap White Paper ―[s]uch discretionary provisions 
are often prone to abuse and applied haphazardly‖ (An Intellecap White Paper, 2010, p. 4, 
[online]). In the article ―The AP Ordinance on Microfinance – a solution with more 
problems,‖ N. Srinivasan points out that:  
 
The requirements of the law are that a list of borrowers with details of each loan should be provided to 
the registering authority at the end of each month. With more than 23.5 million microfinance clients in 
the state, information handling is set to become a nightmare. The capacity of administrative machinery 
to handle registrations, monthly returns, complaints, no-objection certificates and penal proceedings 
may need to be increased manifold. … Loading the authorities with a huge volume of work of a very 
different nature is bound to cause delays, frustration and generally chaotic conditions around these 
offices (Srinivasan, 2010, [online]). 
 
As a response to a comment on the above quoted article N. Srinivasan argues:
134
  
 
                                                 
134
 N. Srinivasan‘s article is posted on Microfinance Focus, an online knowledge platform. As this is a platform 
open to discussions, others may comment on the articles that are posted. 
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What is galling is that suicides were given as the reason.  In 2005, AP had high level of farmer‘s 
suicides (before the explosive growth of microfinance in AP) forcing PMO to design a special package 
(in AP, Karnataka, and Maharashtra states). The package is still running in the state in select districts. 
 At that time the government was blamed with inaction against money lenders and banks were asked to 
write off loans, restructure debts and increase lending for agriculture. Now the blame has shifted 
to MFIs? (Srinivasan, 2010, [online]). 
 
It can be read from this that the government, which controls the agents associated with the 
SBLP, both have been able to disclaim responsibility for their insufficient actions in regards 
to poor people being driven to suicides, and at the same time increased the SBLP‘s 
competitiveness relative to MFIs by blaming the MFIs for tragedies which might or might not 
derive from their actions.
135
 As we saw on page 80, note 112, the SHGs covered under 
government‘s programmes had a comparatively bad repayment records, and it might have 
been a thorn in the government‘s side that the more expensive and not necessarily 
socioeconomic oriented MFIs now grows at a faster pace than the SBLP in terms of client 
acquisition.
136
 Due to the scope of this thesis and the limited time available to me until it is 
due, I am in no position to explore and treat the Ordinance with the attention it deserves,
137
 I 
have however chosen to extract and discuss a part of it; regulations regarding multiple 
lending/borrowing. I have done this because multiple lending was the topic in the former part 
of this chapter, and because I have data I think deserves attention from the second fieldwork 
that relates to tackling the farmer suicides (allegedly deriving from MFIs‘ practices which set 
of this ordinance).  
In regards to multiple lending/borrowing the ordinance compels amongst others the 
following two stipulations:  
 
No MFI shall grant loan to a member of SHG during the subsistence of two previous loans irrespective 
of the source of the previous two loans (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010, p. 5, [online]). 
 
No member of an SHG shall be a member of more than one SHG, provided that where a member has, at 
the commencement of this Ordinance, become a member of more than one SHG, she shall have the 
                                                 
135
 ―It should be noted that these suicides, while worrisome and tragic, are difficult to attribute to a specific cause 
without more evidence. Did the victim have a bad harvest and suffer economically? Was there a medical 
emergency in the family that was financially impossible to pay for? Was there a tragedy in the community? … 
[O]nly an in-depth investigation (which mainstream MFIs have been among the first to call for) would prove or 
disprove the allegations of MFI coercion being responsible for these suicides‖ (An Intellecap White Paper, 2010, 
p. 4-5, [online]). 
136
 Though a slower growth rate might also connote that the SBLP have began to focus more ‗in depth‘, 
undertaking a more inclusive growth, while the MFIs stick to growth in terms of easy client acquisition (‗touch 
and go‘ growth).  
137
 I recommend the Intellecap White Paper: ―Indian Microfinance Crisis of 2010: Turf War or a Battle of 
Intentions?‖ and N. Srinivasan‘s ―The AP Ordinance on Microfinance – a solution with more problems‖ for a 
fuller understanding of the ordinance and its implications, and the AP Ordinance can be read in full at the 
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) webpage. SERP is an autonomous society of the Department of 
Rural Development, Government of Andhra Pradesh (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010, [online]). 
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option to retain the membership of one SHG and to terminate her membership in other SHGs and for 
that purpose, she shall issue a notice to such SHGs about her option to terminate her membership, settle 
and pay the amount payable to the MFIs which had lent monies to such SHGs, within a period of 3 
months from the date of commencement of this Ordinance (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010, p. 4, 
[online]). 
 
 
From what we have addressed hitherto in this thesis, I will suggest that a lot of clients all over 
the country are quite likely to have more than one loan. In AP, particularly, the propensity to 
borrow is documented to be high. ―CMFs‘ [Centre for Micro Finance‘s] sample survey in AP 
brought out that 82% of families had loans from informal sources. The median number of 
loans taken by households was four. The chances are that three out four of these loans are 
from the informal sector―(Srinivasan, 2010, [online]). If the average number of loans taken by 
households in AP is four, and MFIs are prohibited from delivering a third loan to people 
regardless of whom they have borrowed the first two from (including all informal sources of 
credit) neither banks (due to the poor definition of MFIs as mentioned in note 133 on page 
96), nor MFIs (defined in this thesis as the institutions other than banks that provides financial 
services), can continue to operate in AP. Second of all, how can the MFIs, in a cost efficient 
manner, make sure that potential clients have not taken more than one loan from an informal 
source? This is directly related to the problems of imperfect information that we documented 
to exclude poor people from formal financial services in chapter three. As formal banks find 
the cost of tracking the credit history of poor clients borrowing individually to be exceedingly 
high (partly the reason why banks excluded poor from their services), how than does the 
ordinance suggest that MFIs can find out whether or not a client has borrowed from a trader, a 
neighbour, a landowner or the like, while keeping interest rates (which must be high enough 
to cover the cost of lending out money) from going through the roof? If revealing external 
debt will result in clients having no access to formal credit, they naturally have little incentive 
to be truthful about their financial situation. Furthermore, as documented above, the reason 
why many approach multiple lenders is because one microloan does not cover their needs. 
Hence, how can restricting a client from taking a formal loan in order to reinforce her house 
before the monsoon season,
138
 just because she has already approached a neighbour to borrow 
some money for food and her patron in need of farm input, be the best way to assist her?  
Moreover, if a client should be a member of more than one SHG, the second 
stipulation gives that she might have to repay (large) debt in only three months. If the loan has 
                                                 
138
 Recall the discussion in chapter six with regards to how a microloan might help clients to tackle core 
components of poverty.  
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already been invested in something that does not generate an income right away, such as 
medical bills, fertilizer or for example a buffalo, I will suspect that the ordinance might drive 
clients to default, or possibly (further) into the arms of the informal lenders who do not care 
that the clients are not supposed to borrow from more than three sources. As mentioned prior, 
having to approach a moneylender out of desperation might result in the lender raising his 
interests further just because he can. Some clients might even have been trying to avoid 
lending from local moneylenders by participating in multiple SHGs; does the ordinance by its 
regulations really suggest that it is better for desperate women to approach informal lenders 
(even if the alternative is a ‗malicious agent‘) than to be granted a formal loan to cover an 
unexpected medical bill, or to be allowed to repay the loan on the terms that was initially 
given for her repayment period (maybe even the reason why she chose to invest as she did)? 
If the suicides reported in AP was a result of people having problems with repaying their 
formal debt, this decision might not help the constrained situation of poor farmers, at least not 
until all the associated clients have been through the transformation of going from three, or 
maybe even five loans, to having just one.
139
 During this transition phase, if feasible, I will 
strongly recommend making extensive counselling available to the people who (suddenly) 
find themselves in distress.
140
 An admirable example of how this can be put into practice can 
be found in the following story told by Mr. Rajeev Deshpande:  
 
Even if he have a loan of 25 000, only 25 000 loan, and he is unable to pay, the moneylender or the 
persons concerned or the cooperative, in some scrupulous limits, come and insult him. The attitudes of 
the farmers are that he does not want to bend in front of anybody, customs and traditions don‘t permit 
them to tolerate insults. And that is unbearable, and he commits suicide. And behind him left is total 
distress, misery, and family is having that stigma, that in this family it has been committed suicide. On 
this burden, thousands of families are living at present, but if the society stands behind them, then 
definitely they will be normalised. (Monica: So are there some connections between farmer suicides and 
microloans?) I am just coming to that, six or seven thousand farmers have committed suicide in six 
districts of Maharashtra state. That is the most progressive state, so his distress we are addressing from 
Shree Hanuman Vyayam Prasarak Mandal Amravati in collaborating with bank of Maharashtra, I was 
director, and some local institutions. So this counselling centre we started. There we motivate them. 
There we transform technologies. There we ask the bankers to present their schemes. There we ask the 
collectors to present dues, the revenue site, address their problems, if there are specific problems, and 
there is a 24 hour helpline. This is directly addressing the problems of each and every farmer. We are 
creating the leadership, and up to now one lakh farmers have been counselled since last three years, and 
programme is continuing. Government of India, Prime Minister has issued one letter appreciating this 
programme and asking them to continue. ... One lakh farmers, not a single farmer has committed 
suicide. These farmers might not have heard of getting trained ever in their lives, but now this 
institution is standing very firmly on that and taking them along and intervenes them in the society.
141
 
                                                 
139
 Recall also that the reason why some approach multiple lenders is because the size of a microloan might be 
insufficient to cover their needs.  
140
 This is something which I actually advocate in general in regards to people who have accumulated more debt 
than they manage to handle. 
141
 Expressed on the bus ride to visit with Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd. in Phagi, Jaipur (25.06.2010). 
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Despite my negative approach to the AP Ordinance, I still believe that the ordinance might be 
a blessing in disguise. The discussions currently running about its strengths and weaknesses 
might enable the policy makers at the national level to prepare the Act (which ―has been 
holding flat for the last hundred years‖142) based on the lessons learned from this ordinance. 
The scenario is no longer the same as it was when I attended the group discussion on ‗Credit‘ 
(the summary above). The government do now know ―what kind of annual it is going to 
generate‖ and ―we [do in fact] realise its shortcomings‖143 which should enable the GoI to sort 
out the flaws in the AP Ordinance and thereby do better the second time around. 
                                                 
142
 Quoted above in the summary of the group discussion on ‗Credit‘ I attended during the Annual Forum. 
143
 Mr. Ratnesh‘s statement quoted in the summary of the group discussion above. 
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9 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to challenge the claimed outreach by considering the quality of 
it. As stated in Chapter one, the claimed outreach is such that most poor and even low-income 
households have access to formal financial services through the microfinance approaches. 
This has prompted us to ask specific questions about its quality. Does the group lending 
approach correct for the market failures in the formal economy which excluded poor people 
prior to microfinance? Has competition in sector become too harsh? Is a person included in 
the formal economy if he has a bank account in his name? Is it the poor that are being reached 
through this tool for poverty alleviation? These questions do in my view contribute to 
determine the quality of the sector‘s outreach, and I therefore believe that answering them 
based on what we have addressed in this thesis will be a good way to assess the quality of the 
outreach, and to conclude the thesis. In the following we will address them one after the other, 
and thereafter, rounding off the thesis, we should be able to establish whether or not the 
outreach of the sector is overestimated. 
 
9.1 Does the group lending approach correct for the market failures in the formal 
economy which excluded poor people prior to microfinance? 
I will argue that it does. In chapter four we saw that the group lending approach have the 
property to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard that derives from imperfect information, 
because even though banks remains as ignorant as ever about who is safe and who is risky, 
they can take advantage of the fact that the group members themselves might have good 
information about fellow members and that the joint liability gives the members incentive to 
use their information to the bank‘s advantage. The banks transfer the job of screening 
potential borrowers, monitoring their efforts and enforcing contracts onto clients, and should a 
person default, the bank can still expect that the other group members will cover for the 
defaulter so as to ensure access to future services and to secure their pooled savings. Bringing 
the bank to the clients and actively seeking out the formerly unbanked further reduces the cost 
that is associated with poor people trying to access formal credit. Moreover, this means that 
microfinance have improved the formal sectors competitiveness relative to informal lenders. 
But as we have also noted, group lending has its downsides. It might have a 
discouraging/excluding effect on the poor who fear that they will not be able deposit the 
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weekly/monthly requirements, who are not strong or numerous enough to be in a group, who 
do not have the time nor can afford to prioritise group meetings, who fear that the 
responsibility of having to cover for other group members or who fear being vigorously 
monitored by them. Inefficiencies furthermore occur when good projects go unfinanced due 
to the default of a single member, when monitoring is too costly or time consuming, when 
clients experience imperfect information, and when groups do not chose to apply peer 
pressure on a defaulter because they understand the rational for defaulting. Providing loans 
through a group lending approach might even be regarded as a second rate service, but as we 
discussed, it appears to be the best option available at the time. This should not be viewed as 
an incentive not to try to improve the product, or to find better or more suitable methods; 
individual lending programmes, graduating client programmes or building better quality 
groups being some areas in which improvement is possible and in my view even desirable. 
However, as the new inefficiencies should be seen in comparison to the non-defaulting, but 
still formerly excluded, members‘ probability of accessing formal finance if microfinance had 
not been an option, I will argue that all the members accessing services through the 
microfinance providers outweigh the size of the new inefficiencies.  
 
9.2 Has competition in the sector become too harsh? 
Healthy competition tends to be beneficial for the demanders, but is the competition amongst 
the providers of microfinance healthy? In my view, the sector is characterised both by 
excessive competition, and by too little competition. One might argue that competition cannot 
be excessive and too low at the same time, but when restricted to certain areas of a whole, 
providers of microfinance have proven that it can. The providers compete for staff and clients, 
but as they often compete for the same staff and to reach the same clients, not staff in general 
or all clients, competition becomes both excessive and inadequate. That the processes through 
which groups are formed now is being cut back on implies that the most attractive clients 
appear to be those who are not too poor (as they assumingly will have less trouble meeting the 
weekly/monthly instalments), who require less coaching (maybe even those who others have 
already been trained) and who are the most willing. It might also imply that the most 
attractive staff consists of people who bring with them an already established client base. By 
focusing on the easily reached low risk villagers, staff members earn more incentives and 
banks are better able to reach their targets. That there is more competition over these clients 
than what is preferable we have documented by discussing the large extent of multiple 
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lending/borrowing that is going on in the sector, it can be seen in the mere fact that the AP 
Ordinance came into existence, and it is expressed in the testimonies of my informants who 
advocate for an Act. Not all areas are characterised by excessive competition though. In some 
areas microfinance is still an fairly unknown, or at least an inexperienced phenomenon to 
most, but the fact that we have seen how unhealthy competition is going on in areas that the 
microfinance penetration index shows still represent a gap on the microfinance map, for 
example Rajasthan and Uttarakhand (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 4), implies that too harsh 
competition do in fact coexist with too little competition in some areas.  
 
9.3 Is a person included in the formal economy if he has a bank account in his name? 
When practitioners of microfinance view financial inclusion as the ultimate goal, and not pay 
attention to the quality of inclusion, it opens for a gap that can be filled with ‗ghost accounts‘. 
I am under the impression that the number clients expressed as being financially included, but 
who still lack access to formal financial services is worth taking notice of. A person cannot be 
said to benefit from microfinance when he does not know that a bank account has been 
opened in his name. As long as no transactions are made, and there is little or no money 
deposited into the account, I will, like a lot of the people I interacted with and interviewed 
during the fieldworks, argue that financial inclusion is not taking place. There has yet to be 
undertaken any comprehensive countrywide study that shows the extent of the financial 
exclusion of clients that per definition is included in the formal economy, and I am in no 
position to estimate the extent of the phenomenon. I will nonetheless make an educated guess 
and claim that it might be noteworthy, especially when we take into account the proxy 
borrowers who have lent out their names against a fee, who has been convinced by influential 
villagers to form groups because banks need to reach targets, or who have been pressured by 
superior villagers that need fifteen other people to make up a group in order to access the 
comparatively hassle free formal financial services providers of microfinance offer.    
 
9.4 Is it the poor that are being reached through this tool for poverty alleviation? 
As documented in chapter five, Hulme argues that the assumption of microfinance 
automatically being about working with the poor and poorest needs to be dropped unless the 
MFIs can provide clear evidence that it is the case (Hulme, 2007, p. 20), and Srinivasan have 
stated that ―[t]he very poor with no resources may not be fitting clients of the financial system 
till the time their capacities are built‖ (Srinivasan, 2008, p. 3). As we discussed in chapter 
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four, ‗The size of microloans‘, the time it take to build the poor‘s capacities might be 
exceedingly long because microfinance is, as the name imply, an incremental approach. We 
saw in the same chapter how microfinance can enable a family to create a surplus that in time 
might contribute to create equality within the household,
144
 and if a surplus covers the 
domestic needs, people furthermore avoid having to borrow in the informal sector out of 
necessity if that is something that they wish to avoid. These are all arguments for why 
providers of microfinance should focus on the poor, and seen in light of how the group 
lending approach lowers the risk of lending to the poor, I believe that it is mostly unfortunate 
practices and/or attitudes amongst some of the providers and policy makers that restrict the 
potential quality of the outreach. Based on what we have discussed in this thesis, I will 
suggest that excessive competition in the sector is the backbone from which the unfortunate 
practices and attitudes derive, though the strive for profit maximisation (in terms of ‗touch 
and go‘ inclusion regardless of the degree of competition in an area) and incidents of 
corruption might naturally also weaken the quality of the outreach.  
During the bus ride to visit Aapni Sahakari Sewa Samiti Ltd., a north eastern NGO 
worker and the man sitting next to him on the bus argued: ―Because each state has different 
political party ruling the state and those parties still believe that it is their own state and they 
can do whatever they want. (Monica: So in such places MFIs are better options than the 
SBLP?) But MFIs will not go, because organisational activities will be very difficult for them 
to manage.‖145 If we see this statement in connection with the AP Ordinance discussed in 
chapter eight, it might be legit to argue that some political parties, or some state governments, 
directly restrict the outreach of the MFI approach, and thereby the quality of the outreach of 
the sector as a whole. This statement is be substantiated if the argument in chapter eight, that 
policy makers are displeased with being perceived as providing an inferior service despite the 
fact that MFIs tend to be more expensive and do not necessarily focus on the socioeconomic 
development of the poor, is accepted.  
N. Srinivasan argues that ―… actual coverage of poor is neither guaranteed nor clearly 
evident from several studies‖ (Srinivasan, 2009, p. 21). I am in no position to provide an 
                                                 
144
 A surplus can for example serve as insurance in case of an income earning family member falling sick, or 
cover medical bills of all the household members as there is no longer a need to prioritise nutrition for some over 
the health of all. Nor would there be any immediate need to discriminate in terms of nutrition in the household, 
which in turn might contribute to more family members having additional income earning days each year seeing 
that a healthy body is more resistant to diseases and that better nutrition is likely to increase productivity, and 
children might be allowed to attend school longer as the family becomes less depended on them to bring in extra 
cash. 
145
 Extracted from a quote in chapter five, paragraph 5.8. 
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accurate number as to the poor being reached compared to the non-poor as no data is yet 
available as far as I know, but in this thesis we have established how the group based 
approach in itself might have an excluding effect on poor people, and on some subgroups of 
the poor, even though it was established to enhance financial inclusion of the very same 
people. We have also seen how competition among practitioners in some cases leads the 
providers to focus on easily reached areas and clients in their attempt to reach targets or to 
earn more incentives, and that a number of financially included people do not have access to, 
or benefit from, formal financial services. 
 
9.5 Is microfinance living up to its promise? 
When an organisation or an institution choose a ‗touch and go‘ growth instead of going more 
‗in depth‘ in the area in which it operates, I will argue that microfinance cease to function as 
an effective tool through which all deserving financially excluded poor might experience 
economic development, and that the microfinance movement no longer lives up to its full 
potential in terms of creating socioeconomic development. Based on what has been discussed 
in this thesis, I am under the impression that this might be the case with microfinance in India. 
The incredible outreach of the sector might be somewhat overestimated. However, there is a 
big difference between not functioning perfectly and not working at all. Unfortunately the 
great things that are being realised from microfinance have not received the attention they 
deserve in this thesis as it set out to examine the flaws in the sector. Because credit is the 
service that most providers offer, I have held aside (more or less) discussions of initiatives 
like insurance, savings facilities, training centres, Banking Correspondents and Banking 
Facilitators, pension schemes, microleasing of objects that can generate an income, housing 
microfinance, education loans, sanitation schemes and so on, and I have not focused on the 
social empowerment of clients. All these aspects contribute to determine the success of the 
Indian microfinance movement, and many banks and MFIs actively work to improve the 
services they provide by taking advantage of, or by finance the development of, new 
technology which can enhance their outreach in a cost efficient manner (both to themselves 
and to potential clients). 
However, credit continues to be the service which is most commonly provided in 
India, and a place to save is too often the only microfinance service complementing credit. 
But is it feasible to expect that giving poor persons a small loan automatically will lift them 
above the poverty line and make sure that they do not fall back down below it? The fact that 
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microcredit evolved into microfinance witness about that it is not. Yet, a lot of people (clients, 
providers, policymakers, researches and/or the media) expect that a microloan will turn a poor 
person‘s reality upside down, and when this is expected, they sometimes fail to see the 
smaller effects. Even though a microloan might not transfer poor into non-poor, it can 
contribute to lessen intra household discrimination in terms of nutrition, health care and 
education, or having access to a formal loan might allow a client not to borrow from an 
informal lender (if that is not desirable) in case of an emergency. A microloan might ensure 
some clients a steady income which will enable them to work their way out of poverty, or 
(perhaps more often) it might just be enough for the clients to complement the household‘s 
common basket of resources and permit them to spend money on goods that are not 
absolutely necessary for their survival. A microloan might furthermore be invested in a new 
roof, this will not lift a person out of poverty, but it might result in more income earning days 
a year if it keeps the client and her food storage dry (she will probably not fall ill as often). As 
this thesis has addressed the flaws in the sector in order to determine the quality of its 
outreach, to conclude that microfinance is actually working and that I believe it to be an 
appropriate tool through which socioeconomic development can take place, can seem 
inconsistent. However, the point of this thesis has been to raise awareness of the fact that 
there are flaws in the sector that restrict the much acknowledged Indian microfinance 
approaches, and their incredible outreach, from reaching their full potential. Further study is 
needed before it is possible to conclude to what extent the flaws documented here affects the 
overall quality of the sector. But my hope is that by raising awareness of their occurrence, 
both emerging developments and trends that have been addressed by many before me, this 
thesis can contribute to give the concerned people (practitioners, policy makers and clients) 
incentive to keep working towards an improved sector. 
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Appendix 
 
1. A numerical example of how safer clients might get driven out of the formal credit 
market when banks are unable to discriminate between risky and safe borrowers. 
Armendáriz da Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 41-43, provides an example that illustrates 
why safer clients get driven out of the market when banks are unable to discriminate against 
more risky customers. They consider an economy that is populated by individuals who seek to 
maximize profits, and where the banks are just trying to break even. The lender‘s net cost of 
capital is 40 cent per dollar lent, and the investors need to borrow to carry out their project 
because they have no wealth of their own, they are unable to put up collateral and they are 
risk neutral. The potential borrowers are further heterogeneous and are either inherently ‗safe‘ 
or ‗risky‘. The bank does not know who is who, but it knows the fraction of safe types in the 
population.  
  A project requires $100 of investment and takes one month to complete, but if a 
prospective borrower chooses not to borrow, he can earn $45 a month working as a wage 
labourer. They make the assumption that safe borrowers succeed all of the time and earn gross 
revenues of $2 for each dollar borrowed. Their expected revenue is thus $200, of which the 
borrower has to repay the bank the value of the loan ($100) plus the net cost of capital ($40). 
In this case the safe borrowers will earn $15 more from the investment than they would have 
obtained working as a wage labourers. The riskier borrowers invest in riskier projects, so 
when they succeed they gain more than the safe borrowers ($222), but when their projects fail 
(which is 10 per cent of the time) they earn nothing. The expected gross revenue will thus be 
$200 (=0.90∙222) for the risky borrowers as well. 
 The bank‘s concern will be to set the interest rate at a level that will ensure that the 
bank can cover its capital costs and the probability of defaults. If half of the population is safe 
and the other half is risky, the average probability of success is 0.5∙0.90 (half of the 
population times its chance of succeeding) + 0.5∙1.00 (the other half times its chance of 
succeeding) = 0.95 (an average 95 per cent chance of success). To calculate the interest rate 
the bank takes the cost covering sum of $140 and divides it by the chance of a borrower to 
succeed with his project 95(%) and times the sum with 100 to find the percentage that a loan 
of $100 will have to cost the borrower (147.368% ≈ 147.4%). At the net interest rate of 47.4% 
both safe and risky clients will borrow as their net returns will be $52.6 and $67.4 
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respectively. The example reflects that borrowers neither repay interest or principal when they 
fail, and that the safe borrowers are cross-subsidising the risky. 
 This first scenario shows that a lender‘s poor information about the borrowers not 
necessarily creates inefficiency, but faced with more uncertainty it very well might. In the 
second scenario we keep everything the same, except making the risky borrowers more risky. 
Assume that they now only succeed 75 per cent of the time, but when they do well they will 
earn revenue of $267. Again the risky borrowers can expect gross revenue of $200 
(=0.75∙$267) if they borrow, but the lender now face higher risk and need to adjust his interest 
rates to compensate. The probability of success in the population is now just 0.875 = 87.5% 
(= 0.5∙0.75 + 0.5∙1.00).  This implies that the bank will have to raise its interest rate to at least 
60 per cent ((140/87.5)100 = 160). At an interest rate at 60 per cent the risky individuals will 
still borrow because $267 - $160 = $80 > $45, but the safe part of the population will turn to 
wage labour because $200 - $160 = $40 < $45.  Furthermore, once the safe clients leave the 
market, the cross-subsidisation cease, and the banks will be forced to set the interest rate even 
higher. 
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